You are here: / / THE PARTIES’ SEPARATION AGREEMENT DID NOT MAKE IT CLEAR THE PARTIES...
,

THE PARTIES’ SEPARATION AGREEMENT DID NOT MAKE IT CLEAR THE PARTIES KNOWINGLY OPTED OUT OF THE LEVEL OF CHILD SUPPORT REQUIRED BY THE CHILD SUPPORT STANDARDS ACT (CSSA); THEREFORE THE SUPPORT PROVISIONS IN THE AGREEMENT ARE NOT ENFORCEABLE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the separation agreement did not include the required language indication the parties agree to opt out of the level of child support required by the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA):

“Parties to a separation agreement are free to ‘opt out’ of the provisions of the CSSA so long as their decision is made knowingly” … . “To ensure that waivers of the statutory provisions of the CSSA are truly knowingly made, Domestic Relations Law § 240(1-b)(h) requires that, in order to be valid, a stipulation must recite that the parties have been made aware of the CSSA, and that the basic child support obligation provided for therein would presumptively result in the correct amount. Where the stipulation deviates from the basic child support obligation, it must specify what the presumptive amount would have been and the reason for the deviation” … .

Here … the provisions in the parties’ separation agreement relating to the child support obligations with respect to one child did not contain the specific recitals mandated by the CSSA, and the record does not demonstrate that the plaintiff’s agreement to said provisions was made knowingly. … [T]he provisions are not enforceable … . Sayles v Sayles, 2023 NY Slip Op 04968, Second Dept 9-4-23

Practice Point: Parties to a separation agreement can “opt out” of the level of child support required by the Child Support Standards Act (CSAA). But if the agreement doesn’t include recitals which make it clear the parties knowingly opted out, the agreement is not enforceable.

 

You might also like
LAW OFFICE FAILURE REJECTED AS AN EXCUSE FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY ENTER A DEFAULT JUDGMENT, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).
NAMING THE PRESIDENT OF AN UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION AS A DEFENDANT PROPERLY JOINED THE ASSOCIATION.
WRITTEN NOTICE AS A PREREQUISITE FOR CITY LIABILITY APPLIES EVEN TO TRANSITORY CONDITIONS, HERE ICE ON THE SIDEWALK, SLIP AND FALL ACTION AGAINST CITY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.
Relationships Among Subtenancy, Prime Tenancy and Landlord Explained
THE POLICE OFFICERS DID NOT HAVE AN OBJECTIVE, CREDIBLE REASON TO APPROACH DEFENDANT AND REQUEST INFORMATION; THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE STROKE DIAGNOSIS WAS TIMELY AND WHETHER THE FAILURE TO MAKE A TIMELY DIAGNOSIS DECREASED THE CHANCES OF A BETTER OUTCOME (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT DID NOT SHOW A LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF’S TWICE FILING FOR BANKRUPTCY TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR OVER FOUR YEARS, FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS THEREFORE TIMELY (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

DEFENDANT HAD THE RIGHT TO ASSIGNED COUNSEL IN THIS CIVIL CONTEMPT PROCEEDING... IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION, PLAINTIFF WAS ADMITTED WITH COVID, WAS TREATED...