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STATEMENTS POSTED ON FACEBOOK CONCERNING PLAINTIFF’S UNAUTHORIZED PARTIAL DEMOLITION OF A LANDMARK BUILDING WERE DEEMED NON-ACTIONABLE OPINION AND HYPERBOLE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined that defendant’s Facebook posts were non-actionable opinion in this defamation action. Defendant, without obtaining the required certificate, had begun to demolish a building which had been designated a landmark. Defendant posted pictures of the building with comments that the demolition was a crime, that the plaintiff was a vampire, and that plaintiff, rather than gutting the building and maintaining the facade, intended to demolish the building and put up condominiums:

The defendant established that [the] statements, which referred to the plaintiff’s actions in causing the demolition of the building as a “crime” and referred to the plaintiff as a “vampire,” constituted nonactionable opinion or rhetorical hyperbole … . …

… [T]he defendant asserted that the plaintiff had originally said that he would keep the building’s historic facade and gut the interior to convert the building into apartments. The defendant further stated that the plaintiff’s statement was “a lie” and that “[a]ll along he planned a big condo and he removed part of the metal roof and punched holes in it and failed to repair it so the elements would get in and slowly but surely destroy the building. This is known as demolition by intentional neglect.'” …

In distinguishing between statements of opinion and fact, the factors to be considered are: (1) whether the specific language at issue has a precise, readily understood meaning, (2) whether the statements are capable of being proven true or false, and (3) whether either the full context of the communication in which the statement appears or the broader social context and surrounding circumstances are such as to signal readers that what is stated is likely to be opinion, not fact…  Even apparent statements of fact may assume the character of opinion when made in public debate where the audience may anticipate the use of rhetoric or hyperbole … . The question is not whether there is an isolated assertion of fact; rather, it is necessary to consider the writing as a whole, including its tone and apparent purpose, as well as the overall context of the publication, to determine whether the reasonable reader would have believed that the challenged statements were conveying facts about the plaintiff … . Stolatis v Hernandez, 2018 NY Slip Op 03868, Second Dept 5-30-18

​DEFAMATION (STATEMENTS POSTED ON FACEBOOK CONCERNING PLAINTIFF’S UNAUTHORIZED PARTIAL DEMOLITION OF A LANDMARK BUILDING WERE DEEMED NON-ACTIONABLE OPINION AND HYPERBOLE (SECOND DEPT))/OPINION (DEFAMATION, (STATEMENTS POSTED ON FACEBOOK CONCERNING PLAINTIFF’S UNAUTHORIZED PARTIAL DEMOLITION OF A LANDMARK BUILDING WERE DEEMED NON-ACTIONABLE OPINION AND HYPERBOLE (SECOND DEPT))/HYPERBOLE (DEFAMATION, STATEMENTS POSTED ON FACEBOOK CONCERNING PLAINTIFF’S UNAUTHORIZED PARTIAL DEMOLITION OF A LANDMARK BUILDING WERE DEEMED NON-ACTIONABLE OPINION AND HYPERBOLE (SECOND DEPT))

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