You are here: / THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEDED TO DEFENDANT’S REQUEST THAT...

Search Results

/ , ,

THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEDED TO DEFENDANT’S REQUEST THAT THE JURY NOT BE INSTRUCTED ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE, AND, BASED UPON DEFENDANT’S BEHAVIOR, THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD HAVE ORDERED A COMPETENCY EXAMINATION.

The Fourth Department reversed defendant’s conviction for two reasons: (1) the trial judge acceded to defendant’s request that the jury not be instructed on a lesser included offense, and (2) the trial judge, in light of defendant’s behavior during the trial, should have ordered a competency examination:

​

We agree with defendant, however, that he was denied his right to counsel when County Court permitted him, rather than defense counsel, to decide whether to request a jury charge on a lesser included offense. “It is well established that a defendant, having accepted the assistance of counsel, retains authority only over certain fundamental decisions regarding the case’ such as whether to plead guilty, waive a jury trial, testify in his or her own behalf or take an appeal’ ” … . “[D]efense counsel has ultimate decision-making authority over matters of strategy and trial tactics, such as whether to seek a jury charge on a lesser included offense” … . Here, defense counsel requested a charge on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass. After defendant stated that he did not want such a charge, the court noted that defendant’s consent was not required. Nevertheless, defense counsel stated that he was not requesting the charge based on defendant’s decision not to follow his advice. Although defense counsel unequivocally and repeatedly stated that the charge was in defendant’s best interest, and indicated that defendant was declining the charge against defense counsel’s advice, the court abided defendant’s choice and thus “denied [defendant] the expert judgment of counsel to which the Sixth Amendment entitles him” … . …

​

Although a defendant is presumed to be competent … , whenever a court has a ” reasonable ground for believing that a defendant is in such state of idiocy, imbecility or insanity that he is incapable of understanding the charge, indictment or proceedings or of making his defense, it is the duty of the court to direct him to be examined in these respects’ ” … . Here, in light of the nature and frequency of defendant’s outbursts, and the People’s expressed concern about defendant’s competency prior to trial, we conclude that the court abused its discretion in failing to insure that defendant was competent to stand trial … . People v Minckler, 2017 NY Slip Op 03311, 4th Dept 4-28-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEDED TO DEFENDANT’S REQUEST THAT THE JURY NOT BE INSTRUCTED ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE AND, BASED UPON DEFENDANT’S BEHAVIOR, THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD HAVE ORDERED A COMPETENCY EXAMINATION)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEDED TO DEFENDANT’S REQUEST THAT THE JURY NOT BE INSTRUCTED ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE AND, BASED UPON DEFENDANT’S BEHAVIOR, THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD HAVE ORDERED A COMPETENCY EXAMINATION)/LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE (THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEDED TO DEFENDANT’S REQUEST THAT THE JURY NOT BE INSTRUCTED ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE AND, BASED UPON DEFENDANT’S BEHAVIOR, THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD HAVE ORDERED A COMPETENCY EXAMINATION)/JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL LAW, LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE, THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEDED TO DEFENDANT’S REQUEST THAT THE JURY NOT BE INSTRUCTED ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE AND, BASED UPON DEFENDANT’S BEHAVIOR, THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD HAVE ORDERED A COMPETENCY EXAMINATION)/RIGHT TO COUNSEL (CRIMINAL LAW, THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEDED TO DEFENDANT’S REQUEST THAT THE JURY NOT BE INSTRUCTED ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE AND, BASED UPON DEFENDANT’S BEHAVIOR, THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD HAVE ORDERED A COMPETENCY EXAMINATION)/COMPETENCY EXAMINATION (CRIMINAL LAW, THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEDED TO DEFENDANT’S REQUEST THAT THE JURY NOT BE INSTRUCTED ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE AND, BASED UPON DEFENDANT’S BEHAVIOR, THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD HAVE ORDERED A COMPETENCY EXAMINATION)

/

JUDGE DID NOT GIVE A COMPLETE JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE ELEMENTS OF BURGLARY, NEW TRIAL ORDERED.

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the burglary jury instruction was flawed. Defendant allowed her brother into the home where defendant resided and her brother assaulted a resident of the home in the resident’s bedroom. The jury instruction did not make clear the definitions of a building or unit as those terms are used in the burglary statute:

​

A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree, in pertinent part, when he or she “knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling with intent to commit a crime therein” (Penal Law § 140.30 [2]). ” Dwelling’ means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night” (§ 140.00 [3]), and “the definition of building’ includes the following: Where a building consists of two or more units separately secured or occupied, each unit shall be deemed both a separate building in itself and a part of the main building’ ” … .

