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PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHEN HE ATTEMPTED TO AVOID A FALL FROM A SCAFFOLD WHEN THE PLANK HE WAS STANDING ON SHIFTED; PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff was injured when he attempted to avoid a fall from a scaffold when a plank he was standing on shifted:

… [T]he plaintiff made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability on so much of the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) through the submission of the plaintiff’s affidavit and a copy of the transcript of his deposition testimony “which demonstrated that the scaffold failed to afford him proper protection for the work being performed, and that this failure was a proximate cause of his injuries” … . In opposition, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact. “They did not offer any evidence, other than mere speculation, to refute the plaintiff[‘s] showing or to raise a bona fide issue as to how the accident occurred” … . The defendants’ contention that the alleged injuries were only tangentially related to the effects of gravity and/or an elevation-related risk is without merit … .  Wilson v Bergon Constr. Corp., 2023 NY Slip Op 04616, Second Dept 9-13-23

Practice Point: Apparently the plaintiff was injured when he attempted to avoid a fall from a scaffold. It is not clear whether plaintiff actually fell. Even so, he was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of the action.

 

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A PROPERTY OWNER DOES NOT HAVE A DUTY TO INSTALL A NON-SLIP FLOOR OR A GRAB BAR IN A SHOWER STALL; THEREFORE THE NEGLIGENCE AND NUMEROUS OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this slip and fall case, determined that the facts alleged, a shower-stall floor that was slippery when wet, and the absence of a grab bar in the shower, did not state a cause of action for negligence because the allegations did not describe a duty owed to plaintiff:

… [T]he complaint alleged as defects that the shower floor was slippery and there were no grab bars in the shower stall where Royanne Weiss alleged she slipped and fell. However, there is no common-law or statutory requirement imposing a duty upon the defendants to provide nonslip surfacing or grab bars in a shower or shower stall … . Nor is there a duty to install such devices where the shower and shower stall were not alleged to be defective or hazardous for ordinary use . Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted dismissal of the cause of action alleging common-law negligence pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7). Weiss v Vacca, 2023 NY Slip Op 04613, Second Dept 9-13-23

Practice Point: The property owner did not have a duty to provide a non-slip floor or a grab bar in the shower stall which was not alleged to be defective or hazardous for ordinary use.

 

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WHATEVER TIME REMAINS ON THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WHEN THE COVID TOLL BEGAN IS ALL THAT IS LEFT WHEN TO TOLL IS LIFTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that, although the statute of limitations in this personal injury action was subject to the COVID toll, the three-year statute just picked up at the end of the toll where it left off at the beginning of the toll. Therefore plaintiff was not entitled to simply add on the length of the toll (228 days) when the toll was lifted. Plaintiff only had 152 days left when the toll was lifted:

… [D]ue to the tolling provision of the executive orders, the statute of limitations within which the plaintiff was required to file the instant action was tolled between March 20, 2020, and November 3, 2020, a period of 228 days … . However, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, she did not have an additional 228 days, the length of the tolling period, after the toll’s expiration to commence the action. Instead, the remaining 152 days left on her three-year statute of limitations started to run after the toll was lifted on November 4, 2020 … . Since this action was commenced on April 19, 2021, the plaintiff did not timely commence the action within t…he statute of limitations that expired on April 4, 2021…. . Ruiz v Sanchez, 2023 NY Slip Op 04608, Second Dept 9-13-23

Practice Point: Whatever time remains on the applicable statute of limitations when the COVID toll began is all that is left when the COVID toll is lifted.

 

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CONFLICTING EVIDENCE ABOUT WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS MADE AWARE OF THE DANGEROUS CONDITION PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the Department of Education (DOE) did not demonstrate a lack of constructive knowledge of the condition of a cart used by plaintiff teacher to move materials out of a classroom. The cart stopped suddenly and the plaintiff’s foot was injured. There was conflicting evidence about whether plaintiff and others had made the DOE aware of the defective condition of the cart:

… [T]he defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that the DOE did not have constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous condition of the cart that caused the plaintiff’s injuries. In support of their motion, the defendants submitted, among other things, a transcript of the plaintiff’s deposition testimony. At her deposition, the plaintiff testified that in September 2015, approximately five months before she was injured, she complained about the condition of the cart to the school principal. The plaintiff further testified that in January 2016, approximately one month before the accident, her supervisor, an assistant principal at the school, observed the plaintiff “struggling” to use the cart, which “wasn’t working properly.” According to the plaintiff, her supervisor advised that she would speak with the principal about the issue. The DOE also submitted a transcript of the deposition testimony of the plaintiff’s supervisor, who testified that prior to the accident, she did not recall the plaintiff making any complaints specifically about the condition of the cart. This conflicting testimony raised triable issues of fact as to credibility and whether the DOE had constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous condition of the cart … . Rossi v City of New York, 2023 NY Slip Op 04607, Second Dept 9-13-23

Practice Point: Plaintiff, a teacher, alleged she was injured when a cart used to move materials stopped suddenly. There was conflicting evidence whether defendant had been made aware of the defective condition of the cart. Therefore defendant was not entitled to summary judgment.

 

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​DEFENDANTS IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE WERE ENTITLED TO DISCOVERY OF GEOGRAPHICAL DATA (SPEED, LOCATION) RECORDED ON PLAINTIFF’S CELL PHONE DURING A THREE-HOUR PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, modifying Supreme Court in this traffic accident case, determined the defendants’ motion to inspect and collect geographical data recorded on plaintiff’s cell phone leading up to the time of the accident was properly granted but should have been limited to a specific time (1 to 4 pm):

… [T]he defendants’ motion papers sufficiently demonstrated that the production of the plaintiff’s cell phone for the inspection and collection of geographical data recorded on the device on the date of the accident may result in the disclosure of relevant evidence and was reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of information bearing on the plaintiff’s claim … . The affidavit of the defendants’ forensic expert demonstrated, among other things, that the plaintiff’s cell phone would have recorded data regarding the plaintiff’s speed and location before and at the time of the accident, which, under the particular circumstances presented, was relevant to the plaintiff’s contention that the defendant driver was negligent in the operation of his vehicle … .

The Supreme Court, however, improvidently exercised its discretion in failing to limit the defendants’ inspection and collection of geographical data recorded on the plaintiff’s cell phone on the date of the accident. Under the circumstances, the defendants’ inspection and collection of geographical data from the plaintiff’s cell phone shall be limited to such data recorded between 1:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. on the date of the accident … .  Pulgarin v Richmond, 2023 NY Slip Op 04605, Second Dept 9-13-23

Practice Point: Apparently a cell phone in a car records speed and location data which is discoverable in a traffic accident case.

 

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IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO DENY FATHER’S MOTION TO VACATE HIS DEFAULT IN THIS CUSTODY CASE; THE USUAL RULES FOR VACATION OF A DEFAULT ARE RELAXED IN CHILD CUSTODY MATTERS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined it was an abuse of discretion to deny father’s motion to vacate his default in this custody proceeding. The Second Department noted that the strict rules surrounding vacation of a default are relaxed in custody matters:

Although the determination of whether to relieve a party of an order entered upon his or her default is a matter left to the sound discretion of the Family Court … , “the law favors resolution on the merits in child custody proceedings” … . Thus, the “general rule with respect to opening defaults in civil actions is not to be rigorously applied to cases involving child custody” … .

Under the circumstances presented here, including the brief period between the father’s default and his motion to vacate his default, and in light of the policy favoring resolutions on the merits in child custody proceedings, the Family Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the father’s motion to vacate the order of custody and parental access … entered upon his failure to appear … . Matter of Orobona v Cunningham, 2023 NY Slip Op 04594, Second Dept 9-13-23

Practice Point: Because resolution on the merits is the policy favored in child custody matters, the usual rules surrounding vacation of a default are relaxed.

 

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PLAINTIFF WAS HIRED BY THE CITY TO INSTALL A SEWER AND DISCOVERED 45,000 TONS OF CONTAMINATED SOIL; DEFENDANT, WHO CAUSED THE CONTAMINATION, REFUSED TO REMEDIATE; PLAINTIFF, WHO REMEDIATED THE CONTAMINATION, STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the unjust-enrichment cause of action should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff was hired by the city to install a sewer. Plaintiff discovered 45,000 tons of contaminated soil in the process. Defendant, who was responsible for the contamination, refused to remediate. Plaintiff remediated the contamination and sued defendant for the cost. There was no contract between plaintiff and defendant, so the breach of contract action was properly dismissed. However, the complaint stated a cause of action for unjust enrichment:

“To recover under a theory of unjust enrichment, a litigant must show that (1) the other party was enriched, (2) at that party’s expense, and (3) that it is against equity and good conscience to permit [the other party] to retain what is sought to be recovered” … . “‘[T]he essential inquiry in any action for unjust enrichment . . . is whether it is against equity and good conscience to permit the defendant to retain what is sought to be recovered'” … . “Although privity is not required for an unjust enrichment claim, a claim will not be supported if the connection between the parties is too attenuated” … .

Here, affording the complaint a liberal construction, we find that it sufficiently alleged that the defendant was unjustly enriched, at the plaintiff’s expense, by the plaintiff’s remediation of the contaminated soil, and that it would be against equity and good conscience to permit the defendant to retain what was sought to be recovered … . Bedford-Carp Constr., Inc. v Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 2023 NY Slip Op 04566, Second Dept 9-13-23

Practice Point: When there is no contract between the parties, the unjust-enrichment theory may be viable, as it was in this case.

 

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THE LETTER OF INTENT WAS NOT A BINDING REAL ESTATE CONTRACT; THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE BREACH OF CONTRACT, BASED ON “DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE,” SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the letter of intent was a non-binding agreement-to-agree, not a contract for the sale of real property. The letter of intent constituted “documentary evidence” which warranted dismissal of the breach of contract action:

… [T]he defendant submitted the letter of intent which conclusively established that the parties did not enter into a binding contract, but instead had a mere agreement to agree … . The letter of intent expressly stated that the letter was not contractually binding and expressly anticipated the future preparation and execution of a contract. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted dismissal of so much of the complaint as was predicated upon allegations of breach of contract pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1). Krasnow v Catania, 2023 NY Slip Op 04584, Second Dept 9-13-23

Practice Point: This is a rare example of a successful motion to dismiss based on documentary evidence. The letter of intent was, by its terms, not a binding contract. Therefore the breach of contract action, based upon the letter of intent, should have been dismissed.

 

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THE RULES OF THE ROAD APPLY TO BICYCLISTS; HERE THE BICYCLIST DARTED OUT INTO TRAFFIC FROM IN FRONT OF A PARKED VAN; THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPARTMENT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the rules of the road apply to bicyclists who suddenly dart out into traffic from in front of a parked car. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment should have been granted:

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1143 provides that a driver entering or crossing a roadway “from any place other than another roadway shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on the roadway to be entered or crossed.” Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1231 provides that every person riding a bicycle upon a roadway “shall be subject to all of the duties applicable to the driver of a vehicle by this title.”

… [T]he defendants established … that the infant plaintiff negligently entered the roadway mid-block from in front of a parked van without yielding the right-of-way to the defendants’ vehicle, and that such negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident. The evidence submitted in support of the motion, which included, inter alia, transcripts of the deposition testimony of the infant plaintiff, the defendant driver, and a nonparty witness, demonstrated that the defendant driver was traveling only 15 to 20 miles per hour, and had, at most, two seconds to react before the infant plaintiff’s bicycle struck the passenger side of the vehicle. Thus, the defendants demonstrated that the defendant driver was not negligent for failing to avoid colliding with the infant plaintiff … .  A. B. v Waring, 2023 NY Slip Op 04565, Second Dept 9-13-23

Practice Point: Vehicle and Traffic Law section 1231 applies all the duties of a vehicle-driver to bicyclists. Here the bicyclist violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law by suddenly entering the lane of traffic from in front of a parked van. The defendant driver was not negligent.

 

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IN THIS CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT CASE, DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF TO ANSWER DEPOSITION QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS DRUG AND ALCOHOL USE; THE INFORMATION MAY BE RELEVANT TO LIFE AND/OR WORK-LIFE EXPECTANCY (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, in this construction accident case, determined defendant’s were entitled to compel plaintiff to answer deposition questions about his alcohol and drug use:

“Although physician-patient communications are privileged under CPLR 4504, a plaintiff in a personal injury action will be deemed to have waived the privilege when he or she has affirmatively placed his or her mental or physical condition in issue” … .

Here, the plaintiff asserted … damages claims for future economic loss, including loss of future wages, pension, annuity, and health insurance coverage, based upon certain work-life and life expectancy ages. These claims affirmatively placed at issue the plaintiff’s health and ability to work, and the plaintiff’s work-life expectancy … . In making life expectancy determinations in the course of awarding damages for future lost earnings, juries are permitted to make life expectancy determinations based upon statistical life expectancy tables, together with their own experience and the evidence they have heard in determining what the plaintiff’s life and/or work-life expectancy is, based upon the plaintiff’s health, life habits, employment, and activities … . Hogdahl v LCOR 55 Bank St., LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 04582, Second Dept 9-13-23

Practice Point: In a personal injury case, evidence of plaintiff’s drug and alcohol use may be relevant to life and work-life expectancy (damages).

 

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