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HERE DEFENDANT MADE A TIMELY REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF WHICH WAS DENIED WITHOUT ANY INQUIRY; DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over a dissenting opinion (three judges), reversing defendant’s convictions and ordering a new trial, determined that the judge’s failure to conduct an inquiry before denying defendant’s request to represent himself violated his constitutional right to self-representation: A defendant has a constitutional right to proceed […]

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THE PRESENTENCE INTERVIEW WAS CANCELLED DUE TO TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES; THEREFORE THE PRESENTENCE REPORT WAS DEVOID OF INFORMATION ABOUT DEFENDANT’S EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT, HEALTH STATUS, MENTAL HEALTH AND DEFENDANT’S MOTIVE; ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT WAS SENTENCED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PLEA AGREEMENT, THE DEFICIENT PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION AND REPORT REQUIRED VACATION OF THE SENTENCE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, vacating defendant’s negotiated sentence, determined the failure to interview the defendant before creating the presentence report  was tantamount to the failure to conduct the mandatory presentence investigation. The defendant did not take any action to avoid the presentence interview which was scheduled but cancelled due to technical difficulties: At sentencing, defense counsel […]

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MOTHER’S APPEALS FROM EXPIRED PERMANENCY HEARING ORDERS (RE: CHILDREN’S PLACEMENT IN FOSTER CARE) WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED AS MOOT, TWO COMPREHENSIVE DISSENTING OPINIONS (THREE DISSENTING JUDGES) (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Troutman, over two comprehensive dissenting opinions (three judges), determined the Appellate Division had properly dismissed mother’s appeals of expired permanency hearing orders (re: children’s placement in foster care) as moot, and properly declined to hear the appeals under an exception to the mootness doctrine: Generally, […]

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DEFENDANT IN THIS GRAND LARCENY CASE WAS DETAINED BY STORE SECURITY GUARDS; DEFENSE COUNSEL FIRST LEARNED THE IDENTITY OF ONE OF THE STORE’S SECURITY PERSONNEL ON THE EVE OF THE HEARING TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE SECURITY GUARDS WERE LICENSED TO EXERCISE POLICE POWERS OR WERE AGENTS OF THE POLICE; THEREFORE DEFENSE COUNSEL’S REQUEST FOR AN ADJOURNMENT TO SUBPOENA THE STORE’S EMPLOYMENT POLICIES AND OTHER EMPLOYMENT INFORMATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court and ordering a new “state action” hearing, determined defense counsel’s request for an adjournment to subpoena information about the store security guards’ employment should have been granted. The issue is whether the store security guards who detained the defendant in this grand larceny case were licensed to exercise police […]

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PURSUANT TO THE “INTERNAL AFFAIRS” DOCTRINE, PLAINTIFF, A NEW YORK CORPORATION AND BENEFICIAL OWNER OF SHARES IN BARCLAYS, AN ENGLISH CORPORATION, DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO BRING A DERIVATIVE SUIT ON BEHALF OF BARCLAYS AGAINST OFFICERS AND MANAGERS OF A NEW YORK AFFILIATE OF BARCLAYS IN NEW YORK (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannataro, over a comprehensive dissenting opinion, determined that the Business Corporation Law (BCL)  (sections 626(a) and 1319(a)(2)) has not displaced the “internal affairs” doctrine, a choice-of-law rule providing that the substantive law of the place of incorporation governs disputes about the rights and relationships of […]

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PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHEN A STEP BROKE AS HE STEPPED ON IT; THE LABOR LAW 200 AND NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE THERE WAS NO SIGN THE STEP WAS DEFECTIVE; HOWEVER, THE LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION, BASED ON AN INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISION REQUIRING THAT A STAIRCASE BE “FREE OF DEFECTS,” PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the Labor Law 200 and negligence causes of action based upon a step which broke when plaintiff stepped on it should have been dismissed, but the Labor Law 241(6) cause of action, based upon the same defective step, properly survived summary judgment: Defendants, owner and construction manager, […]

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GIVING THE CORRECT “PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE” JURY INSTRUCTION THREE TIMES WITHOUT ACKNOWLEDGING THE ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTION WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR; CROSS-EXAMINATION ABOUT A CIVIL SUIT AGAINST A POLICE OFFICER WHO ALLEGEDLY SHOT THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED; THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE HELD AN IN CAMERA REVIEW OF A POLICE OFFICER’S DISCIPLINARY RECORD (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing defendant’s convictions and ordering a new trial, determined: (1) although the judge accurately instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence three times, the judge failed to acknowledge the erroneous instruction, requiring reversal; (2) the judge should have allowed cross-examination of a police officer about a civil case in which the […]

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BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT CONSENT TO THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING THE PEOPLE’S DISCOVERY OBLIGATIONS, THE JUDGE WAS REQUIRED TO HOLD A HEARING; MATTER REMITTED; ON REMITTAL THE PEOPLE SHOULD PROVIDE WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE REQUEST TO DEFENSE COUNSEL AND, TO FACILITATE ANY REQUEST FOR AN EXPEDITED REVIEW, DEFENSE COUNSEL SHOULD BE PROVIDED WITH A COPY OF THE PROTECTIVE ORDER (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, vacating the protective order and remitting the matter, determined the County Court failed to hold the hearing which is required where defense counsel did not consent to the issuance of a protective order. The Third Department offered guidance on how the further proceedings should be conducted, i.e., defense counsel should be given […]

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THERE IS NO FEDERAL SEX-OFFENDER-REGISTRATION REGIME; THEREFORE A FEDERAL CHILD-PORNOGRAPHY CONVICTION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A “FELONY IN ANY OTHER JURISDICTION FOR WHICH THE OFFENDER IS REQUIRED TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE CORRECTION LAW; DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CLASSIFIED AS A “SEXUALLY VIOLENT OFFENDER” BASED UPON THE “FOREIGN-FELONY” PROVISION OF THE CORRECTION LAW (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, reversing (modifying) the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannataro, determined defendant should not have been classified as a sexually violent offender because his federal child pornography conviction did not require registration as a sex offender. The Correction Law defines a “sexually violent offender” to include a defendant who […]

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THE AFFIDAVIT SUBMITTED TO DEMONSTRATE PLAINTIFF HAD POSSESSION OF THE NOTE PRIOR TO COMMENCING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS HEARSAY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff did not demonstrate standing in this foreclosure action. The affidavit submitted to demonstrate plaintiff had possession of the note prior to commencing the action was hearsay: … [T]he plaintiff relied on Harris’s affidavit to demonstrate that it had possession of the note prior to commencing this action. […]

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