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THE ALLEGATION THE LAW ENFORCEMENT DEFENDANTS PRESENTED FALSE TESTIMONY DURING PLANTIFFS’ PROSECUTIONS STATED A VALID FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS VIOLATION CAUSE OF ACTION PURSUANT TO 42 USC 1983 (SECOND DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs’ cause of action alleging defendants violated 42 USC 1983 by presenting false testimony during the course of plaintiffs’ prosecution should not have been dismissed:

Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the cause of action alleging civil rights violations pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 as was predicated on a violation of the plaintiffs’ due process rights enumerated in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution insofar as asserted against the individual defendants. The plaintiffs’ allegations that, during the course of their prosecution, the individual defendants presented false testimony were governed by the Fourteenth Amendment … . Thus, contrary to the defendants’ contention, a due process analysis was appropriate … . Batista v City of Yonkers, 2025 NY Slip Op 06592, Second Dept 11-26-25

Practice Point: An allegation that law enforcement officers presented false testimony during plaintiffs’ prosecutions stated a 42 USC 1983 violation-of-due-process cause of action.

 

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THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY HANDLED A JUROR’S CLAIM THAT OTHER JURORS HAD EXHIBITED RACIAL BIAS DURING DELIBERATIONS AND PROPERLY DENIED THE DEFENSE REQUEST FOR A MISTRIAL; THERE WAS A COMPREHENSIVE DISSENT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Garcia, affirming the Appellate Division, over an extensive dissent, determined the trial judge properly assessed a juror’s claim that jurors exhibited racial bias during deliberations and properly denied defense counsel’s motion for a mistrial:

On appeal, the Appellate Division held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying a mistrial because the court made an “appropriate inquiry into this most serious charge” of racial bias by consulting with the parties and questioning relevant jurors, which ensured that “defendant’s right to an impartial verdict [was] properly balanced with the jury’s right to adjudicate ‘free from outside interference’ “… . In reviewing the actions of the trial judge, the Court concluded that ” ‘[i]n a probing and tactful inquiry, the [trial] court [did] evaluate the nature of what [juror No. 5] ha[d] seen, heard, or ha[d] acquired knowledge of, and assess[ed] its importance and its bearing on the case’ ” … . Two Justices dissented, asserting they were “unable to conclude on the record before us that the jury was not tainted by racial bias in their deliberations” … . … * * *

… [T]he judge was aware of the conduct of the jurors throughout the proceedings, observed the demeanor of the jurors as they were questioned on the issue of racial bias, evaluated their responses, and reasonably concluded on this record that what Juror 5 perceived as racial bias was in fact a discussion about the identification evidence, some of which, as the court noted in its post-trial decision denying the motion to set aside the verdict, may have been misinterpreted. As to the other unidentified jurors allegedly harboring some form of racial bias, defense counsel declined to request that the court question them individually (and, indeed, argued that the court should not do so), and therefore “the only asserted error preserved for appellate review was the denial of the motion for a mistrial” … . Our role is not to substitute our judgment as to the appropriate remedy for that of the trial judge. … On review of the record here, we hold that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the motion for a mistrial. People v Jaylin Wiggins, 2025 NY Slip Op 06539, Ct App 11-25-25

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for insight into the issues raised by a juror’s claim that other jurors have exhibited racial bias during deliberations. Here the majority concluded the trial judge handled the inquiry properly and properly denied the defense request for a mistrial.

 

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PLAINTIFF WIRED $300,000 TO AN ACCOUNT IN DEFENDANT BANK WHICH HAD BEEN SET UP BY A FRAUDSTER TO DEFRAUD PLAINTIFF; PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PLEAD A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH DEFENDANT BANK WHICH IS REQUIRED BEFORE A DUTY (OWED TO PLAINTIFF) TO ENFORCE ITS ANTI-FRAUD PROCEDURES ARISES; THE COMPLAINT THEREFORE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a one-sentence memorandum decision which adopted the reasoning of the Second Department dissent by Justice Higgitt, reversed the Second Department’s ruling that the complaint adequately pled a special relationship between the bank and plaintiff and held that the bank’s motion to dismiss the complaint should have been granted. There must have existed a special relationship between defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank and plaintiff before a duty (owed to plaintiff) to enforce the bank’s anti-fraud procedures arises. Defendant David Tate had opened an account at a New Jersey Chase bank in the name of his business, Alchemy. Tate did not provide any personal identification or any corporate documentation to the bank. Plaintiff, thinking she was investing in Alchemy, wired $300,000 to the Alchemy account which was appropriated by Tate. As Justice Higgitt wrote in his dissent:

