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IN THIS THIRD-PARTY ASSAULT CASE, THE FACT THAT THE INTRUDER KILLED PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, A RESIDENT OF DEFENDANT’S APARTMENT BUILDING, IN A PRE-MEDITATED, TARGETED ATTACK DID NOT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, INSULATE THE LANDLORD FROM LIABILITY BASED UPON AN ALLEGEDLY BROKEN LOCK ON THE BUILDING’S EXTERIOR DOOR; THE 2ND DEPARTMENT DISAGREED WITH A LINE OF 1ST DEPARTMENT CASES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dillon, disagreeing with a line of First Department decisions, determined a targeted, premeditated attack on a building resident is not necessarily an intervening cause which insulates the landlord from liability. Here plaintiff’s decedent was targeted by her former fiance (Boney) who set her, himself and one of her children on fire in the hallway outside plaintiff’s decedent’s apartment. There was evidence the exterior door to the building did not have a functioning lock. The Second Department held that the defendant landlord (the New York City Housing Authority [NYCHA]) did not eliminate questions of fact about whether the broken lock was a proximate cause of the attack and whether the attack was foreseeable:

The test in determining summary judgment motions involving negligent door security should … not focus on whether the crime committed within the building was “targeted” or “random,” but whether or not, and to what extent, an alleged negligently maintained building entrance was a concurrent contributory factor in the happening of the criminal occurrence. In examining whether there is a triable issue of fact as to foreseeability and proximate cause requiring trial, a jury could conceivably conclude that the chronically broken lock at the building’s front door provided Boney with an opportunity to attack the decedent, in a manner that might not otherwise have been possible, and that NYCHA could have foreseeably anticipated that its broken front door lock would result in the entry of intruders into the building for the commission of criminal activities against known or unknown specific tenants … . All of these actions should be examined sui generis, recognizing the unique facts of individualized matters, rather than simplistically or arbitrarily channeling them into either “targeted” or “random” criminal boxes that do not accommodate the factual nuances that may vary from case to case. Scurry v New York City Hous. Auth., 2021 NY Slip Op 00447, Second Dept 1-27-21

 

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