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ARGUMENT THAT THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR FOR THE JUSTICE CENTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE WITH SPECIAL NEEDS DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO PROSECUTE DEFENDANT WAS NOT RAISED BELOW AND COULD NOT BE DECIDED WITHOUT ADDITIONAL FACTS DEVELOPED ON REMITTAL, THE RECORD ON APPEAL THEREFORE WILL NOT ALLOW REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, over a dissent, determined it could not reach a constitutional issue, regarding whether the authority to prosecute the defendant had been properly delegated to the Special Prosecutor for the Justice Center for the Protection of People with Special Needs, because it was not raised below. The dissent argued the court could exercise its interest of justice jurisdiction and send the case back for a factual determination of the issue (delegation of authority to prosecute):

Defendant first argues that the statute authorizing creation of the Justice Center (see Executive Law § 552 [2]) violates the State Constitution because the statute permits an appointed special prosecutor to conduct prosecutions, thereby usurping the constitutional responsibilities and power of the local District Attorney and the Attorney General, both of whom are elected officials. In the alternative, defendant argues that the statute can be viewed as constitutional only if the District Attorney grants the special prosecutor authority to prosecute and retains oversight and ultimate responsibility for the prosecution, but that these conditions were not met in this case. Thus, defendant argues, the indictment must be dismissed because the Justice Center lacked the authority to prosecute him. * * *

This Court is permitted only to reverse or modify in the interest of justice … . But a full review of the issue would be impossible without remittal, so, at this point, we do not now know if we would ultimately reverse, modify or affirm. Because we do not know what the outcome would be, and since it is possible that the outcome could be to affirm, we find no authority that would permit us to take corrective action with respect to this issue in the interest of justice. People v Cubero, 2018 NY Slip Op 02839, Third Dept 4-26-18

​CRIMINAL LAW (APPEALS, ARGUMENT THAT THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR FOR THE JUSTICE CENTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE WITH SPECIAL NEEDS DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO PROSECUTE DEFENDANT WAS NOT RAISED BELOW AND COULD NOT BE DECIDED WITHOUT ADDITIONAL FACTS DEVELOPED ON REMITTAL, THE RECORD ON APPEAL THEREFORE WILL NOT ALLOW REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (THIRD DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, INTEREST OF JUSTICE, ARGUMENT THAT THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR FOR THE JUSTICE CENTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE WITH SPECIAL NEEDS DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO PROSECUTE DEFENDANT WAS NOT RAISED BELOW AND COULD NOT BE DECIDED WITHOUT ADDITIONAL FACTS DEVELOPED ON REMITTAL, THE RECORD ON APPEAL THEREFORE WILL NOT ALLOW REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (THIRD DEPT))/INTEREST OF JUSTICE JURISDICTION (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS, ARGUMENT THAT THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR FOR THE JUSTICE CENTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE WITH SPECIAL NEEDS DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO PROSECUTE DEFENDANT WAS NOT RAISED BELOW AND COULD NOT BE DECIDED WITHOUT ADDITIONAL FACTS DEVELOPED ON REMITTAL, THE RECORD ON APPEAL THEREFORE WILL NOT ALLOW REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (THIRD DEPT))/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (CRIMINAL LAW, AUTHORITY TO PROSECUTE, ARGUMENT THAT THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR FOR THE JUSTICE CENTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE WITH SPECIAL NEEDS DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO PROSECUTE DEFENDANT WAS NOT RAISED BELOW AND COULD NOT BE DECIDED WITHOUT ADDITIONAL FACTS DEVELOPED ON REMITTAL, THE RECORD ON APPEAL THEREFORE WILL NOT ALLOW REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (THIRD DEPT))

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DEFENSE COUNSEL TOOK A POSITION ADVERSE TO HER CLIENT’S RE THE CLIENT’S PRO SE MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA, MATTER REMITTED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS ON THE MOTION WITH NEW COUNSEL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined defense counsel took a position adverse to her client’s on the client’s pro se written motion to withdraw his plea. Therefore the matter was remitted for further proceedings on the motion with new counsel:

