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You are here: Home1 / Evidence2 / PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, A PATIENT IN DEFENDANT REHAB FACILITY, FELL...
Evidence, Medical Malpractice, Negligence

PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, A PATIENT IN DEFENDANT REHAB FACILITY, FELL WHEN WALKING UNATTENDED BACK TO HIS BED FROM THE BATHROOM; PLAINTIFF ALLEGED THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE A BED ALARM WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE; THAT CAUSE OF ACTION SOUNDED IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, NOT NEGLIGENCE; DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION WAS PROPERLY GRANTED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUBMIT EXPERT EVIDENCE IN OPPOSITION (WHICH WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REQUIRED IF THE CAUSE OF ACTION SOUNDED IN NEGLIGENCE, AS THE MOTION COURT HAD HELD) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the cause of action at issue sounded in medical malpractice, not negligence. Therefore, to avoid summary judgment, plaintiff was required to submit expert opinion evidence in opposition. Plaintiff’s decedent, a patient in a rehabilitation facility (defendant St. James), fell when walking unattended after going to the bathroom. Plaintiff alleged defendant’s failure to provide decedent with a bed alarm was a proximate cause of the fall. The motion court held that cause of action sounded in negligence and raised a jury question:

The essence of the allegation that St. James improperly failed to provide the decedent with a bed alarm which would have prevented his fall is that it improperly assessed his condition and the degree of supervision necessary to prevent him from falling, which sounds in medical malpractice … . Thus, with respect to this allegation, St. James bore the initial burden of establishing either that there was no departure from good and accepted medical practice or that any departure was not a proximate cause of the decedent’s injuries … .

In response to St. James’ prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact by submitting an expert opinion that specifically addressed the defense expert’s assertions … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of St. James’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as alleged a failure to provide the decedent with a bed alarm. Losak v St. James Rehabilitation & Healthcare Ctr., 2021 NY Slip Op 05961, Second Dept 11-3-21

 

November 3, 2021
Tags: Second Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-11-03 13:49:092021-11-09 11:44:23PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, A PATIENT IN DEFENDANT REHAB FACILITY, FELL WHEN WALKING UNATTENDED BACK TO HIS BED FROM THE BATHROOM; PLAINTIFF ALLEGED THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE A BED ALARM WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE; THAT CAUSE OF ACTION SOUNDED IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, NOT NEGLIGENCE; DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION WAS PROPERLY GRANTED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUBMIT EXPERT EVIDENCE IN OPPOSITION (WHICH WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REQUIRED IF THE CAUSE OF ACTION SOUNDED IN NEGLIGENCE, AS THE MOTION COURT HAD HELD) (SECOND DEPT).
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