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CONSTRUCTION MANAGER DID NOT EXERCISE SUFFICIENT CONTROL TO BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s Labor Law 240(1) cause of action against the construction manager was properly dismissed. Plaintiff fell from a ten-foot-high stack of blasting mats. The construction manager demonstrated it did not exercise supervisory control over plaintiff’s work or site safety:

A construction manager of a work site is generally not responsible for injuries under Labor Law § 200, § 240(1), or § 241(6) unless it functions as an agent of the property owner or general contractor in circumstances where it has the ability to control the activity which brought about the injury …  “A party is deemed to be an agent of an owner or general contractor under the Labor Law when it has supervisory control and authority over the work being done where a plaintiff is injured”… . An agent’s liability is limited “to those areas and activities within the scope of the work delegated or, in other words, to the particular agency created” … .

Here, the construction management services contract … provided that the defendants were responsible for coordinating the work relating to the … project, namely liaising with contractors to ensure that the project was completed in accordance with cost, time, safety, and quality control requirements and reporting … . However, the contract did not confer upon the defendants the authority to control the methods used by the contractors, including the plaintiff’s employer, to complete their work. The defendants were authorized only to review and monitor safety programs and requirements and make recommendations, provide direction to contractors regarding corrective action to be taken if an unsafe condition was detected, and stop work only in the event of an emergency. The parties’ deposition testimony also demonstrated that the defendants did not have control or a supervisory role over the plaintiff’s day-to-day work and that they did not assume responsibility for the manner in which that work was conducted. Lamar v Hill Intl., Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 06167, Second Dept 8-16-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (CONSTRUCTION MANAGER DID NOT EXERCISE SUFFICIENT CONTROL TO BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1) (SECOND DEPT))CONSTRUCTION MANAGER (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, CONSTRUCTION MANAGER DID NOT EXERCISE SUFFICIENT CONTROL TO BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1) (SECOND DEPT))

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LABOR LAW 240(1) NOT APPLICABLE TO INJURY FROM A PORTION OF A FENCE WHICH FELL... PLAINTIFF’S STEPPING ON AN UNSECURED PLANK HE HAD JUST PLACED, RATHER...