Before sentencing, defendant made a written pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that his plea was involuntary because he “was not fully aware of the circumstances involved,” and that he had a meritorious defense. In a companion motion, he cited specific inconsistencies in the victim’s statements. Defendant did not claim there were any deficiencies in defense counsel’s performance. However, when asked by the court whether she had anything to say “on behalf of the motion,” counsel replied, “I don’t think that there . . . is a basis for it,” and that defendant had not wanted to proceed to trial.

This constituted taking a position adverse to defendant’s, and thus warranted assignment of new counsel… . To the extent that, after the court denied the motion, counsel made additional comments that appeared to bear on her advice to defendant about taking the plea, these were unnecessary because, in his plea withdrawal motion, defendant never complained about his attorney’s conduct. Thus, counsel’s comments were adverse to her client’s position, and “went beyond a mere explanation of h[er] performance” … . People v Colson, 2018 NY Slip Op 02885, First Dept 4-26-18

​CRIMINAL LAW (ATTORNEYS, DEFENSE COUNSEL TOOK A POSITION ADVERSE TO HER CLIENT’S RE THE CLIENT’S PRO SE MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA, MATTER REMITTED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS ON THE MOTION WITH NEW COUNSEL (FIRST DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENSE COUNSEL TOOK A POSITION ADVERSE TO HER CLIENT’S RE THE CLIENT’S PRO SE MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA, MATTER REMITTED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS ON THE MOTION WITH NEW COUNSEL (FIRST DEPT))/PLEA, MOTION TO WITHDRAW  (ATTORNEYS, DEFENSE COUNSEL TOOK A POSITION ADVERSE TO HER CLIENT’S RE THE CLIENT’S PRO SE MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA, MATTER REMITTED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS ON THE MOTION WITH NEW COUNSEL (FIRST DEPT))/PRO SE (CRIMINAL LAW, ATTORNEYS, PRO SE MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA, DEFENSE COUNSEL TOOK A POSITION ADVERSE TO HER CLIENT’S RE THE CLIENT’S PRO SE MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA, MATTER REMITTED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS ON THE MOTION WITH NEW COUNSEL (FIRST DEPT))

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ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT DIRECTORS ON THE BOARD OF GEROVA DID NOT RESIDE OR DO BUSINESS IN NEW YORK, OTHER GEROVA DEFENDANTS PARTICIPATED IN THE FRAUDULENT SCHEME IN NEW YORK, THEREBY PROVIDING A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR LONG-ARM JURISDICTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a memorandum decision that does not lay out the facts, determined that, although the defendant directors on the board of Gerova did not reside or do business in New York, other Gerova defendants participated in the fraudulent scheme in New York thereby providing a sufficient basis for long-arm jurisdiction (the decision doesn’t indicate what “Gerova” is):

The Supreme Court properly concluded that defendants are subject to jurisdiction under New York’s long-arm statute because they were part of a conspiracy that involved the commission of tortious acts in New York (CPLR 302[a][2]…). Defendants were directors on Gerova’s board during most of the time when Gerova was involved in a fraudulent scheme. The amended complaint details the conspiracy to commit fraud using Gerova, the agreements … to loot Wimbledon (plaintiff), and Wimbledon’s resulting insolvency … . Although defendants did not reside or do business in New York, other Gerova defendants were in New York or interacted regularly with New York, including one of the masterminds of the fraudulent scheme … . Regarding their overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, defendants’ approval of a Gerova proxy statement on which they are listed and which seeks approval of the sham acquisition of a reinsurance company, their receipt of “hush money” to ignore certain red flags at Gerova, and their failure to correct misrepresentations or disclose material information to the public sufficed at this stage. Although defendants did not mastermind the conspiracy, their receipt of “hush money” allows the reasonable inference that they exerted “control” to the extent that the fraud could not have been accomplished without their acquiescence to the proxy and other misconduct … . Wimbledon Fin. Master Fund, Ltd. v Weston Capital Mgt. LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 02903, First Dept 4-26-18

​CIVIL PROCEDURE (ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT DIRECTORS ON THE BOARD OF GEROVA DID NOT RESIDE OR DO BUSINESS IN NEW YORK, OTHER GEROVA DEFENDANTS PARTICIPATED IN THE FRAUDULENT SCHEME IN NEW YORK, THEREBY PROVIDING A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR LONG-ARM JURISDICTION (FIRST DEPT))/LONG-ARM JURISDICTION  (ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT DIRECTORS ON THE BOARD OF GEROVA DID NOT RESIDE OR DO BUSINESS IN NEW YORK, OTHER GEROVA DEFENDANTS PARTICIPATED IN THE FRAUDULENT SCHEME IN NEW YORK, THEREBY PROVIDING A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR LONG-ARM JURISDICTION (FIRST DEPT))/FRAUD (CIVIL PROCEDURE, JURISDICTION, CONSPIRACY ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT DIRECTORS ON THE BOARD OF GEROVA DID NOT RESIDE OR DO BUSINESS IN NEW YORK, OTHER GEROVA DEFENDANTS PARTICIPATED IN THE FRAUDULENT SCHEME IN NEW YORK, THEREBY PROVIDING A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR LONG-ARM JURISDICTION (FIRST DEPT))/CONSPIRACY (CIVIL PROCEDURE, LONG-ARM JURISDICTION, FRAUDULENT SCHEME, ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT DIRECTORS ON THE BOARD OF GEROVA DID NOT RESIDE OR DO BUSINESS IN NEW YORK, OTHER GEROVA DEFENDANTS PARTICIPATED IN THE FRAUDULENT SCHEME IN NEW YORK, THEREBY PROVIDING A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR LONG-ARM JURISDICTION (FIRST DEPT))

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PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO RECOVER FROM DEFENDANT THE COST OF ALTERNATE SERVICE BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT RETURN THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT (CPLR 312-a) UPON BEING SERVED BY MAIL (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to the costs of serving the defendant by alternate means after defendant failed to return the acknowledgment of receipt (of service by mail) was not returned within 30 days:

Plaintiff commenced this negligence action by serving defendants by mail pursuant to CPLR 312-a (a) and thereafter utilized “an alternative method” of service of process when “the acknowledgment of receipt” was not returned by defendants or the other persons set forth in CPLR 312-a (b) within the requisite 30-day period. Plaintiff moved for, inter alia, an immediate judgment in the amount of $110.53, i.e., the amount expended by plaintiff in serving defendants by the alternative method of service of process … . … Supreme Court erred in denying that part of plaintiff’s motion… . Here, plaintiff submitted prima facie evidence that his attorney mailed the requisite documents to defendants pursuant to CPLR 312-a (a), and defendants failed to raise an issue of fact with respect to that service. McGriff v Mallory, 2018 NY Slip Op 03003, Third Dept 4-26-18

​CIVIL PROCEDURE (COST OF ALTERNATE SERVICE, PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO RECOVER FROM DEFENDANT THE COST OF ALTERNATE SERVICE BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT RETURN THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT (CPLR 312-a) UPON BEING SERVED BY MAIL (FOURTH DEPT))/CPLR 312-a  (COST OF ALTERNATE SERVICE, PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO RECOVER FROM DEFENDANT THE COST OF ALTERNATE SERVICE BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT RETURN THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT (CPLR 312-a) UPON BEING SERVED BY MAIL (FOURTH DEPT))/ALTERNATIVE SERVICE, COST OF (CIVIL PROCEDURE, PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO RECOVER FROM DEFENDANT THE COST OF ALTERNATE SERVICE BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT RETURN THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT (CPLR 312-a) UPON BEING SERVED BY MAIL (FOURTH DEPT))

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PARTIES HAD CONSENTED TO PROCEDURES WHICH DEVIATED FROM THE CPLR, SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS, ALTHOUGH UNTIMELY UNDER THE CPLR, SHOULD HAVE BEEN DEEMED TIMELY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, noted that the parties, through stipulations, had consented to procedures which deviated from the CPLR. Therefore the summary judgment motions, although untimely under the CPLR, should have been deemed timely:

Prior court orders and stipulations between the parties show that the parties, with the court’s consent, charted a procedural course that deviated from the path established by the CPLR and allowed for defendants’ filing of this round of summary judgment motions more than 120 days after the filing of the note of issue … . Thus, the motions were timely, and we remand the matter to the motion court for a full consideration of their merits … . Reeps v BMW of N. Am., LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 02907, First Dept 4-26-18

​CIVIL PROCEDURE (PARTIES HAD CONSENTED TO PROCEDURES WHICH DEVIATED FROM THE CPLR, SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS, ALTHOUGH UNTIMELY UNDER THE CPLR, SHOULD HAVE BEEN DEEMED TIMELY (FIRST DEPT))/STIPULATIONS (CIVIL PROCEDURE, PARTIES HAD CONSENTED TO PROCEDURES WHICH DEVIATED FROM THE CPLR, SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS, ALTHOUGH UNTIMELY UNDER THE CPLR, SHOULD HAVE BEEN DEEMED TIMELY (FIRST DEPT))

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THE 20% VACANCY INCREASE SHOULD BE INCLUDED WHEN CALCULATING THE LEGAL REGULATED RENT TO DETERMINE WHETHER AN APARTMENT HAS REACHED THE $2000 THRESHOLD IN THE RENT STABILIZATION LAW (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, reversing the Appellate Division, determined “the 20% vacancy increase should be included when calculating the legal regulated rent for purposes of determining whether the subject apartment has reached the $2,000 deregulation threshold in the Rent Stabilization Law:”

In November 2003, plaintiff Richard Altman entered into a sublease with Keno Rider, who had been the tenant of the subject apartment since 1993. Rider had a rent-stabilized lease with the prior landlord at a legal regulated rent of $1,829.49 per month. In December 2004, the prior landlord commenced a nonpayment proceeding against Altman and Rider. In March 2005, Altman and the prior landlord entered into a stipulation of settlement, under which the parties agreed that Rider would surrender all rights to the apartment and the landlord would deliver a new lease to Altman. Along with the new lease, Altman executed a ‘Deregulation Rider for First Unregulated Tenant.’ The Deregulation Rider stated that the apartment was not rent-stabilized ‘because the legal rent was or became $2000 or more on vacancy” after the statutory vacancy increase was added to the last regulated rent. In August 2005, the landlord removed the apartment from registration with the Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR), based on “high rent vacancy.’ * * *

… [T]he 20% increase should have been considered in determining the legal regulated rent at the time of the vacancy and, as a result, the subject apartment was properly deregulated in 2005. Altman’s remaining arguments relating to this issue are without merit. Altman v 285 W. Fourth LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 02829. CtApp 4-26-18

​LANDLORD-TENANT (THE 20% VACANCY INCREASE SHOULD BE INCLUDED WHEN CALCULATING THE LEGAL REGULATED RENT TO DETERMINE WHETHER AN APARTMENT HAS REACHED THE $2000 THRESHOLD IN THE RENT STABILIZATION LAW (CT APP))/RENT STABILIZATION LAW (THE 20% VACANCY INCREASE SHOULD BE INCLUDED WHEN CALCULATING THE LEGAL REGULATED RENT TO DETERMINE WHETHER AN APARTMENT HAS REACHED THE $2000 THRESHOLD IN THE RENT STABILIZATION LAW (CT APP))/VACANCY INCREASE (LANDLORD-TENANT, RENT STABILIZATION LAW, THE 20% VACANCY INCREASE SHOULD BE INCLUDED WHEN CALCULATING THE LEGAL REGULATED RENT TO DETERMINE WHETHER AN APARTMENT HAS REACHED THE $2000 THRESHOLD IN THE RENT STABILIZATION LAW (CT APP))

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ALLEGATIONS OF SEX OFFENSES OF WHICH DEFENDANT WAS ACQUITTED AT TRIAL PROPERLY USED IN THE SORA RISK ASSESSMENT CALCULATION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, over an extensive dissenting opinion by Judge Rivera, affirmed the SORA court’s use of allegations of sex offenses of which defendant was acquitted at trial in its risk assessment calculation:

The record supports the affirmed finding that defendant engaged in sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, or aggravated sexual abuse, warranting the imposition of 25 points under risk factor 2 in determining defendant’s risk level under the Sex Offender Registration Act. Contrary to defendant’s argument, his acquittal of charges at his criminal trial relating to such conduct, does not foreclose the hearing court from finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that he engaged in such acts … .

From the dissent:

As this Court has recognized, the clear and convincing evidence standard is an exacting one … . “[T]he registration duties that SORA imposes are a nontrivial restriction on the individual’s liberty, and there is a material difference between having to register for ten years and having to register for life”… . In a case such as this, where the jury clearly had grave doubts about [the complainant’s] narrative, the courts below erred in concluding that her testimony was clear and convincing evidence of defendant having committed the sexual conduct necessary for an assessment of 25 points under risk factor two. People v Britton, 2018 NY Slip Op 02830, Ct App, 4-26-18

​CRIMINAL LAW (SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA), ALLEGATIONS OF SEX OFFENSES OF WHICH DEFENDANT WAS ACQUITTED AT TRIAL PROPERLY USED IN THE SORA RISK ASSESSMENT CALCULATION (CT APP))/SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA) (ALLEGATIONS OF SEX OFFENSES OF WHICH DEFENDANT WAS ACQUITTED AT TRIAL PROPERLY USED IN THE SORA RISK ASSESSMENT CALCULATION (CT APP))/ACQUITTAL (SEX OFFENSES, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA), ALLEGATIONS OF SEX OFFENSES OF WHICH DEFENDANT WAS ACQUITTED AT TRIAL PROPERLY USED IN THE SORA RISK ASSESSMENT CALCULATION (CT APP))

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A GENERIC NEW YORK CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION IN A CONTRACT DOES NOT TRANSFORM ALL NEW YORK STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS INTO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS, HERE THE CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT CONTRACT DID NOT MENTION BOND REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE LIEN LAW AND THE CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION COULD NOT BE USED TO READ THE LIEN LAW REQUIREMENT INTO THE CONTRACT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division, determined that the clause of a contract indicating construction of the contract was governed by New York law did not incorporate a specific statutory requirement, here a requirement of the Lien Law:

Plaintiff’s complaint does not identify which, if any, provision or provisions of the [CM agreement] were purportedly breached. Unlike the Development and Lease Agreements — to which plaintiff is not a party — the CM Agreement contains no express provision requiring compliance with the Lien Law. Plaintiff nevertheless maintains that section 5 of the Lien Law should be “read into” the CM Agreement because the contract is governed by New York law. Specifically, plaintiff points to section 17.3 of the CM Agreement, which provides that “[t]he construction, validity and performance of [the CM Agreement] shall be exclusively governed by the laws of the State of New York, excluding any provisions or principles thereof which would require the application of the laws of a different jurisdiction.” However, this is a typical choice-of-law provision that we do not read as imposing a contractual obligation here. The mere fact that an agreement, and disputes arising thereunder, are governed by the law of a particular jurisdiction does not transform all statutory requirements that may otherwise be imposed under that body of law into contractual obligations, and we decline to interpret the CM Agreement as “impliedly stating something which [the parties] have neglected to specifically include” … . Skanska USA Bldg. Inc. v Atlantic Yards B2 Owner, LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 02828, CtApp 4-26-18

