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Entries by Bruce Freeman

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SOCIAL SERVICES LAW ARTICLE 11 DOES NOT CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR THE INAPPROPRIATE USE OF PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Leventhal, determined the Social Services Law did not create a private right of action for the inappropriate use of physical restraints. The complaint alleged infant plaintiff, a person with special needs, was injured by the hospital defendants: [The] causes of action alleged assault, battery, false imprisonment, […]

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THE FAILURE TO RAISE THE LACK OF STANDING DEFENSE IN A FORECLOSURE ACTION CAN BE REMEDIED BY A MOTION TO AMEND THE ANSWER AND BY RAISING THE DEFENSE IN OPPOSITION TO A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a comprehensive opinion by Justice Miller, explained the relationship between the waiver provisions in  CPLR 3211 (e) and Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) 1302-a in foreclosure proceedings. The opinion includes a detailed discussion of when defenses are waived by the failure to include them in the answer and when and […]

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UNDER THE AGUILAR-SPINELLI ANALYSIS, THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE FOR PLAINTIFF’S ARREST; THE CITY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE 42 USC 1983, FALSE ARREST, ASSAULT AND BATTERY CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the city’s motion for summary judgment on the 42 USC 1983, false arrest, assault and battery causes of action should not have been granted. Under the Aguilar-Spinelli analysis, there were questions of fact about the existence of probable cause for plaintiff’s arrest: “The existence of probable cause constitutes a […]

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PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS REAR-END TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE DEFENDANT’S ALLEGATION PLAINTIFFS’ CAR STOPPED SUDDENLY DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s allegation plaintiffs’ vehicle came to a sudden stop did not raise a question of fact about defendant’s negligence in this rear-end collision case: … [T]he defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether there was a nonnegligent explanation for the happening of the […]

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NONPARTY BANK SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED POSSESSION OF A CAR SUBJECT TO CIVIL FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS. (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the nonparty banks should not have been awarded possession of cars subject to civil forfeiture proceedings brought by plaintiff: The plaintiff commenced this civil forfeiture action pursuant to chapter 420, article II of the Code of Suffolk County, seeking forfeiture of a vehicle owned by the defendant Mary […]

ALTHOUGH AN ORDER DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT HAD BEEN ISSUED, NO JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT WAS ENTERED; THEREFORE THE ACTION WAS STILL VIABLE AND PLAINTIFFS COULD MOVE TO EXTEND THE TIME TO SERVE; THE MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion to extend time to serve the defendants in the interest of justice should have been granted. Although defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction had been granted, no judgment dismissing the complaint had been entered. Therefore the action was still viable when […]

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THE SENTENCING JUDGE DID NOT INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES FOR NONCITIZENS; MATTER REMITTED TO GIVE THE DEFENDANT THE OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TO VACATE HER GUILTY PLEA, DESPITE THE FACT DEFENSE COUNSEL TOLD THE JUDGE THAT DEFENDANT SAID SHE WAS A CITIZEN (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department remitted the matter to allow defendant the opportunity to move to vacate her plea of guilty based upon the sentencing court’s failure to inform the defendant of the immigration consequences for noncitizens. Defense counsel had informed the court that defendant had informed him she was a citizen: … [D]efense counsel’s statement during […]

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CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON THIRD DEGREE IS NOT AN ARMED FELONY; MATTER REMITTED FOR A NEW YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS DETERMINATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant was eligible for youthful offender status because criminal possession of a weapon third degree is not an armed felony: The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s application for youthful offender status based upon its mistaken belief that he had been convicted of an armed felony, which required the court to find […]

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EVIDENCE OF A 1990 ROBBERY AND SEXUAL ASSAULT TO PROVE IDENTITY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED; THE SIMILARITIES WERE NOT STRONG ENOUGH (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s attempted rape conviction, determined the evidence of a 1990 robbery and sexual assault should not have been admitted as evidence of the identity of the perpetrator. But the burglary, robbery and sexual abuse convictions, apparently stemming from the same incident, were not disturbed: … [T]he similarities between the alleged 1990 robbery […]

THE DE BOUR STREET STOP REQUIREMENTS, NOT THE TRAFFIC STOP REQUIREMENTS, APPLY TO THE APPROACH OF A PERSON IN A STATIONARY CAR WITH THE ENGINE RUNNING (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department noted that a police officer (Meskill) approaching a person in a parked car is subject to the De Bour requirements for a street stop, not a traffic stop: With respect to the initial encounter, unlike a stop of a moving vehicle — which must be based upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity […]

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