Here, the court instructed the jurors that a “dwelling is a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night. A bedroom in a home, where there is more than one tenant, may be considered independent of the rest of the house and may be considered a separate dwelling within a building.” The court, however, failed to include the part of the definition of building that would require the jury to determine whether the house at issue consisted of “two or more units” and whether the bedroom at issue was a unit that was “separately secured or occupied” (Penal Law § 140.00 [2]). Consequently, “given the omission of the definition of [ unit’] and/or [ separately secured or occupied,’] the instruction did not adequately convey the meaning of [ building’] to the jury and instead created a great likelihood of confusion such that the degree of precision required for a jury charge was not met” … . People v Pritchard, 2017 NY Slip Op 03287, 4th Dept 4-28-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (JUDGE DID NOT GIVE A COMPLETE JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE ELEMENTS OF BURGLARY, NEW TRIAL ORDERED)/BURGLARY (JUDGE DID NOT GIVE A COMPLETE JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE ELEMENTS OF BURGLARY, NEW TRIAL ORDERED)

/

DEFENDANT’S REFUSAL TO TURN AROUND AND HIS HANDS POSITIONED AT HIS WAISTBAND JUSTIFIED AN OFFICER’S DRAWING HIS WEAPON AND POLICE PURSUIT.

The Fourth Department determined defendant’s refusal to turn around upon request and his hands positioned at his waistband justified a police officer’s drawing his weapon and a pursuit of the defendant when her ran. Suppression of the weapon discarded by the defendant was properly denied:

​

… [W]e conclude that defendant’s positioning and his refusal to comply with the officer’s request to return to the vehicle, while not alone indicative of criminal behavior, could be “considered in conjunction with other attendant circumstances” to establish the requisite reasonable suspicion of criminal activity … . In our view, once defendant refused the officer’s request to return to the vehicle and turned toward the officers, the officers could “reasonably suspect[] that defendant was armed and posed a threat to their safety because his actions were directed to the area of his waistband, which was concealed from their view”,,, . The officer who drew his weapon was justified in doing so out of a concern for his own safety … . We thus conclude that defendant’s flight, “in conjunction with the attendant circumstances, gave rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion justifying police pursuit” … . People v Walker, 2017 NY Slip Op 03317, 4th Dept 4-28-17

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT’S REFUSAL TO TURN AROUND AND HIS HANDS POSITIONED AT HIS WAISTBAND JUSTIFIED AN OFFICER’S DRAWING HIS WEAPON AND POLICE PURSUIT)/STREET STOPS (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT’S REFUSAL TO TURN AROUND AND HIS HANDS POSITIONED AT HIS WAISTBAND JUSTIFIED AN OFFICER’S DRAWING HIS WEAPON AND POLICE PURSUIT)/SUPPRESS, MOTION TO  (DEFENDANT’S REFUSAL TO TURN AROUND AND HIS HANDS POSITIONED AT HIS WAISTBAND JUSTIFIED AN OFFICER’S DRAWING HIS WEAPON AND POLICE PURSUIT)

/

DEFENDANT WALKED BY POLICE OFFICER HOLDING HIS WAISTBAND, OFFICER WAS JUSTIFIED IN REQUESTING DEFENDANT TO SHOW HIM HIS HANDS REVEALING A GUN, SUPPRESSION PROPERLY DENIED.

The Fourth Department, over a dissent, determined the arresting officer had a founded suspicion of criminal activity justifying his request that defendant show him his hands. Defendant had walked by the officer holding his waistband. When the defendant complied with the officer’s request and raised his hands the officer saw a gun:

​

… [W]e conclude that the location of this encounter in a high-crime area, the officer’s training and his experience in investigating weapons possession crimes at this location, together with defendant’s grabbing of his waistband with his hand concealed under his shirt, provided the requisite founded suspicion for the officer to command defendant to show his hands. Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that it is of no consequence that the officer did not observe a gun before commanding defendant to show his hands. Indeed, defendant’s hand was concealed under his shirt while simultaneously grabbing his waistband. The Court of Appeals has noted that “a handgun is often carried in the waistband” … , and that it would be “absurd to suggest that a police officer has to await the glint of steel before he can act to preserve his safety” … .