On this appeal, which involves an individual who was swindled when she authorized a wire transfer to the account of a fraudster, we are asked to determine whether New Jersey law recognizes a common-law duty on the part of a bank to an existing customer to exercise reasonable care before permitting a potential customer to open an account. I find that a duty to exercise such care exists only when a bank has a “special relationship” with its existing customer from which that duty should be deemed to flow. The amended complaint, however, fails to allege facts suggesting that a special relationship existed between plaintiff and defendant Bank. Therefore, defendant Bank’s CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion should have been granted. Ben-Dor v Alchemy Consultant LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 03797, Second Dept 7-11-24; Ben-Dor v Alchemy Consultant LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op 06538 CtApp 11-25-25

Practice Point: In New Jersey, to sue a bank for the wrongful conduct of a third party, here the use of a bank account to defraud plaintiff, the bank must owe plaintiff a special duty. Reversing the Second Department and adopting the reasoning of the dissent, the Court of Appeals held the complaint should have been dismissed because it did not adequately allege the existence of a special relationship between the bank and the plaintiff.

 

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THE FORECLOSURE ABUSE PREVENTION ACT (FAPA) WAS PROPERLY APPLIED RETROACTIVELY IN THIS CASE; RETROACTIVE APPLICATION DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS OR CONTRACT CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Singas, determined the Foreclosure Prevention Abuse Act applied retroactively to the case before it. Retroactive application does not violate the Due Process or Contract Clauses of the United States Constitution:

We therefore hold that the provisions apply retroactively. Accordingly, because “a final judgment of foreclosure and sale has not been enforced” in this action … , FAPA §§ 4, 7, and 8 govern here by their terms. * * *

To comport with substantive due process, a statute’s retroactive application must be supported by “a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means” … . That is, “the retroactive application of the legislation” must “itself [be] justified by a rational legislative purpose” … .

… FAPA’s legislative history identifies certain “abus[ive]” litigation practices engaged in by mortgage lenders and noteholders as the animating force behind FAPA’s enactment: the sponsors’ memoranda state “legislat[ive] find[ings]” to this effect … . In light of the legislature’s determination that these “abuses” should be curtailed, it is rational for FAPA to apply retroactively to shield as many borrowers as possible from those practices. Moreover, insofar as FAPA’s relevant provisions clarify or change the manner in which the six-year statute of limitations applies, FAPA’s retroactive application also rationally advances “the strong public policy favoring finality, predictability, fairness and repose” in human affairs … . Van Dyke v U.S. Bank, Natl. Assn., 2025 NY Slip Op 06537, CtApp 11-25-25

 

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IN ANSWERING TWO CERTIFIED QUESTIONS FROM THE SECOND CIRCUIT, THE COURT OF APPEALS HELD THAT THE FORECLOSURE ABUSE PREVENTION ACT (FAPA) APPLIED RETROACTIVELY AND DID NOT VIOLATE SUBSTANTIVE OR PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS UNDER THE NEW YORK CONSTITUTION (CT APP)

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, answering two certified questions from the Second Circuit, determined (1) the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA) took effect immediately upon enactment and applied to all foreclosure actions in which a final judgment of foreclosure has not been enforced, and (2), retroactive application of the statute does not violate substantive or procedural due process rights under the New York Constitution:

… FAPA Section 7 applies to “foreclosure actions commenced before the statute’s enactment.” FAPA achieved its clear purpose with straightforward statutory text. The portion of Section 7 of FAPA at issue in this case is codified at CPLR 213 (4) (b):

“[A] defendant shall be estopped from asserting that the period allowed by the applicable statute of limitation for the commencement of an action upon the instrument has not expired because the instrument was not validly accelerated prior to, or by way of commencement of a prior action, unless the prior action was dismissed based on an expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated.”

