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COMMON CARRIERS DO NOT HAVE A DUTY TO KEEP BUS STEPS FREE OF SNOW TRACKED IN DUE TO A RECENT STORM.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant transit authority’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted. Plaintiff slipped on snow on a step as she got off a bus:

Plaintiff testified that she slipped and fell as she was exiting a bus owned and operated by defendants because the step was covered with a slushy condition. She and the bus driver both stated that there was snow all over the ground from a storm that had ended earlier that day, and certified meteorological records submitted by defendants demonstrated that a snow storm that started the previous night and ended earlier in the day of the accident had left about six inches of snow on the ground. The bus driver also testified that passengers tracked snow onto the bus on their shoes and boots as they boarded.

Common carriers are not obligated to provide a “constant remedy” for the tracking of water onto a bus during an ongoing storm or for a reasonable time thereafter … . Similarly, when the ground is covered with snow left by a recent storm, “it would be unreasonable to expect the [defendants] to constantly clean the front steps of the subject bus” … . Plaintiff’s argument that defendants failed to show lack of notice of the slushy condition is irrelevant, since they did not breach any duty of care under the existing weather conditions. Harbison v New York City Tr. Auth., 2017 NY Slip Op 01503, 1st Dept 2-28-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (COMMON CARRIERS DO NOT HAVE A DUTY TO KEEP BUS STEPS FREE OF SNOW TRACKED IN DUE TO A RECENT STORM)/BUSES (SLIP AND FALL, COMMON CARRIERS DO NOT HAVE A DUTY TO KEEP BUS STEPS FREE OF SNOW TRACKED IN DUE TO A RECENT STORM)/SLIP AND FALL (BUSES, COMMON CARRIERS DO NOT HAVE A DUTY TO KEEP BUS STEPS FREE OF SNOW TRACKED IN DUE TO A RECENT STORM)

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VIOLATION OF A TEMPORARY ORDER OF PROTECTION IS A VALID GROUND FOR ISSUANCE OF A FINAL ORDER OF PROTECTION; EXPIRATION OF AN ORDER OF PROTECTION DOES NOT RENDER AN APPEAL MOOT.

The First Department, over an extensive dissent, determined Family Court properly issued a final order of protection after respondent’s violation of a temporary order of protection. The court noted that the expiration of the order of protection did not render the appeal moot because the order “still imposes significant enduring consequences upon respondent…”. The dissent argued that a final order of protection cannot be issued unless a family offense has been committed:

Here, the Family Court found, on the record after a hearing, that respondent had willfully violated the temporary order of protection with his April 3, 2014 emails containing statements clearly intended to harass petitioner. As a result of this determination, the Family Court conducted a dispositional hearing on respondent’s violation of the temporary order of protection, and thereafter issued a new order of protection. The Family Court adhered to the prescribed procedure and did not exceed its jurisdiction by issuing this final order of protection. * * * … [W]e read Family Court Act § 846-a as prescribing the remedies available to the court when a respondent violates a temporary order of protection, which is what is at issue here. Matter of Lisa T. v King E.T., 2017 NY Slip Op 01487, 1st Dept 2-28-17

FAMILY LAW (VIOLATION OF A TEMPORARY ORDER OF PROTECTION IS A VALID GROUND FOR ISSUANCE OF A FINAL ORDER OF PROTECTION, EXPIRATION OF AN ORDER OF PROTECTION DOES NOT RENDER AN APPEAL MOOT)/ORDER OF PROTECTION (FAMILY LAW, VIOLATION OF A TEMPORARY ORDER OF PROTECTION IS A VALID GROUND FOR ISSUANCE OF A FINAL ORDER OF PROTECTION, EXPIRATION OF AN ORDER OF PROTECTION DOES NOT RENDER AN APPEAL MOOT)/APPEALS (FAMILY LAW, VIOLATION OF A TEMPORARY ORDER OF PROTECTION IS A VALID GROUND FOR ISSUANCE OF A FINAL ORDER OF PROTECTION, EXPIRATION OF AN ORDER OF PROTECTION DOES NOT RENDER AN APPEAL MOOT)

