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Three-Step Analysis for Child Support Under Child Support Standards Act

The Second Department explained the three step analysis for the determination of child support obligations pursuant to the Child Support Standards Act (the parents in this case had a combined annual income of more than $700.000.00):

Under the first step of the analysis, a court must determine the parties’ combined parental income … . …Under the second step of the analysis, pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 240(1-b)(c)(1), we multiply so much of the combined parental income up to $80,000.00—which was the “statutory cap” in effect on the date of the 2008 Judgment …—by the applicable statutory child support percentage, or 29% for the parties’ three children (see Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b][c][2]…). We then allocate the resulting amount … between the parties according to their pro rata share of the combined parental income (see Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b][c][2]). The third step in the analysis applies where, as here, the combined parental income exceeds the applicable statutory limit of $80,000.00. In this situation, “courts [have] the discretion to apply the [sub]paragraph (f)’ factors, or to apply the statutory percentages, or to apply both in fixing the basic child support obligation on parental income over $80,000” … . As applicable here, the subparagraph (f) factors include a consideration of the financial resources of the custodial and noncustodial parent, and the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage or household not been dissolved (see Domestic Relations Law § 240[1-b][f][1][3]). These factors further the objectives of the CSSA, which include “the assurance that both parents would contribute to the support of the children” and that the court consider “the total income available to the parents and the standard of living that should be shared with the child” … .  Beroza v Hendler, 2013 NY Slip Op 05607, 2nd Dept 8-14-13

 

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