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THE ONE YEAR TIME-LIMIT IN CPLR 3404 FOR A MOTION TO RESTORE AN ACTION TO THE CALENDAR DID NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE WHERE THE ACTION WAS ADMINISTRATIVELY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined CPLR 3404, which requires a motion to restore an action to the calendar be made within one year, did not apply here where the action was administratively dismissed:

The plaintiffs commenced this action, inter alia, for a judgment declaring a certain deed null and void. In November 2017, the plaintiffs moved, among other things, to extend their time to file a note of issue. Subsequently, this action was administratively dismissed on December 26, 2017, for failure to file a note of issue, and the plaintiffs’ motion was “marked off” the calendar on January 10, 2018. On or about January 31, 2019, the plaintiffs moved, inter alia, to restore the action to the active calendar. In an order dated February 26, 2019, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’ motion on the ground that they had failed to move to restore the action within the one-year time limit of CPLR 3404. The plaintiffs appeal.

CPLR 3404 does not apply to this pre-note of issue action … . Since the action could not properly be marked off pursuant to CPLR 3404, the plaintiffs were “not required to move to restore within any specified time frame” … . Further, there was neither a 90-day demand pursuant to CPLR 3216 … , nor an order dismissing the action pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.27 … . Wynn v Wynn-Wright, 2022 NY Slip Op 00466, Second Dept 1-26-22

 

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