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ALTHOUGH THE CHILD HAD NOT BEEN HARMED, MOTHER’S MENTAL ILLNESS JUSTIFIED THE NEGLECT FINDING.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Tom, over a two-justice dissenting opinion, determined Family Court properly found mother had neglected her child. The child was not harmed by the mother. There was evidence the mother suffered from delusions:

A neglected child is one whose “physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of his parent . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care” … . It is well settled that “[a] respondent’s mental condition may form the basis of a finding of neglect if it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her condition resulted in imminent danger to the child[]” … .

In this case, the mother presented a risk of harm to her child through her unfounded fears that her daughter had been raped, since these fears resulted in the mother on different occasions “testing” the child to see if she was raped, by checking her diaper and by sticking a Q-tip inside her, and making an unnecessary trip to the hospital … .

Further, the mother displayed a “lack of insight” into her illness by refusing to agree that she had any mental health condition, despite her diagnoses, and by repeatedly refusing to comply with her medication regimen … .

Significantly, lack of evidence as to actual injury to the child is inconsequential. “A showing that [the child was] impaired by [the mother’s] failure to exercise a minimum degree of care is not required for an adjudication of neglect; it is sufficient that [the child was] in imminent danger of becoming impaired'” … .Indeed, the imminent danger standard exists specifically to protect children who have not yet been harmed and to prevent impairment … .

With regard to mental illness, we have previously found that a parent suffering from untreated paranoid delusions presents an imminent risk of harm to children who are placed in her care … . * * *

The neglect finding was not based only on the mother’s mental illness. Rather, it was based on her mental condition in conjunction with her failure to comply with her medication regimen and follow-up treatment, and the fact that her mental illness impaired her ability to care for her infant daughter, and caused her to keep unnecessarily checking her daughter for evidence of rape. Matter of Ruth Joanna O.O. (Melissa O.), 2017 NY Slip Op 01524, 1st Dept 2-28-17

 

FAMILY LAW (NEGLECT, ALTHOUGH THE CHILD HAD NOT BEEN HARMED, MOTHER’S MENTAL ILLNESS JUSTIFIED THE NEGLECT FINDING)/NEGLECT (NEGLECT, ALTHOUGH THE CHILD HAD NOT BEEN HARMED, MOTHER’S MENTAL ILLNESS JUSTIFIED THE NEGLECT FINDING)/MENTAL ILLNESS (FAMILY LAW, NEGLECT, ALTHOUGH THE CHILD HAD NOT BEEN HARMED, MOTHER’S MENTAL ILLNESS JUSTIFIED THE NEGLECT FINDING)

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IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE CONTRACT ALLOWS REFUSAL OF LOANS FOR ANY REASON, EVEN THOUGH THE REFUSAL MAY HAVE BEEN INTENTIONALLY AIMED AT PUTTING PLAINTIFF OUT OF BUSINESS.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Saxe, modifying (reversing) Supreme Court, determined that a contract provision which allowed defendant (Capital One) to deny loans to plaintiff (TFA) for any reason trumped any implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, even though defendant’s actions GODDput plaintiff out of business:

