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ATTORNEY WHO HIRED AN ASSOCIATE WHO PREVIOUSLY WORKED AS A PARALEGAL AT THE FIRM REPRESENTING DEFENDANTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISQUALIFIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court determined the disqualification of plaintiffs’ counsel, D’Agostino, was required based on his hiring of an associate, Monteleon, who previously worked as a paralegal in the firm representing defendants. Even if Monteleon had not acquired client confidences, there existed the appearance of impropriety:

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The Supreme Court should have granted the defendants’ motions to disqualify D’Agostino as the plaintiffs’ counsel in the instant actions. A party seeking to disqualify an attorney or a law firm for an opposing party on the ground of conflict of interest has the burden of demonstrating (1) the existence of a prior attorney-client relationship between the moving party and opposing counsel, (2) that the matters involved in both representations are substantially related, and (3) that the interests of the present client and former client are materially adverse … . When the moving party is able to demonstrate each of these factors, an irrebuttable presumption of disqualification follows … . The defendants established that there is an irrebuttable presumption that Monteleon, who was a paralegal and subsequently D’Agostino’s associate, is subject to disqualification from representing the plaintiffs in these actions due to his prior employment.

Where one attorney is disqualified as a result of having acquired confidential client information in his former employment (see Rules of Professional Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0] rule 1.9), there is a rebuttable presumption that the entirety of the attorney’s current firm must be disqualified … . … There is a rebuttable presumption here that D’Agostino, who employed Monteleon as a paralegal and subsequently an associate in his solo practice, is disqualified from representing the plaintiffs. That presumption has not been rebutted by the plaintiffs, as they failed to disprove that Monteleon had the opportunity to acquire confidential information in his former employment.  …

Even assuming that the irrebuttable presumption in favor of disqualification did not attach to Monteleon, disqualification of D’Agostino nonetheless is warranted. … Any doubts as to the existence of a conflict of interest must be resolved in favor of disqualification … . Moray v UFS Indus., Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 08822, Second Dept 12-20-17

 

ATTORNEYS (CONFLICT OF INTEREST, ATTORNEY WHO HIRED AN ASSOCIATE WHO PREVIOUSLY WORKED AS A PARALEGAL AT THE FIRM REPRESENTING DEFENDANTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISQUALIFIED (SECOND DEPT))/CONFLICT OF INTEREST (ATTORNEY WHO HIRED AN ASSOCIATE WHO PREVIOUSLY WORKED AS A PARALEGAL AT THE FIRM REPRESENTING DEFENDANTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISQUALIFIED (SECOND DEPT))/IMPROPRIETY, APPEARANCE OF (ATTORNEY WHO HIRED AN ASSOCIATE WHO PREVIOUSLY WORKED AS A PARALEGAL AT THE FIRM REPRESENTING DEFENDANTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISQUALIFIED (SECOND DEPT))/DISQUALIFICATION (ATTORNEYS, CONFLICT OF INTEREST, ATTORNEY WHO HIRED AN ASSOCIATE WHO PREVIOUSLY WORKED AS A PARALEGAL AT THE FIRM REPRESENTING DEFENDANTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISQUALIFIED (SECOND DEPT))

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EVEN WHERE AN INJURED WORKER SETTLES WITH A THIRD-PARTY BEFORE THE WORKERS’... COURT HAS DISCRETION TO ACCEPT UNAUTHORIZED SURREPLIES (SECOND DEPT).