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SPECIAL USE PERMIT PROPERLY GRANTED, CRITERIA FOR A SPECIAL USE PERMIT VERSUS A VARIANCE EXPLAINED 2ND DEPT.

The Second Department determined a special use permit was properly granted to a golf course seeking permission to host nonmember events. The court explained the different criteria for a special use permit versus a variance:

“Unlike a variance which gives permission to an owner to use property in a manner inconsistent with a local zoning ordinance, a special use permit gives permission to use property that is consistent with the zoning ordinance, although not necessarily allowed as of right” … . The burden of proof on an applicant seeking a special use permit is lighter than that carried by an applicant for a zoning variance … . Once an applicant shows “that the contemplated use is in conformance with the conditions imposed, a special [use] permit or exception must be granted unless there are reasonable grounds for denying it that are supported by substantial evidence” … .

Here, on this record, there was substantial evidence that Hampshire Club, Inc.’s contemplated use comported with the requirements of Village of Mamaroneck Zoning Code … , and there were no reasonable grounds for denying the special use permit. Therefore, the special use permit to host nonmember events at the Country Club should have been granted… . “Where substantial evidence exists, a court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the board, even if such a contrary determination is itself supported by the record” … . Matter of Mamaroneck Coastal Envt. Coalition, Inc. v Board of Appeals of the Vil. of Mamaroneck, 2017 NY Slip Op 05822, 2nd Dept 7-25-17

ZONING (SPECIAL USE PERMIT PROPERLY GRANTED, CRITERIA FOR A SPECIAL USE PERMIT VERSUS A VARIANCE EXPLAINED 2ND DEPT)/SPECIAL USE PERMIT (ZONING, SPECIAL USE PERMIT PROPERLY GRANTED, CRITERIA FOR A SPECIAL USE PERMIT VERSUS A VARIANCE EXPLAINED 2ND DEPT)/VARIANCE (ZING, SPECIAL USE PERMIT PROPERLY GRANTED, CRITERIA FOR A SPECIAL USE PERMIT VERSUS A VARIANCE EXPLAINED 2ND DEPT)

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