Although “[i]n New York, all contracts imply a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the course of performance” … , the existence of the covenant cannot be relied on as grounds for TFA’s action . The covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot negate express provisions of the agreement … , nor is it violated where the contract terms unambiguously afford Capital One the right to exercise its absolute discretion to withhold the necessary approval … . Where a contract allows one party to terminate the contract in “its sole discretion” and for “any reason whatsoever,” the covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot serve to negate that provision … . Notably, where the parties intended to limit either party’s rights under the loan agreement so that they could only be exercised “in good faith,” they specifically included such language; for example, section 1.1 of the agreement allows Capital One to establish a valuation methodology “in its sole and absolute discretion exercised in good faith.” In contrast, the provision of section 2.1 authorizing Capital One to decline any request for an advance “in its sole and absolute discretion” lacks any such limitation requiring Capital One to act in good faith when doing so. Because Capital One’s complained-of conduct consists entirely of acts it was authorized to do by the contract, its alleged motivation for doing so is irrelevant. Simply put, an intent to put TFA out of business cannot justify a lawsuit for a claimed breach of the covenant where the express provisions of the agreement allowed Capital One to act as it did. Transit Funding Assoc., LLC v Capital One Equip. Fin. Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 01525, 1st Dept 2-28-17

CONTRACT LAW (IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE CONTRACT ALLOWS REFUSAL OF LOANS FOR ANY REASON, EVEN THOUGH THE REFUSAL MAY HAVE BEEN INTENTIONALLY AIMED AT PUTTING PLAINTIFF OUT OF BUSINESS)/GOOD FAITH, IMPLIED COVENANT (IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE CONTRACT ALLOWS REFUSAL OF LOANS FOR ANY REASON, EVEN THOUGH THE REFUSAL MAY HAVE BEEN INTENTIONALLY AIMED AT PUTTING PLAINTIFF OUT OF BUSINESS)

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PROPERTY OWNERS’ FRAUD AND OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT COUNTERCLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED IN THIS ACTION BY THE TOWN ALLEGING ZONING VIOLATIONS.

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant property owners’ counterclaim should have been dismissed. Defendants, in the context of a zoning-violation action by the town, alleged fraud and a violation of civil rights by the town. With respect to municipal liability for civil rights violations in the zoning context, the court explained:

A government official may face civil liability if a party can prove that he or she was “depriv[ed] of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” (42 USC § 1983). With respect to zoning issues, “42 USC § 1983 protects against municipal actions that violate a property owner’s rights to due process, equal protection of the laws and just compensation for the taking of property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution” … . To state a cause of action, defendants must “allege that, without legal justification, they were deprived of a vested property interest, consisting of more than a mere expectation or hope of obtaining a permit or a variance” … . Further, a municipal body may face liability pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 only where the constitutional deprivation stems from an official municipal policy or custom … .

Here, defendants never had a permit to allow them to park more than four commercial vehicles on the property or to install fuel tanks to use in association with their commercial operations. Nor do they allege that they had a vested property interest in such a special use permit … . Moreover, defendants’ submissions fail to establish that the Planning Board’s discretionary determination to impose conditions on defendants’ special use permit “rose to the level of a constitutional violation, i.e., that they were so outrageously arbitrary as to constitute a gross abuse of governmental authority . . . that would support a claim pursuant to 42 USC § 1983” … . Even accepting as true that one Planning Board member stated that he wanted to “make an example” of defendants, defendants did not allege, nor does the record support a claim, that this motivation resulted from official municipal policy or custom … . Town of Tupper Lake v Sootbusters, LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 01428, 3rd Dept 2-23-17

 

ZONING (PROPERTY OWNERS’ FRAUD AND OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT COUNTERCLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED IN THIS ACTION BY THE TOWN ALLEGING ZONING VIOLATIONS)/MUNCIPAL LAW (ZONING, (PROPERTY OWNERS’ FRAUD AND OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT COUNTERCLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED IN THIS ACTION BY THE TOWN ALLEGING ZONING VIOLATIONS)/CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (MUNICIPAL LAW, ZONING, PROPERTY OWNERS’ FRAUD AND OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT COUNTERCLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED IN THIS ACTION BY THE TOWN ALLEGING ZONING VIOLATIONS)

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ATTORNEY’S FEE FORM IMPROPERLY FILLED, IMPOSSIBLE FOR APPELLATE REVIEW OF $3000 AWARD.