We recognize that a founded suspicion may not rest upon innocuous behavior that is susceptible of an innocent as well as a culpable interpretation … . Viewed in isolation by an untrained observer, defendant’s actions might not appear to be suspicious but, “when viewed collectively and in the light of the officer’s expertise,” we conclude that the officer had a founded suspicion of criminal activity warranting a level two inquiry … . People v Simmons, 2017 NY Slip Op 03280, 4th Dept 4-28-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT WALKED BY POLICE OFFICER HOLDING HIS WAISTBAND, OFFICER WAS JUSTIFIED IN REQUESTING DEFENDANT TO SHOW HIM HIS HANDS REVEALING A GUN, SUPPRESSION PROPERLY DENIED)/STREET STOPS (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT WALKED BY POLICE OFFICER HOLDING HIS WAISTBAND, OFFICER WAS JUSTIFIED IN REQUESTING DEFENDANT TO SHOW HIM HIS HANDS REVEALING A GUN, SUPPRESSION PROPERLY DENIED)/SUPPRESS, MOTION TO  (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT WALKED BY POLICE OFFICER HOLDING HIS WAISTBAND, OFFICER WAS JUSTIFIED IN REQUESTING DEFENDANT TO SHOW HIM HIS HANDS REVEALING A GUN, SUPPRESSION PROPERLY DENIED)

/

NON-PROFIT PROVIDING WORK TRAINING TO PSYCHIATRIC PATIENTS IS EXEMPT FROM UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COVERAGE.

The Third Department determined claimant was not eligible for unemployment insurance benefits and the statute which exempts rehabilitative non-profits is constitutional. Claimant was employed by a non-profit which provided work-training for psychiatric patients. Claimant worked 20 hours per week and sought unemployment benefits when the non-profit temporarily closed:

​

To file a valid original claim, a claimant must meet certain qualifications and satisfy employment requirements (see Labor Law § 527 [1]). Labor Law § 563 (2) (d) excludes certain employment from unemployment insurance coverage, including “services rendered for a non-profit organization by a person who (1) receives rehabilitative services in a facility conducted for the purpose of carrying out a program of rehabilitation for individuals whose earning capacity is impaired by age or physical or mental deficiency or injury or (2) is given remunerative work in a facility conducted for the purpose of providing such work for persons who cannot be readily absorbed in the competitive labor market because of their impaired physical or mental capacity.” The Board credited the hearing testimony establishing that, as part of his vocational rehabilitation, claimant worked for Landmark, a non-profit organization that operates workshops and rehabilitative programs open exclusively to RPC [Rochester Psychiatric Center] patients. Matter of Janakievski (Commissioner of Labor), 2017 NY Slip Op 03253, 3rd Dept 4-27-17

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (NON-PROFIT PROVIDING WORK TRAINING TO PSYCHIATRIC PATIENTS IS EXEMPT FROM UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COVERAGE)/NON-PROFITS (UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, NON-PROFIT PROVIDING WORK TRAINING TO PSYCHIATRIC PATIENTS IS EXEMPT FROM UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COVERAGE)

/ ,

LOSS OF TRANSCRIPT OF LAST DAY OF BENCH TRIAL AND SENTENCING DID NOT PRECLUDE APPEAL.

The First Department determined the loss of the stenographic notes for the last day of the bench trial and sentencing did not preclude appeal:

​

Although the stenographic notes of the last day of the trial and the sentencing proceeding have been lost and no transcript is available for those dates, a reconstruction hearing sufficed to protect defendant’s right to appeal. The judge’s notes from the last day of trial, the prosecutor’s detailed outline of her summation and trial counsel’s affirmation, which were placed in the record at the hearing, provided an adequate basis to determine whether appealable issues existed … . The fact that this was a nonjury trial, where the factfinder is presumed to have disregarded prejudicial matter … , weighs strongly against the concern that the missing minutes may have revealed appealable issues. People v Zuniga, 2017 NY Slip Op 03264, 1st Dept 4-27-17

​

CRIMINAL LAW (LOSS OF TRANSCRIPT OF LAST DAY OF BENCH TRIAL AND SENTENCING DID NOT PRECLUDE APPEAL)/APPEAL (CRIMINAL LAW, LOSS OF TRANSCRIPT OF LAST DAY OF BENCH TRIAL AND SENTENCING DID NOT PRECLUDE APPEAL)/TRANSCRIPT (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS, LOSS OF TRANSCRIPT OF LAST DAY OF BENCH TRIAL AND SENTENCING DID NOT PRECLUDE APPEAL)