FAPA Section 10 then provides that “[t]his act shall take effect immediately and shall apply to all actions commenced on[, as relevant here, a residential mortgage loan agreement,] in which a final judgment of foreclosure and sale has not been enforced.” Article 13 LLC v Ponce De Leon Fed. Bank, 2025 NY Slip Op 06536, CtApp 11-25-25

 

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HERE THE MISDEMEANOR COMPLAINT DID NOT INCLUDE FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS SUPPORTING ONE OF THE COUNTS; THEREFORE THE PEOPLE’S CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH CPL 30.30 (5-A) WAS INACCURATE; THE INACCURACY REQUIRED THE DISMISSAL OF THE COUNT, NOT THE INVALIDATION THE PEOPLE’S CORRESPONDING CPL 245.20 STATEMENT OF READINESS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannataro, over a two-judge dissent, determined that if the People’s CPL 30.30 (5-a) certification is inaccurate because the misdemeanor complaint did not include facts supporting one of the counts, the appropriate remedy is dismissal of the defective count, not the invalidation of the People’s statement of readiness:

On its face, the clear language of CPL 30.30 (5-a) requires that the People, in conjunction with filing their statement of readiness, certify that each count of the accusatory instrument is supported by facially sufficient, nonhearsay allegations, and that any counts that are not so supported have been dismissed. However, the statute does not provide for any readiness-related consequence for a mistaken or incorrect certification …. Such a requirement would make little sense because facial sufficiency is a legal question—sometimes a close legal question—and the People cannot reasonably be expected to attest accurately to the outcome of a defendant’s challenge to the facial sufficiency of the instrument … .

Defendant contends that the People’s obligation to certify facial sufficiency should be treated the same as the requirement that they certify compliance with their discovery obligations under CPL article 245. A comparison of the text of the relevant provisions reveals why this interpretation is incorrect. CPL 30.30 (5), as originally enacted in 2019, specifically stated that any “statement of trial readiness must be accompanied or preceded by a certification of good faith compliance with the disclosure requirements of [CPL 245.20] and the defense shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard on the record as to whether the disclosure requirements have been met.” Mirroring this provision, CPL 245.50 (3) provided that “the prosecution shall not be deemed ready for trial for purposes of [CPL 30.30] until it has filed a proper certificate” of compliance (former CPL 245.50 [3] [emphasis added]). .. [R]ead together, CPL 245.50 and [CPL] 30.30 require that due diligence must be conducted prior to filing a” certificate of compliance… . Thus, unlike the subdivision (5-a) certification requirement, the legislature specifically provided that an invalid certificate of compliance would render the People’s accompanying statement of readiness illusory. The legislature could have, but did not, similarly tie the accuracy of certification pursuant to subdivision (5-a) to the People’s trial readiness. People v Williams, 2025 NY Slip Op 06535, CtApp 1125-25

Practice Point: The failure to include factual allegations in support of a count in a misdemeanor complaint which has been certified to be in compliance with CPL 30.30 (5-a) requires dismissal of that count, but does not invalidate the corresponding CPL 245.20 statement of readiness.

 

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THE APPROPRIATE TEST FOR WHETHER THE POLICE HAD “REASONABLE SUSPICION” SUFFICIENT FOR A TRAFFIC STOP BASED ON AN ANONYMOUS TIP IS THE “TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES;” THE CRITERIA INCLUDE THE AGUILAR-SPINELLI RELIABILITY AND BASIS OF KNOWLEDGE FACTORS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannataro, over a two-judge dissent, applied the “totality of the circumstances” test and determined the police had probable cause to stop defendant’s car based upon an anonymous tip. The anonymous 911 caller told the dispatcher he was calling from a specified intersection and he had just been shot by two Black males in a white Mercedes. The caller said he knew the perpetrators and gave the dispatcher the address of one of them. A police officer four blocks away in a patrol car spotted a White Mercedes 30 to 60 seconds after the dispatcher broadcasted the report and stopped it. After the officer confirmed the address on the driver’s license was the address provided by the 911 caller, the officer asked if there were anything in the car he should know about. After the driver said “no, you can check the car” the officer saw a handgun and smelled gun powder through a gap in the locked glove compartment:

We have continued to apply the principles of Aguilar-Spinelli in the probable cause context … after the United States Supreme Court abandoned it in favor of the totality-of-the-circumstances approach (see Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213, 233 [1983] …), in recognition that Aguilar-Spinelli is more protective of our citizens’ rights under the State Constitution … . At issue here … is whether that same analysis is required for the lesser intrusion of an investigatory stop requiring reasonable suspicion. * * *

… [W]e now hold that the appropriate test is whether an anonymous tip is sufficiently reliable to provide reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances. While this approach involves an analysis of the Aguilar-Spinelli reliability and basis of knowledge factors, “allowance must be made in applying them for the lesser showing required” to meet the reasonable suspicion standard .. . .

Here, the totality of the circumstances establishes that there was reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle. The anonymous informant used the 911 system to report that he had “just been shot,” necessarily claiming personal knowledge of the crime. The caller also provided a description of the alleged shooter, the make and color of the shooter’s vehicle, and his location. The police were able to corroborate that information, within one minute of receiving the dispatch and within a block from the reported location, when they observed a car and suspect matching the description provided. The contemporaneous nature of the report is substantial here and weighs in favor of the caller’s veracity.

The police were duty-bound to investigate the radio report of a shooting, and they could not ignore their own contemporaneous observation of a vehicle matching the caller’s description and location. … [O]ur review of the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct is limited to the information known to the police at the time of the vehicle stop. … [T]here is record support for the affirmed finding of reasonable suspicion. People v Leighton R., 2025 NY Slip Op 06534, CtApp 11-25-25

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for insight into the application of the “totality of the circumstances” test to determine whether there was “reasonable suspicion” sufficient to justify a traffic stop based on an anonymous tip.

 

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INDIGENT PARTIES WHO ARE ASSIGNED COUNSEL IN FAMILY COURT PROCEEDINGS HAVE A RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL; HERE IN THESE PERMANENT-NEGLECT/TERMINATION-OF-PARENTAL-RIGHTS PROCEEDINGS, THE MAJORITY CONCLUDED MOTHER DID NOT RECEIVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE; THERE WAS A THREE-JUDGE DISSENT (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, over a two-judge dissent, determined mother had a right to, but did not receive, effective assistance of counsel in the permanent neglect proceeding in Family Court. Assigned counsel did not speak to mother until after the fact-finding hearing had begun, was unprepared, and did not request an adjournment. During the fact-finding hearing, mother asked to represent herself and waived her right counsel. Assigned counsel remained in a standby capacity. After the fact-finding hearing, the court moved directly to the dispositional hearing. During the dispositional hearing mother’s request for representation was denied:

… [D]espite being assigned more than two months earlier, counsel had not spoken to the mother before the hearing to terminate her parental rights had already begun. We cannot determine based on this record why counsel and the mother did not speak prior to the fact-finding hearing, and the court did not inquire, so the reasons for that lack of communication are pure speculation. Even assuming … that counsel attempted to contact the mother but was unsuccessful, there is no strategic or other reasonable explanation for counsel’s failure to request an adjournment of the proceeding so that he could speak to his client before the fact-finding hearing began, especially when the mother indicated that she would not be surrendering her parental rights. Before the mother indicated that she would not, in fact, surrender her parental rights, counsel could have legitimately thought that the fact-finding hearing would not go forward. However, once it was clear that the hearing was about to commence, counsel should have requested an adjournment to speak to his client about the proceeding and its implications. Counsel’s failure to do so lacks a strategic or legitimate explanation.

Counsel also appeared unprepared, questioning whether the records that were subpoenaed were available to be reviewed and announcing that he would remain silent during the hearing, only to be admonished by the court that he was required to participate. In addition, the court, faced with a record that showed counsel’s unpreparedness to proceed due to lack of communication, continued forward with the fact-finding hearing and the dispositional hearing even after it was clear that the mother did not understand the proceedings, denied the mother’s subsequent request to be represented by counsel even though the court told the mother she could change her mind about self-representation, and gave the mother’s standby counsel only five minutes in which to explain the proceedings to her. Matter of Parker J. (Beth F.), 2025 NY Slip Op 06533, CtApp 11-25-25

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for insight into what constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of an assigned counsel representing an indigent parent in permanent neglect and termination of parental rights proceedings.