The Third Department sent the matter back to the Worker’s Compensation Board for a review of the Board’s award of $3000 in attorney’s fees. The Third Department determined that the attorney’s fee form was not properly filled out and there was not enough information in the form to allow appellate review:

Our review of the OC-400.1 form submitted in this case reveals that it is very similar to the form submitted by counsel in Matter of Tenecela v Vrapo Constr. (146 AD3d 1217, 2017 NY Slip Op 00367 [2017]) — a form that the Board ultimately deemed to be inadequate in that case (id. at *2). Specifically, although the form here sets forth the dates upon which services were rendered to claimant and the number of hours allocated thereto, the description of those services is largely indecipherable. More to the point, the form tendered by counsel in this matter appears to allocate “25+” hours to an unspecified date or range of dates, thereby “making impossible any assessment of the services rendered” (id.). Finally, the Board premised its award (in part) upon “the financial status of . . . claimant” but, other than noting a reduction in the loss of wage-earning capacity suffered by claimant, the Board’s decision makes no reference to — and the record sheds no light upon — claimant’s financial status. For these reasons, the Board’s award of counsel fees is incapable of intelligent appellate review, and we remit this matter to the Board for reconsideration thereof … . Matter of Shiqerukaj v Gotham Broad, LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 01426, 3rd Dept 2-23-17

WORKERS’S COMPENSATION LAW (ATTORNEY’S FEE FORM IMPROPERLY FILLED, IMPOSSIBLE FOR APPELLATE REVIEW OF $3000 AWARD)/ATTORNEYS (WORKER’S COMPENSATION LAW, ATTORNEY’S FEE FORM IMPROPERLY FILLED, IMPOSSIBLE FOR APPELLATE REVIEW OF $3000 AWARD)

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INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PUBLIC FUNDS WERE USED TO PAY FOR CONSTRUCTION AT THE SARATOGA RACE COURSE, THEREFORE THE PREVAILING WAGE REQUIREMENT OF LABOR LAW 220 DID NOT APPLY.

The Third Department annulled the determination of the Department of Labor finding that the New York Racing Association (NYRA) was required to pay the prevailing wage to a construction contractor working at the Saratoga Race Course. The Third Department held there was insufficient proof public funds were used to pay the contractor:

Labor Law § 220 provides that “[t]he wages to be paid for a legal day’s work . . . to laborers, work[ers] or mechanics upon . . . public works, shall be not less than the prevailing rate of wages” (Labor Law 220 § [3] [a]), defined as the rate paid to “workers, laborers or mechanics in the same trade or occupation in the locality where the work is being performed” (Labor Law § 220 [5]). The NY Constitution further provides that “[n]o laborer, worker or mechanic, in the employ of a contractor or sub-contractor engaged in the performance of any public work, shall . . . be paid less than the rate of wages prevailing in the same trade or occupation in the locality within the state where such public work is to be situated, erected or used” (NY Const, art I, § 17). The Court of Appeals has recently clarified the meaning of a public work: “[f]irst, a public agency must be a party to a contract involving the employment of laborers, workers, or mechanics. Second, the contract must concern a project that primarily involves construction-like labor and is paid for by public funds. Third, the primary objective or function of the work product must be the use or other benefit of the general public” … . W.M. Schultz Constr., Inc. v Musolino, 2017 NY Slip Op 01425, 3rd Dept 2-23-17

LABOR LAW (INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PUBLIC FUNDS WERE USED TO PAY FOR CONSTRUCTION AT THE SARATOGA RACE COURSE, THEREFORE THE PREVAILING WAGE REQUIREMENT OF LABOR LAW 220 DID NOT APPLY)/EMPLOYMENT LAW INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PUBLIC FUNDS WERE USED TO PAY FOR CONSTRUCTION AT THE SARATOGA RACE COURSE, THEREFORE THE PREVAILING WAGE REQUIREMENT OF LABOR LAW 220 DID NOT APPLY)/PREVAILING WAGE INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PUBLIC FUNDS WERE USED TO PAY FOR CONSTRUCTION AT THE SARATOGA RACE COURSE, THEREFORE THE PREVAILING WAGE REQUIREMENT OF LABOR LAW 220 DID NOT APPLY)/NEW YORK RACING ASSOCIATION (INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PUBLIC FUNDS WERE USED TO PAY FOR CONSTRUCTION AT THE SARATOGA RACE COURSE, THEREFORE THE PREVAILING WAGE REQUIREMENT OF LABOR LAW 220 DID NOT APPLY)