/

15 MONTH DELAY IN ARTICLE 10 TRIAL DID NOT DEPRIVE RESPONDENT OF DUE PROCESS.

The First Department determined the 15-month delay in holding respondent sex-offender’s Article 10 trial did not deprive him of due process. The court explained that the statutory 60-day time limit for holding the trial did not require dismissal of the petition and further explained and applied the four-point due process analysis:

​

The 60-day deadline by which a trial “shall” be commenced, pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 10.07(a), is not a “strict time limit[]” … . As there is no clear legislative intent to make compliance with that time frame a prerequisite to continued jurisdiction … , the failure to commence a trial within 60 days does not mandate dismissal of the petition … . Article 10 of the Mental Hygiene Law (MHL) states repeatedly that failure to comply with various deadlines does not affect the validity of the petition or the various actions subject to those deadlines … . …

​

Respondent’s due process rights were not violated by the 15-month delay between his declaration of readiness for trial, after the probable cause determination, made upon his waiver of a probable cause hearing, and the start of the trial. Under the four-factor balancing test set forth in Barker v Wingo (407 US 514 [1972] … , the length of the delay may be considered presumptively prejudicial … . The second factor, the reason given for the delay (id. at 531), weighs only slightly against petitioner, because a considerable portion of the delay is attributable to respondent, the unavailability of the experts, and circumstances beyond petitioner’s control. …

The third Barker factor, respondent’s assertion of his rights (407 US at 531-532), weighs in respondent’s favor with respect to those adjournments to which he objected. However, his failure to retain any experts for, or to testify in, the article 10 proceedings, his consent to delays, his refusal to appear in court twice, and his engagement in abusive conduct directed against those associated with the proceeding suggest that respondent “did not desire an early judicial hearing” … . …

​

The fourth Barker factor, prejudice to respondent (407 US 532), weighs in petitioner’s favor. There was no oppressive pretrial incarceration, since respondent chose to be confined at Rikers Island, rather than at a secure mental health facility, during the proceedings … , and respondent’s ability to put on a defense was not affected by the delay. Matter of State of New York v Keith F., 2017 NY Slip Op 03276, 1st Dept 4-27-17

 

MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (SEX OFFENDERS, 15 MONTH DELAY IN ARTICLE 10 TRIAL DID NOT DEPRIVE RESPONDENT OF DUE PROCESS)/SEX OFFENDERS (MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, 15 MONTH DELAY IN ARTICLE 10 TRIAL DID NOT DEPRIVE RESPONDENT OF DUE PROCESS)

/ , ,

EXCLUSION OF INJURY FROM ASSAULT CONTROLLED, NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION STEMMING FROM ASSAULT NOT COVERED.

The Third Department determined the policy exclusion for injury stemming from an assault controlled and defendant insurer was not required to defend the action by defendant bar patron, Christian, who alleged-plaintiff bar’s employee injured him when ejecting him from the bar. The language of the exclusion took precedence over the general liability provisions. Any negligence causes of action were not covered because the negligence claims stemmed from the assault:

The exclusion, which states that it “is subject to the terms contained in the General Liability Coverage,” provides that “[n]otwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, . . . this policy excludes any and all claims arising out of any assault, battery, fight, altercation, misconduct or other similar incident,” including claims of negligent hiring and supervision. * * *

Here … Supreme Court properly found that the terms of the exclusion controlled over those in the general liability coverage, as “language such as a ‘notwithstanding’ provision ‘controls over any contrary language’ in a contract” … .

Christian asserts that the assault and battery exclusion does not apply because the underlying action alleges acts of negligence. We disagree. “[I]f no cause of action would exist but for the assault, the claim is based on assault and the exclusion applies” and the fact that an insured might be liable under a theory of negligence does not change this … . Graytwig Inc. v Dryden Mut. Ins. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 03229, 3rd Dept 4-27-17

INSURANCE LAW (EXCLUSION OF INJURY FROM ASSAULT CONTROLLED, NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION STEMMING FROM ASSAULT NOT COVERED)/CONTRACT LAW (INSURANCE LAW, EXCLUSION OF INJURY FROM ASSAULT CONTROLLED, NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION STEMMING FROM ASSAULT NOT COVERED)/ASSAULT (INSURANCE LAW, EXCLUSION OF INJURY FROM ASSAULT CONTROLLED, NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION STEMMING FROM ASSAULT NOT COVERED)/EXCLUSIONS  (INSURANCE LAW, EXCLUSION OF INJURY FROM ASSAULT CONTROLLED, NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION STEMMING FROM ASSAULT NOT COVERED)/THIRD PARTY ASSAULT

/

INMATE’S REQUESTS FOR UNIDENTIFIED WITNESSES IMPROPERLY DENIED.

