You are here: / / COMMENCING A LAWSUIT, STANDING ALONE, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ABUSE OF PROCESS...

COMMENCING A LAWSUIT, STANDING ALONE, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ABUSE OF PROCESS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment was properly granted, noting that commencing a lawsuit, standing alone, does not constitute abuse of process:

” Abuse of process has three essential elements: (1) regularly issued process, either civil or criminal, (2) an intent to do harm without excuse or justification, and (3) use of the process in a perverted manner to obtain a collateral objective'” … . The mere commencement of a lawsuit cannot serve as the basis for a cause of action alleging abuse of process … . “[T]here must be an unlawful interference with one’s person or property under color of process in order that action for abuse of process may lie” … . Lynn v McCormick, 2017 NY Slip Op 06169, Second Dept 8-16-17

INTENTIONAL TORTS (ABUSE OF PROCESS, COMMENCING A LAWSUIT, STANDING ALONE, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ABUSE OF PROCESS (SECOND DEPT))/ABUSE OF PROCESS (COMMENCING A LAWSUIT, STANDING ALONE, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ABUSE OF PROCESS (SECOND DEPT))

You might also like
FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DELEGATED ITS AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE PARENTAL ACCESS TO THE PARTIES AND SHOULD NOT HAVE MADE FINDINGS IN THE ABSENCE OF A HEARING (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE POLICE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST HIM AND WHETHER THE POLICE GAVE FALSE EVIDENCE TO THE GRAND JURY; THE MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, FALSE ARREST, FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
Court Abused Its Discretion In Exercising Its Inherent Power to Grant a Motion to Vacate a Default Judgment More than a Year After the Judgment Was Entered (Five Years Here)
DEFENDANTS IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE WHEN THE STAIRS HAD LAST BEEN INSPECTED, THEREFORE DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE ABSENCE OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).
THE TENANT HARASSMENT CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; SUPREME COURT HAD SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION FOR THAT CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).
Curtailing of Defense Counsel’s Summation Argument Re: Lack of Motive Was (Harmless) Error
THE TENANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A YELLOWSTONE INJUNCTION BECAUSE THE RELIEF WAS SOUGHT AFTER THE DEADLINE IN THE NOTICE TO CURE; THAT DEADLINE WAS CONTROLLED BY THE LEASE AND THEREFORE WAS NOT EXTENDED BY THE COVID-RELATED EXECUTIVE ORDERS (SECOND DEPT).
THE PEOPLE DID NOT PRESENT EVIDENCE OF THE TEMPORAL REQUIREMENTS FOR AN ASSESSMENT OF 20 POINTS FOR RISK FACTOR 4 AND DEFENSE COUNSEL AGREED WITH THAT 20-POINT ASSESSMENT, THEREBY WAIVING ANY OBJECTION TO IT ON APPEAL; DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL; NEW SORA HEARING ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

LAW OFFICE CONFUSION NOT A SUFFICIENT EXCUSE FOR BANK ATTORNEY’S FAILURE... LABOR LAW 240(1) NOT APPLICABLE TO INJURY FROM A PORTION OF A FENCE WHICH FELL...