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ALTHOUGH A FORECLOSURE ACTION USUALLY ACCELERATES THE DEBT AND STARTS THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS CLOCK, HERE THE DEFENDANTS-BORROWERS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT THE 2009 FORECLOSURE ACTION SOUGHT THE ENTIRE AMOUNT DUE (THE 2009 COMPLAINT WAS NOT SUBMITTED); THEREFORE THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE INSTANT ACTION IS UNTIMELY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendants-borrowers in this foreclosure action did not demonstrate the debt was accelerated by the 2009 foreclosure action. Therefore the complaint in the instant action should not have been dismissed as untimely:

… [T]he defendants failed to demonstrate that the debt was validly accelerated by the commencement of the 2009 action. In support of their respective motions, the defendants submitted only the summons with notice from the 2009 action, which did contain a statement that BAC sought “payment of the full balance due,” and a printout of the WebCivil Supreme-Case Detail related to the instant action … . Since the defendants did not submit the complaint or the notice of pendency filed in the 2009 action, it cannot be determined whether those documents elected to accelerate the mortgage loan … . GSR Mtge. Loan Trust v Epstein, 2022 NY Slip Op 03232, Second Dept 5-18-22

Practice Point: To demonstrate that a prior foreclosure action accelerated the debt and thereby started the statute of limitations clock, proof that the prior action called for payment of the entire debt must be submitted. Here the defendants-borrowers did not submit the 2009 foreclosure complaint and therefore did not prove the debt was accelerated by the 2009 foreclosure action.

 

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