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A TIMELY BUT DEFECTIVE ATTEMPT TO COMMENCE AN ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING IS A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT WHICH CANNOT BE CURED BY A SECOND ATTEMPT AFTER THE FOUR-MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS RUN (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the petitioner’s Article 78 action should have been dismissed because it was not properly commenced within four months. An attempt to commence the action was timely made, but the petition was returned:

An article 78 proceeding must be commenced within four months of the final determination under review (see CPLR 217[1]). Such a proceeding is commenced when the clerk of the court receives the petition in valid form … . Although petitioners attempted to file the petition in Queens County within four months, they did not do so in a manner which was then authorized (see CPLR 304[b]; 22 NYCRR 202.5-b[a], 202.5-bb[a]). The petition was returned to petitioners, who filed it after the four-month period had passed. The petition was untimely, and the court had no discretion to extend the statute of limitations … . Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the deficiency in their initial filings is not subject to correction pursuant to CPLR 2001 so as to render the proceeding timely, as the failure to file the papers required to commence a proceeding constitutes a nonwaivable, jurisdictional defect … . Matter of Heffernan v New York City Mayor’s Off. of Hous. Recovery Operations, 2021 NY Slip Op 04276, First Dept 7-8-21

 

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