​CONTRACT LAW (A GENERIC NEW YORK CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION IN A CONTRACT DOES NOT TRANSFORM ALL NEW YORK STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS INTO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS, HERE THE CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT CONTRACT DID NOT MENTION BOND REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE LIEN LAW AND THE CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION COULD NOT BE USED TO READ THE LIEN LAW REQUIREMENT INTO THE CONTRACT (CT APP))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (CONTRACT LAW, CHOICE OF LAW, A GENERIC NEW YORK CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION IN A CONTRACT DOES NOT TRANSFORM ALL NEW YORK STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS INTO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS, HERE THE CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT CONTRACT DID NOT MENTION BOND REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE LIEN LAW AND THE CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION COULD NOT BE USED TO READ THE LIEN LAW REQUIREMENT INTO THE CONTRACT (CT APP))/CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS (A GENERIC NEW YORK CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION IN A CONTRACT DOES NOT TRANSFORM ALL NEW YORK STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS INTO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS, HERE THE CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT CONTRACT DID NOT MENTION BOND REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE LIEN LAW AND THE CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION COULD NOT BE USED TO READ THE LIEN LAW REQUIREMENT INTO THE CONTRACT (CT APP))/LIEN LAW (CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS, ERE THE CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT CONTRACT DID NOT MENTION BOND REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE LIEN LAW AND THE CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION COULD NOT BE USED TO READ THE LIEN LAW REQUIREMENT INTO THE CONTRACT (CT APP))

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DEFENDANT WAS THE ALTER EGO OF PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER, THEREFORE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION WAS THE ONLY REMEDY FOR THE PLAINTIFF WHO WAS INJURED ON THE JOB (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined that the defendant was the alter ego of plaintiff’s employer and therefore plaintiff’s only remedy for the on the job injury was under the Workers’ Compensation Law:

Generally, employees injured in the course of their employment may recover against their employers only under the Workers’ Compensation Law … . Workers’ Compensation Law § 29(6) expressly provides that “[t]he right to compensation or benefits under this chapter, shall be the exclusive remedy to an employee” … . The exclusive remedy provisions also bar employees from seeking damages from “alter egos” of their employers … .. The alter ego rule applies when one of the entities in question controls the other or when the two entities operate as a single integrated entity … . A mere showing that the entities are related—by, for example, sharing officers or ownership—is insufficient… .

Here, the defendant established, prima facie, that it was an alter ego of the plaintiff’s employer by submitting evidence that, among other things, in addition to owning the premises, it was the sole owner and manager of the limited liability company that was the plaintiff’s employer, that the plaintiff’s employer was formed to provide bus drivers for the defendant’s pupil transportation business, and that the two entities shared the same Workers’ Compensation insurance policy … . Clarke v First Student, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 02766, Second Dept 4-25-18

​WORKER’S COMPENSATION LAW (DEFENDANT WAS THE ALTER EGO OF PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER,THEREFORE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION WAS THE ONLY REMEDY FOR THE PLAINTIFF WHO WAS INJURED ON THE JOB (SECOND DEPT))/CORPORATION LAW (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, ALTER EGO, DEFENDANT WAS THE ALTER EGO OF PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER,THEREFORE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION WAS THE ONLY REMEDY FOR THE PLAINTIFF WHO WAS INJURED ON THE JOB (SECOND DEPT))/ALTER EGO  (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, DEFENDANT WAS THE ALTER EGO OF PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER,THEREFORE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION WAS THE ONLY REMEDY FOR THE PLAINTIFF WHO WAS INJURED ON THE JOB (SECOND DEPT))