 

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DEFENDANTS DID NOT PRODUCE A SURVEILLANCE VIDEO DEPICTING PLAINTIFF’S ACCIDENT UNTIL AFTER PLAINTIFF’S DEPOSITION; DEFENDANTS ARE PRECLUDED FROM INTRODUCING THE VIDEO IN EVIDENCE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s should have been precluded from introducing in evidence a surveillance video depicting plaintiff’s accident. Although the video had been explicitly demanded by plaintiff, defendants did not produce it until after plaintiff’s deposition, six months after the entry of the compliance order:

Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion seeking discovery sanctions. Plaintiff demonstrated that defendants acted willfully and contumaciously when they failed to turn over video footage of plaintiff’s accident … . Defendants failed to produce the video in response to repeated explicit demands and repeatedly denied the existence of any video of plaintiff’s accident. It was not until after plaintiff’s deposition on May 20, 2024 and during the June 27, 2024 deposition of defendants’ building manager that defendants revealed the existence of the video. While only six months elapsed from entry of the compliance order to the belated production of the video, it cannot be said that plaintiff was not prejudiced by the late production. Defendants should be sanctioned for their dilatory behavior in producing the surveillance video after plaintiff’s deposition had already taken place … .

Given the totality of the circumstances, Supreme Court should have granted the lesser sanction of preclusion … . Larue v 1201-31 Lafayette Ground Gowner LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op 06546, First Dept 11-25-25

Practice Point: Here there was an explicit demand for any video of plaintiff’s accident but defendants did not produce to video until after plaintiff’s deposition. Introduction of the video in evidence was precluded.

 

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PETITIONERS, THE NEW YORK TAXI WORKERS ALLIANCE, HAD STANDING TO CONTEST THE NYC TAXI AND LIMOUSINE COMMISSION’S PILOT PROGRAM WHICH WOULD ADD 2500 FOR-HIRE VEHICLES TO THE CITY STREETS; PETITIONERS DEMONSTRATED THE ADDED VEHICLES WOULD REDUCE MEMBERS’ INCOME (INJURY-IN-FACT) IN VIOLATION OF A LOCAL LAW (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Higgitt, reversing Supreme Court, determined the petitioners, the New York Taxi Workers Alliance and two individual drivers, had standing to challenge a pilot program initiated by the NYC Taxi and Limousine Commission as violating a Local Law. The pilot program would put 2500 more for-hire vehicles (FHV’s} on the street. Petitioners argued standing based on evidence the pilot program will lower the income of the members of the Taxi Workers Alliance. Supreme Court had held the loss-of-income claim was speculative:

… [P]etitioners established both an injury in fact and that their alleged harm satisfies the zone of interest requirement, and they therefore have standing.

… [P]etitioners allege a concrete, particularized harm: a loss of income and a deterioration of driver well-being occasioned by the introduction or potential introduction of additional vehicles into the for-hire market. That harm is neither speculative nor conjunctural; rather, it is well-demonstrated by the legislative facts underpinning Local Law 147, which facts are based, in part, on industry data. Moreover, petitioners’ alleged harm is supported by the findings of the Committee on For-Hire Vehicles as expressed in their reports. The legislative materials evince a clear connection between the number of FHVs on the streets and driver income: when the number of FHVs increases without a corresponding increase in passenger demand, driver income decreases. * * *

… [P]etitioners demonstrated that the alleged harms of loss of income and deterioration of driver well-being fall within the zone of interests or concerns promoted or protected by Local Law 147. Two of the principal interests or concerns expressly promoted or protected by the law are driver income and driver well-being (see Administrative Code § 19-550[a]; 35 RCNY 59A-06[a][1]), and the significant legislative history of Local Law 147 confirms that the City Council was concerned with the human costs associated with the exceptional growth in the FHV market, particularly drivers’ ability to earn a living. Matter of New York Taxi Workers Alliance v New York City Taxi & Limousine Commission, 2025 NY Slip Op 06551, First Dept 11-25-25

Practice Point: To have standing to challenge a local law, the challenger must demonstrate an injury-in-fact and the injury is within the scope of the protections afforded by the local law.

 

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