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INFORMATION ALLEGED BY THE DEFENDANTS TO HAVE REVEALED FRAUD IN THE SALE OF CREDIT DEFAULT OBLIGATIONS AT A TIME WHICH RENDERED THE CURRENT FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION ACTION TIME-BARRED WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT A DISMISSAL AT THE PLEADING STAGE.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Mazzarelli, over a two-justice dissent, in a case involving the sale of credit default obligations (CDO’s), determined the motion to dismiss the fraudulent misrepresentation cause of action was properly denied. Defendants argued the plaintiffs had sufficient information to alert them to the fraud at a time which would render the current action time-barred. The First Department determined the information cited by the defendants was insufficient to support dismissal at the pleading stage. [The opinion is fact-specific and too detailed to fairly summarize here]:

Here, it is undisputed that, when plaintiffs commenced the action, six years had passed since plaintiffs made their investments in the Funds. The question, then, is whether plaintiffs discovered, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered, the fraud more than two years before commencement (CPLR 213[8]). * * *

… [W]e make no conclusive finding that plaintiffs were blind to the scheme they accuse defendants of perpetrating. We merely determine, at this early stage of the litigation, that the evidence presented by defendants can be interpreted in a myriad of ways and does not facially clash with plaintiffs’ position that, even having some knowledge that the Funds had an equity component to them, they could not have known before the SEC proceeding the extent to which defendants used plaintiffs’ investment to acquire and control the Portfolio Companies, or otherwise had an obligation, based on that evidence, to further investigate. Thus, Supreme Court properly declined to dismiss the fraudulent misrepresentation complaint on statute of limitations grounds, and the viability of the defense must await a fully developed factual record, at which point it can be either decided as a matter of law on a motion for summary judgment, or at a trial. Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Tilton, 2017 NY Slip Op 01482, 1st Dept 2-23-17

 

SECURITIES (INFORMATION ALLEGED BY THE DEFENDANTS TO HAVE REVEALED FRAUD IN THE SALE OF CREDIT DEFAULT OBLIGATIONS AT A TIME WHICH RENDERED THE CURRENT FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION ACTION TIME-BARRED WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT A DISMISSAL AT THE PLEADING STAGE)/FRAUD (SECURITIES, INFORMATION ALLEGED BY THE DEFENDANTS TO HAVE REVEALED FRAUD IN THE SALE OF CREDIT DEFAULT OBLIGATIONS AT A TIME WHICH RENDERED THE CURRENT FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION ACTION TIME-BARRED WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT A DISMISSAL AT THE PLEADING STAGE)/CREDIT DEFAULT OBLIGATIONS (INFORMATION ALLEGED BY THE DEFENDANTS TO HAVE REVEALED FRAUD IN THE SALE OF CREDIT DEFAULT OBLIGATIONS AT A TIME WHICH RENDERED THE CURRENT FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION ACTION TIME-BARRED WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT A DISMISSAL AT THE PLEADING STAGE)

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PLAINTIFFS’ DECEDENT COMMITTED SUICIDE SHORTLY AFTER DEFENDANT PSYCHIATRISTS SAW HER, PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER DEFENDANTS DEVIATED FROM THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF CARE.

