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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE APPLIED, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact whether the statute of limitations in this medical malpractice action was tolled by the continuous treatment doctrine:

“Under the continuous treatment doctrine, the 2½ year period does not begin to run until the end of the course of treatment, when the course of treatment which includes the wrongful acts or omissions has run continuously and is related to the same original condition or complaint'” … . The doctrine “applies when further treatment is explicitly anticipated by both physician and patient,” which is generally “manifested in the form of a regularly scheduled appointment for the near future, agreed upon during that last visit, . . . for the purpose of administering ongoing corrective efforts for the same or a related condition” …  Further “[i]ncluded within the scope of continuous treatment’ is a timely return visit instigated by the patient to complain about and seek treatment for a matter related to the initial treatment” ,,, ,

In the present case, [defendant doctor] testified at his deposition that when he discussed treatment options with the plaintiff, he advised the plaintiff that a new treatment process was available outside the United States and that he was cautiously optimistic that, at some time in the foreseeable future, he could offer it to the plaintiff in New York. The plaintiff, who was aware that the treatment process was the subject of a study aimed at obtaining FDA approval, testified at his deposition that he was waiting for the new treatment process to become available. After being told, in November 2008, that his only options were to wait for the new treatment or seek treatment outside the country, the plaintiff returned to the defendants for treatment of the same condition on March 9, 2011, and, in fact, received treatment for the same condition from the defendants continuing until December 2012. Freely v Donnenfeld, 2017 NY Slip Op 03491, 2nd Dept 5-3-17

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE APPLIED, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE APPLIED, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS,  QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE APPLIED, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE APPLIED, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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