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“Standing” to Bring Foreclosure Action Defined

The Second Department explained “standing” as it relates to a mortgage foreclosure action as follows:

Where, as here, standing is put into issue by the defendant, “the plaintiff must prove its standing in order to be entitled to relief”…. “In a mortgage foreclosure action, a plaintiff has standing where it is both the holder or assignee of the subject mortgage and the holder or assignee of the underlying note at the time the action is commenced” … .”Either a written assignment of the underlying note or the physical delivery of the note prior to the commencement of the foreclosure action is sufficient to transfer the obligation” … .  Deutsche Bank Natl Trust Co v Whalen, 2013 NY Slip Op 04770, 2nd Dept 6-26-13

 

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Exceptions to “No-Damage-for-Delay” Clause in Construction Contract Explained

The defendant library was sued by the plaintiff contractor which claimed the library caused a delay in the performance of a contract by failing to secure access to an adjacent property which was necessary before plaintiff could complete the work.   In affirming the denial of summary judgment to the defendant library, the Second Department listed the exceptions to the enforceability of a “no-damage-for-delay” clause:

“A clause which exculpates a contractee from liability to a contractor for damages resulting from delays in the performance of the latter’s work is valid and enforceable and is not contrary to public policy if the clause and the contract of which it is a part satisfy the requirements for the validity of contracts generally”…. However, “even with such a clause, damages may be recovered for: (1) delays caused by the contractee’s bad faith or its willful, malicious, or grossly negligent conduct, (2) uncontemplated delays, (3) delays so unreasonable that they constitute an intentional abandonment of the contract by the contractee, and (4) delays resulting from the contractee’s breach of a fundamental obligation of the contract”….  Aurora Contrs Inc v West Babylon Pub Lib, 2013 NY Slip Op 04762, 2nd Dept 6-26-13

 

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Motion for Default Judgment Should Have Been Denied; Motion to Compel Acceptance of Late Answer Should Have Been Granted

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should not have granted plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment and denied defendant’s motion to compel the acceptance of a late answer:

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendant Lockwood Associates, LLC (hereinafter Lockwood), and in denying Lockwood’s cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3012(d) to compel the plaintiffs to accept service of its answer. Considering the lack of any prejudice to the plaintiffs as a result of Lockwood’s relatively short delay in answering, the existence of a potentially meritorious defense, and the public policy favoring the resolution of cases on the merits, Lockwood’s delay in answering should have been excused….  Grammas v Lockwood Assoc LLC, 2013 NY Slip Op 04776, 2nd Dept 6-26-13

 

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Starbuck’s Tip-Splitting Policy Analyzed

The Second Circuit asked the Court of Appeals to answer certified questions about how the Labor Law relates to a tip-splitting policy used by Starbucks.  Over two dissents, the Court of Appeals determined, under the Labor Law, limited supervisory duties did not mandate exclusion from the tip pool:

Starbucks maintains a written policy governing the collection, storage and distribution of customer tips. Pursuant to this policy, each Starbucks store places a plexiglass container at the counter where patrons may deposit tips. Once these tip canisters become full, Starbucks requires that they be emptied into a bag and the money is stored in a safe. At the end of each week, the tips are tallied and distributed in cash to two categories of employees — baristas and shift supervisors — in proportion to the number of hours each employee worked. Starbucks does not permit its assistant store managers or store managers to share in the weekly distribution of tips. The company’s decision to include shift supervisors in these tip pools was the impetus for the first lawsuit before us, while its exclusion of assistant store managers underlies the claims in the second action. * * *

…[A]n employee whose personal service to patrons is a principal or regular part of his or her duties may participate in an employer-mandated tip allocation arrangement under Labor Law § 196-d, even if that employee possesses limited supervisory responsibilities. But an employee granted meaningful authority or control over subordinates can no longer be considered similar to waiters and busboys within the meaning of section 196-d and, consequently, is not eligible to participate in a tip pool. * * *

…Starbucks’ decision to exclude assistant store managers from the tip pool is not contrary to Labor Law § 196-d.  Barenboim, et al v Starbucks Corporation, No 122, CtApp 6-26-13

 

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Closure of Railroad Crossing Did Not Constitute a Taking of Claimant’s Land

The Court of Appeals determined the closure of a railroad crossing did not constitute a regulatory taking of claimant’s land.  Claimant used the crossing to move equipment from one part of his land to another:

The basis for the claim is that the State Department of Transportation required the closure of a railroad crossing that claimant had used to move equipment from one part of its land to another. The record shows that the Department ordered the closure after it determined that the crossing presented a safety hazard. It found that fast moving trains passed by frequently; that a curve in the tracks limited the distance at which a train could be seen from the crossing; that heavy, slow-moving farm equipment was being transported over the tracks; and that there was a substantial grade at the approaches to the crossing, which made it necessary for crossing vehicles to reduce their speed. In an article 78 proceeding brought by claimant, the Department’s determination was upheld as being supported by substantial evidence….

On this record, the conclusion is inescapable that the closure of the crossing was a proper exercise of the State’s police power. Moreover, claimant has failed to show the extent to which the Department’s action diminished the value of its land, and has not argued that its easement to cross the railroad tracks should be treated for these purposes as an item of property separate from the land itself. Claimant’s claim of a regulatory taking is without merit.  Island Park, LLC v State of New York, No 132, CtApp 6-26-13

 

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Motion for Resentencing Under CPL 440.46 (Drug Reform Law) Properly Denied

The Second Department affirmed Supreme Court’s denial of defendant’s motion for resentencing pursuant to CPL 440.46:

When a defendant is eligible for resentencing pursuant to CPL 440.46, there is ” a presumption in favor of granting a motion for resentencing relief absent a showing that substantial justice dictates the denial thereof'”…. “However, resentencing is not automatic, and the determination is left to the discretion of the Supreme Court”…. In exercising its discretion, a court may “consider any facts or circumstances relevant to the imposition of a new sentence which are submitted by [the defendant] or the people” (L 2004, ch 738, § 23), including the defendant’s institutional record of confinement, the defendant’s prior criminal history, the severity of the current offense, whether the defendant has shown remorse, and whether the defendant has a history of parole or probation violations…. Relevant considerations include the defendant’s status as a probation or parole violator as a consequence of the conviction for which resentencing is sought…, and the defendant’s conviction of a violent felony subsequent to the commission of the narcotics felony for which resentencing is sought…. People v Parker, 2013 NY Slip Op 04831, 2nd Dept 6-26-13

 

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Plea Colloquy Raised Concerns Requiring Further Inquiry Re: Defendant’s Mental Health

The Second Department determined that defendant’s plea colloquy raised concern about defendant’s mental health requiring inquiry by the sentencing court:

Here, in light of the defendant’s known history of mental illness, and the finding within six days after commission of the instant sex offense that the defendant was suffering from psychotic symptoms attributable to bipolar disorder, for which he required hospitalization, certain statements made during the defendant’s plea allocution—specifically, statements regarding the complainant’s impression that, at the time of incident, the defendant was “very very much mentally unwell”—“signaled that [the defendant] may have been suffering from a mental disease or defect” when the offense was committed, thereby triggering the Supreme Court’s duty to inquire…. The trial court’s failure to conduct any inquiry as to a potential affirmative defense to the charges based upon mental disease or defect (see Penal Law 40.15), requires vacatur of the defendant’s plea of guilty…. While the People are correct that the defendant’s argument is unpreserved for appellate review, preservation is not required where, as here, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant’s guilt and the voluntariness of the plea were called into question before the court….  People v Grason, 2013 NY Slip Op 04827, 2nd Dept 6-26-13

 

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No Standing to Contest Search of Guest Room

The Court of Appeals determined there was support in the record for the trial court’s finding that defendant did not have standing to contest the search of a room in his grandmother’s house where a weapon was found:

The judge credited the grandmother’s testimony that the bedroom where the gun was found was an extra or guest bedroom; and that defendant had a separate room and did not stay in the guest bedroom. Given these facts, Supreme Court held that defendant failed to meet his burden of establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy in “a room that wasn’t his, that was used by several other people.”  People v Leach, No 130, CtApp 6-25-13

SUPPRESSION

 

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Defendant May Not Be Cross-Examined About Criminal Conviction on Direct Appeal

In reversing defendant’s assault conviction, the Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Lippman, determined a defendant with a conviction pending appeal may not be cross-examined about the underlying facts of that conviction until direct appeal has been exhausted.  Judge Lippman wrote:

At trial, the defense was justification and defendant planned to testify, but the People received permission, after a Sandoval hearing, to cross-examine him about his recent rape conviction, still pending on direct appeal, as well as the underlying facts, and the sentence he received. After the People rested, defense counsel asked the court to reconsider the Sandoval ruling, objecting that an appeal of the rape conviction was pending and, therefore, cross-examination about the conviction and its underlying facts would violate defendant’s constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, but the court adhered to its ruling. Defendant did not testify and was convicted of third-degree assault. Subsequently, his conviction for rape was reversed for ineffective assistance of counsel, his prior attorney having failed to impeach the complainant with exculpatory hospital records…. Defendant was retried and acquitted.  * * *

…[I]n ruling that the prosecution could cross-examine defendant about the underlying facts of his rape conviction, presumably the court was not implying that defendant could not assert his Fifth Amendment privilege in response to those questions. However, “taking the Fifth,” is highly prejudicial as to both the instant case and the conviction pending appeal. To a jury, it appears as though defendant is admitting the truth of the leading questions posed by the prosecutor; “[i]t exerts an undeniable chilling effect upon a real ‘choice’ whether to testify in one’s own behalf” …. More problematic, defendant must invoke the Fifth Amendment as to both exculpatory and inculpatory questions to protect himself; otherwise he might waive the privilege… .  People v Cantave, No 129, CtApp 6-25-13

 

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Illegal Arrest Did Not Taint Identification Procedure – Attentuation Doctrine Applied

Over a dissent, the Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, determined that the defendant’s identification in a line-up, after an admittedly illegal arrest, was not tainted by the arrest under the doctrine of “attenuation.”  The operative legal principles were described as follows:

The sergeant’s initial arrest of defendant was without probable cause and therefore illegal. But evidence discovered subsequent to an illegal arrest is not indiscriminately subject to the exclusionary rule…. Instead, the People “must have ‘somehow exploited or benefitted from [the] illegal conduct’ such that ‘there is a connection between the violation of a constitutional right and the derivative evidence’ obtained by the police”….

Defendant claims that the lineup identification must be suppressed because it was the product of an illegal arrest. In order to counter that challenge, the People were required to demonstrate that the identification was “acquired by means sufficiently distinguishable from the arrest to be purged of the illegality” …, i.e., that the taint of the illegal arrest was “attenuated” …. In order to determine whether attenuation exists, the court must “consider the temporal proximity of the arrest and [the evidence at issue], the presence of intervening circumstances and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct”…. *  *  *

By the time the sergeant effected the illegal arrest, the detective already had in his possession sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for defendant’s arrest. People v Jones, No 125, CtApp 6-25-13

 

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