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JURY INSTRUCTION ALLOWED CONVICTION ON A THEORY NOT IN THE INDICTMENT, COUNT DISMISSED, SENTENCING JUDGE DID NOT CONSIDER MITIGATING FACTORS AND INDICATED DEFENDANT WAS SENTENCED HARSHLY BECAUSE HE WENT TO TRIAL, SENTENCE REDUCED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined that the harassment jury instruction was defective because it allowed the jury to convict on a theory that was not alleged in the indictment. The Fourth Department further found that the 18-year sentence for rape was unduly harsh and reduced the sentence to eight years. The Fourth Department noted that the sentencing court did not take certain mitigating factors into consideration and indicated defendant was sentenced harshly because he had decided to go to trial:

Here, the indictment charged defendant with harassment in the second degree on the ground that … he slapped the complainant with the intent to harass, annoy, or alarm her. Nevertheless, the court instructed the jury that it could find him guilty if he shoved her or subjected her to other forms of physical contact. The evidence at trial could have established either theory. Therefore, that part of the judgment convicting defendant of harassment in the second degree must be reversed … . …

… [T]he sentence imposed for rape in the first degree is unduly harsh and severe. The alleged incident occurred in the context of an intimate relationship that lasted several months between two otherwise consenting adults who were close in age. The complainant had the opportunity to report the incident to the police immediately after it happened but chose not to do so. In the recorded conversations between defendant and the complainant, which occurred two to three months after the incident, the complainant repeatedly expressed satisfaction with her relationship, and a willingness to use the criminal justice system to gain the upper hand in it. We note that defendant’s history of contacts with the criminal justice system is not extensive, and thus it does not weigh heavily against him.

The record does not indicate that the sentencing court considered any of the above substantial mitigating factors in imposing the sentence. To the contrary, the court expressed only that it wished to impose a sentence for rape in the first degree in excess of the offers made during the plea bargaining process. Indeed, the sentence of 18 years of incarceration is double that of the most recent plea offer. It is well established that a defendant may not be punished for exercising his constitutional right to a trial … . Although a sentence after trial usually will be harsher than a sentence accompanying a prior plea offer … , a defendant’s refusal to plead guilty does not absolve the court of its responsibility to consider appropriate sentencing factors … . People v Morales, 2018 NY Slip Op 02958, Fourth Dept 4-27-18

​CRIMINAL LAW (JURY INSTRUCTION ALLOWED CONVICTION ON A THEORY NOT IN THE INDICTMENT, COUNT DISMISSED, SENTENCING JUDGE DID NOT CONSIDER MITIGATING FACTORS AND INDICATED DEFENDANT WAS SENTENCED HARSHLY BECAUSE HE WENT TO TRIAL, SENTENCE REDUCED (FOURTH DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, JURY INSTRUCTION ALLOWED CONVICTION ON A THEORY NOT IN THE INDICTMENT, COUNT DISMISSED, SENTENCING JUDGE DID NOT CONSIDER MITIGATING FACTORS AND INDICATED DEFENDANT WAS SENTENCED HARSHLY BECAUSE HE WENT TO TRIAL, SENTENCE REDUCED (FOURTH DEPT))/SENTENCING (SENTENCING JUDGE DID NOT CONSIDER MITIGATING FACTORS AND INDICATED DEFENDANT WAS SENTENCED HARSHLY BECAUSE HE WENT TO TRIAL, SENTENCE REDUCED (FOURTH DEPT))/HARSH AND SEVERE (SENTENCING JUDGE DID NOT CONSIDER MITIGATING FACTORS AND INDICATED DEFENDANT WAS SENTENCED HARSHLY BECAUSE HE WENT TO TRIAL, SENTENCE REDUCED (FOURTH DEPT))

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