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PLAINTIFF RECORDED HER DEED AND MORTGAGE PRIOR TO THE RECORDING OF A MORTGAGE BY DEFENDANT BANK, DEFENDANT BANK WAS NOT A GOOD FAITH PURCHASER IN THAT IT IS DEEMED TO HAVE PRIOR NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF’S INTERESTS, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff (Heidi) had recorded her deed and mortgage before defendant bank (M & T) recorded its mortgage (to secure a loan to a co-tenant). Therefore defendant bank had notice of plaintiff’s prior interests:

“The New York Recording Act … , inter alia, protects a good faith purchaser for value from an unrecorded interest in a property, provided such a purchaser’s interest is first to be duly recorded … . The status of good faith purchaser for value cannot be maintained by a purchaser with either notice or knowledge of a prior interest or equity in the property, or one with knowledge of facts that would lead a reasonably prudent purchaser to make inquiries concerning such”… . “The recording of a transaction involving real property provides potential subsequent purchasers [and encumbrancers] with notice of previous conveyances and encumbrances that might affect their interests. If the [encumbrancer] fails to use due diligence in examining the title, he or she is chargeable, as a matter of law, with notice of the facts which a proper inquiry would have disclosed” … . The encumbrancer “must be presumed to have investigated the title, and to have examined every deed or instrument properly recorded, and to have known every fact disclosed or to which an inquiry suggested by the record would have led” … .

Here, the Supreme Court erred in failing to award Heidi … proceeds from the sale of the property, the entire principal of her mortgage, plus interest, and reasonable collection costs, including an attorney’s fee and disbursements incurred in collecting the indebtedness secured by the mortgage. Heidi demonstrated that her mortgage and the … deed were duly recorded prior to M & T’s mortgage. Therefore, Heidi established that M & T is chargeable with notice of these prior interests. Gregg v M&T Bank Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 02774, Second Dept 4-25-18

​REAL PROPERTY LAW (GOOD FAITH PURCHASER, PLAINTIFF RECORDED HER DEED AND MORTGAGE PRIOR TO THE RECORDING OF A MORTGAGE BY DEFENDANT BANK, DEFENDANT BANK WAS NOT A GOOD FAITH PURCHASER IN THAT IT IS DEEMED TO HAVE PRIOR NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF’S INTERESTS, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/MORTGAGES (REAL PROPERTY LAW, GOOD FAITH PURCHASER, PLAINTIFF RECORDED HER DEED AND MORTGAGE PRIOR TO THE RECORDING OF A MORTGAGE BY DEFENDANT BANK, DEFENDANT BANK WAS NOT A GOOD FAITH PURCHASER IN THAT IT IS DEEMED TO HAVE PRIOR NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF’S INTERESTS, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/DEEDS  (REAL PROPERTY LAW, GOOD FAITH PURCHASER, PLAINTIFF RECORDED HER DEED AND MORTGAGE PRIOR TO THE RECORDING OF A MORTGAGE BY DEFENDANT BANK, DEFENDANT BANK WAS NOT A GOOD FAITH PURCHASER IN THAT IT IS DEEMED TO HAVE PRIOR NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF’S INTERESTS, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/GOOD FAITH PURCHASER  (REAL PROPERTY LAW, PLAINTIFF RECORDED HER DEED AND MORTGAGE PRIOR TO THE RECORDING OF A MORTGAGE BY DEFENDANT BANK, DEFENDANT BANK WAS NOT A GOOD FAITH PURCHASER IN THAT IT IS DEEMED TO HAVE PRIOR NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF’S INTERESTS, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/RECORDING (DEEDS AND MORTGAGES, GOOD FAITH PURCHASER, REAL PROPERTY LAW, PLAINTIFF RECORDED HER DEED AND MORTGAGE PRIOR TO THE RECORDING OF A MORTGAGE BY DEFENDANT BANK, DEFENDANT BANK WAS NOT A GOOD FAITH PURCHASER IN THAT IT IS DEEMED TO HAVE PRIOR NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF’S INTERESTS, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))

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