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SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT SIGNATURES ON THE NOTE AND DEFENDANTS’ DENIAL OF RECEIPT OF THE RPAPL 1304 NOTICE DID NOT RAISE QUESTIONS OF FACT; THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank’s motion for summary judgment in this foreclosure action should have been granted. Slightly different signatures on the note and defendants’ denial of receipt of the RPAPL 1304 notice did not raise questions of fact:

… [U]nder the circumstances of this case, the fact that the plaintiff submitted a copy of the consolidated note that contained slightly different signatures of the defendants than the copy appended to the CEMA [consolidation, extension, and modification agreement], did not provide a sufficient basis to deny the plaintiff’s motion … . The defendants do not dispute that they signed the consolidated notes, including the one under which the plaintiff wished to proceed, nor do they claim that there were any differences in the terms of the notes … . Furthermore, the defendants’ mere denial of receipt of the RPAPL 1304 notices was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact warranting denial of the motion … . Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy. v Theagene, 2022 NY Slip Op 00465, Second Dept 1-26-22

 

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