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motions for summary judgment in this psychiatric malpractice case should not have been granted. Plaintiffs’ expert found fault in, inter alia, defendants’ failure to document suicide assessments. Plaintiffs’ decedent committed suicide shortly after the defendant psychiatrists, Roberts and Decker, saw her:

Plaintiffs submitted the factually specific affidavit of a psychiatrist who, relying upon the foregoing, opined that Roberts deviated from the minimum standard of care in failing to document a proper suicide risk assessment and then discharging decedent without ensuring that she obtain psychotherapy and medication management within two days … . * * *

Plaintiffs’ expert psychiatrist opined that Decker fell short of the minimum standard of care by failing to properly conduct and document a suicide risk assessment of decedent, who was experiencing triggering anxiety and untreated depression. The psychiatrist further opined that Decker departed from the minimum standard of care in placing medication adjustment and psychotherapy on hold in the expectation that a “severely compromised” person would provide more information on an inpatient treatment facility that she was curious about. Tkacheff v Roberts, 2017 NY Slip Op 01429, 3rd Dept 2-23-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PLAINTIFFS’ DECEDENT COMMITTED SUICIDE SHORTLY AFTER DEFENDANT PSYCHIATRISTS SAW HER, PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER DEFENDANTS DEVIATED FROM THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF CARE)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (PLAINTIFFS’ DECEDENT COMMITTED SUICIDE SHORTLY AFTER DEFENDANT PSYCHIATRISTS SAW HER, PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER DEFENDANTS DEVIATED FROM THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF CARE)/EVIDENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PLAINTIFFS’ DECEDENT COMMITTED SUICIDE SHORTLY AFTER DEFENDANT PSYCHIATRISTS SAW HER, PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER DEFENDANTS DEVIATED FROM THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF CARE)/EXPERT OPINION (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PLAINTIFFS’ DECEDENT COMMITTED SUICIDE SHORTLY AFTER DEFENDANT PSYCHIATRISTS SAW HER, PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER DEFENDANTS DEVIATED FROM THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF CARE)/PSYCHIATRISTS (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PLAINTIFFS’ DECEDENT COMMITTED SUICIDE SHORTLY AFTER DEFENDANT PSYCHIATRISTS SAW HER, PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER DEFENDANTS DEVIATED FROM THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF CARE)/SUICIDE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PLAINTIFFS’ DECEDENT COMMITTED SUICIDE SHORTLY AFTER DEFENDANT PSYCHIATRISTS SAW HER, PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER DEFENDANTS DEVIATED FROM THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF CARE)

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JANITOR CAN NOT SUE FOR A SLIP AND FALL CAUSED BY THE CONDITION HE WAS TO REMEDY AS PART OF HIS JOB.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff janitor could not sue for a slip and fall because the fall was caused by the condition he attempting to remedy as part of his job:

Dismissal of the complaint as against defendants is warranted in this action where plaintiff janitor alleges that he was injured when he slipped on pebbles on the bathroom floor of the building he was hired to clean. It is well established that a maintenance or cleaning worker has no claim at law for injury suffered from a dangerous condition that he was hired to remedy … , and here, plaintiff stated that as part of his job cleaning the bathroom, he frequently removed the pebbles from the floor. Black v Wallace Church Assoc., 2017 NY Slip Op 01480, 1st Dept 2-23-17

NEGLIGENCE (JANITOR CAN NOT SUE FOR A SLIP AND FALL CAUSED BY THE CONDITION HE WAS TO REMEDY AS PART OF HIS JOB)/SLIP AND FALL (JANITOR CAN NOT SUE FOR A SLIP AND FALL CAUSED BY THE CONDITION HE WAS TO REMEDY AS PART OF HIS JOB)/EMPLOYMENT LAW (JANITOR CAN NOT SUE FOR A SLIP AND FALL CAUSED BY THE CONDITION HE WAS TO REMEDY AS PART OF HIS JOB)/JANITORS (JANITOR CAN NOT SUE FOR A SLIP AND FALL CAUSED BY THE CONDITION HE WAS TO REMEDY AS PART OF HIS JOB)

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