You are here: / / NONPARTY BANK SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED POSSESSION OF A CAR SUBJECT...
, ,

NONPARTY BANK SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED POSSESSION OF A CAR SUBJECT TO CIVIL FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS. (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the nonparty banks should not have been awarded possession of cars subject to civil forfeiture proceedings brought by plaintiff:

The plaintiff commenced this civil forfeiture action pursuant to chapter 420, article II of the Code of Suffolk County, seeking forfeiture of a vehicle owned by the defendant Mary A. Nolie, and operated by an individual who was under the influence of an illegal substance. Thereafter, nonparty Santander Consumer USA, Inc. (hereinafter Santander), which held a lien on the vehicle, moved for summary judgment declaring that it was entitled to take possession of the vehicle, free and clear of any claims, and the plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment awarding civil forfeiture of the vehicle. … In a judgment … , the court directed that the vehicle be released to Santander, upon demand, free and clear of any claims. …

Contrary to Santander’s contention, it was not named in this action as a noncriminal defendant against whom the County sought to “recover” seized property … . Thus, the plaintiff was not required to establish that Santander “engaged in affirmative acts which aided, abetted or facilitated the conduct of [a] criminal defendant” in order to obtain forfeiture of the subject property … . Further, an innocent lienholder is not entitled to immediate possession of a vehicle which is the subject of a civil forfeiture action, but rather is merely entitled to “satisfy its lien from the proceeds of the property after the forfeiture ha[s] been adjudicated against the guilty party” and to seek any deficiency from the debtor … . Thus, Santander failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and the Supreme Court should have denied its motion for summary judgment declaring that it is entitled to take possession of the vehicle, free and clear of any claims. Brown v A 2014 Honda, Vin No. 5J6RM4H74EL039078, 2020 NY Slip Op 07024, Second Dept 11-25-20

Similar issues and result in Brown v A 2007 Chevrolet, Vin No. 1GNET13M372223303, 2020 NY Slip Op 07023, Second Dept 11-25-20

 

You might also like
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE AND A HEARING WERE NECESSARY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE SEPARATION AGREEMENT WAS INVALID, SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE AGREED TO BY PLAINTIFF WIFE WAS LESS THAN PLAINTIFF’S APARTMENT RENTAL (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE RAISED BRICK WAS A TRIVIAL DEFECT OR AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS DEFECT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED 2ND DEPT.
THE THREE-DAY FACT-FINDING HEARING RELATED TO THE NEGLECT PETITION RE: SERENA, NOT THE NEWLY-FILED DERIVATIVE NEGLECT PETITION RE: VINCENT; FAMILY COURT IMPROPERLY CONSOLIDATED THE TWO PETITIONS FOR THE DISPOSITIONAL HEARING DEPRIVING MOTHER OF DUE PROCESS (SECOND DEPT).
Observing a “Bulge” Did Not Justify Forcible Detention
IN REINSTATING THE ACTION AFTER VACATING THE ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS’, THE SECOND DEPARTMENT EXPLAINED WHAT SHOULD BE ALLEGED IN A COMPLAINT FOR LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT). ​
Hospital Employees, Working With a Non-Employee Attending Physician, Were Not Independently Negligent and Were Not Asked to Follow Orders Which Were Contrary to Normal Practice—Summary Judgment Dismissing Complaint Against Hospital Should Have Been Granted
Supreme Court Properly Imputed Income to Husband (Higher than that Reported by Husband) in Awarding Pendente Lite Maintenance and Child Support
DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNERS BORROWED A LIFT FROM DEFENDANT MIS, PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED USING THE LIFT, THE LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST MIS WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED AS INAPPLICABLE, BUT THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION AGAINST MIS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

ALTHOUGH AN ORDER DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT HAD BEEN ISSUED, NO JUDGMENT DISMISSING... PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS REAR-END TRAFFIC ACCIDENT...