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DEFENDANTS WERE UNABLE TO COMPLETE DISCOVERY BECAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S ILLNESS AND THE COVID-19 SHUTDOWN; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO EXTEND THE TIME FOR FILING A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion to extend the time for making a summary judgment, for reasons related to COVID-19, should have been granted:

… [T]he defendants submitted evidence showing that after their prior motion was decided, the plaintiff did not attend scheduled independent medical examinations because of illness and that discovery was further delayed by the COVID-19 shutdown. As a result, the defendants established good cause for their failure to timely move for summary judgment … . Under these COVID-19-related circumstances, the Supreme Court improvidently denied those branches of the defendants’ motion which were for leave to renew those branches of their prior motion which were to vacate the note of issue and certificate of readiness and extend the time to move for summary judgment. Upon renewal, the court should have granted those branches of the defendants’ motion which were to vacate the note of issue and certificate of readiness and to extend the time to move for summary judgment. We therefore remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for the selection of a new date by which summary judgment motions shall be filed…. . Newfeld v Midwood Ambulance & Oxygen Serv., Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 02422, Second Dept 4-13-22

​Practice Point: The COVID-19 shutdown was a valid excuse for defendants’ inability to complete discovery. Defendants’ motion to extend the time to file a summary judgment motion should have been granted.

 

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