The Third Department determined some of petitioner’s requests for testimony from unidentified witnesses to the underlying incident were improperly denied. The hearing officer should have checked logs before denying the request for an unidentified corrections officer alleged to have been present. And petitioner’s request for testimony from unidentified inmates who allegedly were delayed by the incident should not have been denied simply because of the number of potential inmate witnesses (50):

​

Petitioner requested the testimony of a correction officer that he believed was present with the sergeant during the incident. Petitioner did not know the name of the witness, but gave the Hearing Officer a description and requested that the Hearing Officer review the logbooks to identify the witness. The Hearing Officer denied the witness, based upon the testimony of the sergeant that he was alone during the incident with petitioner. Inasmuch as the record does not reflect that the Hearing Officer reviewed the logbooks or made any other effort to identify the witness, we cannot say that a diligent effort was made to locate the witness … . …

​

Petitioner also requested the testimony of 50 unidentified inmates who, according to the misbehavior report and hearing testimony, were delayed in returning to their cells from breakfast because of the incident involving petitioner. A correction officer testified that, because of the incident, she was unable to release those inmates to return to petitioner’s cellblock for approximately five to seven minutes. The Hearing Officer denied petitioner’s request, stating that he was not going to call 50 witnesses. We disagree with respondents’ contention that the requested testimony was irrelevant because the inmates did not witness the incident involving petitioner, inasmuch as their testimony was relevant to the charge of interfering with staff. In our view, petitioner was improperly denied the right to call a reasonable number of these witnesses, who were all housed on the same cellblock and should have been easily identifiable. Although calling all 50 witnesses would be impractical and unnecessary, the requested testimony was not irrelevant or redundant, and the Hearing Officer’s blanket denial of these witnesses was therefore improper … . Matter of Harriott v Koenigsmann, 2017 NY Slip Op 03240, 3rd Dept 4-27-1

 

DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS (INMATES) (INMATE’S REQUESTS FOR UNIDENTIFIED WITNESSES IMPROPERLY DENIED)

/

SENTENCE NOT CONTEMPLATED BY THE PLEA AGREEMENT MUST BE VACATED AS THE RESULT OF AN INVOLUNTARY PLEA.

​The Third Department determined the sentence imposed was not in accordance with the plea agreement. Therefore defendant’s plea was not voluntarily made and must be vacated. Defendant was initially sentenced as a persistent felon and that sentence was overturned on appeal. The plea agreement contemplated sentencing either as a persistent felon, or, if the appeal succeeded, as a second felony offender. After the successful appeal, however, defendant was sentenced as a first-time felon:

​

The People concede, and we agree, that the parties’ plea agreement, as set forth in the record before us, did not contemplate the possibility that defendant would be sentenced as a first-time felony offender in the event of a successful appeal to this Court … . Indeed, the record before us establishes that the parties’ contingent plea agreement and ensuing plea colloquy were limited to whether defendant could be sentenced as a second felony offender — versus sentencing as a mandatory persistent felony offender — upon a successful appeal. Accordingly, because the record reflects a mutual mistake at the time of defendant’s plea regarding his predicate status and potential sentencing exposure in the event that he was successful on appeal, his decision to plead guilty was not a knowing, voluntary and intelligent one and, therefore, the plea must be vacated … . People v Brewington, 2017 NY Slip Op 03224, 3rd Dept 4-27-17

CRIMINAL LAW (SENTENCE NOT CONTEMPLATED BY THE PLEA AGREEMENT MUST BE VACATED AS THE RESULT OF AN INVOLUNTARY PLEA)/SENTENCING (SENTENCE NOT CONTEMPLATED BY THE PLEA AGREEMENT MUST BE VACATED AS THE RESULT OF AN INVOLUNTARY PLEA)/GUILTY PLEAS (SENTENCE NOT CONTEMPLATED BY THE PLEA AGREEMENT MUST BE VACATED AS THE RESULT OF AN INVOLUNTARY PLEA)

​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy