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You are here: Home1 / Criminal Law2 / THE ONE COUNT INDICTMENT WAS RENDERED DUPLICITOUS BY THE BILL OF PARTICULARS...
Criminal Law

THE ONE COUNT INDICTMENT WAS RENDERED DUPLICITOUS BY THE BILL OF PARTICULARS AND WAS DISMISSED AFTER TRIAL; THE APPELLATE COURT NOTED THAT EVEN IF THE EVIDENCE HAD BEEN NARROWED AT TRIAL, DISMISSAL WOULD STILL BE REQUIRED BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE PRETRIAL NOTICE OF THE CHARGES (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing the conviction and dismissing the indictment, determined the one count indictment was rendered duplicitous by the bill of particulars. The court noted that, even if the scope of the evidence had been narrowed at trial, reversal still would have been necessary because defendant did not have pretrial notice of the charges:

Because the sole count of the indictment charged only one offense, as required by CPL 200.30 (1) … , the indictment on its face was not duplicitous. It is well settled, however, that indictments charging one offense per count can be rendered duplicitous by, among other things, a bill of particulars alleging more than one offense per count … . Here, the bill of particulars alleged that defendant engaged in two separate and distinct acts of nonconsensual sexual intercourse with the victim. The second such act allegedly occurred more than three hours after the first act. Thus, while the indictment charged only one criminal act, the jury heard evidence at trial of two criminal acts, with no specification from the court or the prosecutor as to which act they were to consider when rendering a verdict.

Even if the trial evidence narrowed the scope of defendant’s allegedly illegal conduct, and here it did not, that “is irrelevant. Defendant was entitled to pretrial notice of the charges so that he would be able to adequately prepare a defense” … . People v Baek, 2022 NY Slip Op 04263, Fourth Dept 7-1-22

Practice Point: Here the one count indictment was rendered duplicitous by the bill of particulars which alleged two sexual acts. Even if the evidence had been narrowed at trial, reversal still would have been necessary because defendant did not have pretrial notice of the charges.

 

July 1, 2022
Tags: Fourth Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-07-01 11:21:182022-07-03 11:37:07THE ONE COUNT INDICTMENT WAS RENDERED DUPLICITOUS BY THE BILL OF PARTICULARS AND WAS DISMISSED AFTER TRIAL; THE APPELLATE COURT NOTED THAT EVEN IF THE EVIDENCE HAD BEEN NARROWED AT TRIAL, DISMISSAL WOULD STILL BE REQUIRED BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE PRETRIAL NOTICE OF THE CHARGES (FOURTH DEPT).
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