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SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED PETITION FOR CIVIL MANAGEMENT OF A SEX OFFENDER FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION.

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should not have dismissed a petition for civil management of a sex offender (Ezekial R) for failure to state a cause of action:

The Supreme Court, relying on Matter of State of New York v Donald DD. (24 NY3d 174), dismissed the State of New York’s petition for the civil management of Ezikiel R. on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. This was error. It is true that a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder does not, by itself, “distinguish the sex offender whose mental abnormality subjects him to civil commitment from the typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case” … . Here, however, the petition alleges a mental abnormality based on a composite diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy, and is supported by expert evidence containing an additional diagnosis of conduct disorder, a provisional diagnosis of sexual sadism disorder, and a determination that Ezikiel R.’s actions were suggestive of his potential for deviant sexual behavior and/or sexual preoccupation. Under these circumstances, the petition was facially valid and not subject to dismissal prior to a probable cause hearing … . Although the court at a probable cause hearing or the factfinder at trial may or may not be convinced by the expert evidence, the evidence was not so deficient as to warrant dismissal of the petition at this early juncture … . Matter of State of New York v Ezikiel R., 2017 NY Slip Op 01213, 2nd Dept 2-15-17

MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED PETITION FOR CIVIL MANAGEMENT OF A SEX OFFENDER FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION)/SEX OFFENDERS (MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED PETITION FOR CIVIL MANAGEMENT OF A SEX OFFENDER FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION)

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