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THE PARTIES’ SEPARATION AGREEMENT DID NOT MAKE IT CLEAR THE PARTIES KNOWINGLY OPTED OUT OF THE LEVEL OF CHILD SUPPORT REQUIRED BY THE CHILD SUPPORT STANDARDS ACT (CSSA); THEREFORE THE SUPPORT PROVISIONS IN THE AGREEMENT ARE NOT ENFORCEABLE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the separation agreement did not include the required language indication the parties agree to opt out of the level of child support required by the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA):

“Parties to a separation agreement are free to ‘opt out’ of the provisions of the CSSA so long as their decision is made knowingly” … . “To ensure that waivers of the statutory provisions of the CSSA are truly knowingly made, Domestic Relations Law § 240(1-b)(h) requires that, in order to be valid, a stipulation must recite that the parties have been made aware of the CSSA, and that the basic child support obligation provided for therein would presumptively result in the correct amount. Where the stipulation deviates from the basic child support obligation, it must specify what the presumptive amount would have been and the reason for the deviation” … .

Here … the provisions in the parties’ separation agreement relating to the child support obligations with respect to one child did not contain the specific recitals mandated by the CSSA, and the record does not demonstrate that the plaintiff’s agreement to said provisions was made knowingly. … [T]he provisions are not enforceable … . Sayles v Sayles, 2023 NY Slip Op 04968, Second Dept 9-4-23

Practice Point: Parties to a separation agreement can “opt out” of the level of child support required by the Child Support Standards Act (CSAA). But if the agreement doesn’t include recitals which make it clear the parties knowingly opted out, the agreement is not enforceable.

 

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