You are here: / / PEDESTRIAN STRUCK WHILE LAWFULLY IN CROSSWALK ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT,...

PEDESTRIAN STRUCK WHILE LAWFULLY IN CROSSWALK ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SUPREME COURT REVERSED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment in this pedestrian wrongful death case. Plaintiffs’ decedent was crossing the street with the walk signal when she was struck. There was no evidence of the pedestrian’s comparative negligence:

A pedestrian who has the right of way is entitled to anticipate that motorists will obey the traffic laws that require them to yield … . Here, the plaintiffs established, through admissible evidence, that [defendant driver]  failed to yield the right of way to the decedent, who was crossing the street within the crosswalk with the pedestrian “WALK” signal in her favor … . The plaintiffs’ prima facie showing was buttressed by [defendant driver’s] admission that he did not see the decedent and that he struck her … . As neither the plaintiffs’ submissions nor the defendants’ opposition papers revealed any triable issue of fact regarding the decedent’s comparative negligence … , the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability … . Huang v Franco, 2017 NY Slip Op 02629, 2nd Dept 4-5-17

NEGLIGENCE (PEDESTRIAN STRUCK WHILE LAWFULLY IN CROSSWALK ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SUPREME COURT REVERSED)/PEDESTRIANS (PEDESTRIAN STRUCK WHILE LAWFULLY IN CROSSWALK ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SUPREME COURT REVERSED)/CROSSWALKS  (PEDESTRIAN STRUCK WHILE LAWFULLY IN CROSSWALK ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SUPREME COURT REVERSED)

You might also like
ABSENCE OF A TRANSLATOR’S AFFIDAVIT CONTRIBUTED TO DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).
COURT ATTORNEY REFEREE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO DETERMINE A CONTESTED FAMILY OFFENSE PETITION OR CUSTODY AND VISITATION ISSUES (SECOND DEPT).
THE 2008 FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS DISMISSED BECAUSE THE BANK DID NOT HAVE STANDING; THEREFORE THE DEBT WAS NOT ACCELERATED IN 2008 AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR FORECLOSURE DID NOT START RUNNING; PLAINTIFF’S ACTION TO CANCEL AND DISCHARGE THE MORTGAGE PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
THE BANK IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE MAILING REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 OR THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1303 (SECOND DEPT).
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE DEFENDANT KNEW THE COMPLAINANT WAS A 14-YEAR-OLD RUNAWAY WHEN SHE STAYED AT HIS HOUSE; THE EVIDENCE OF KIDNAPPING WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT (SECOND DEPT).
GRANDMOTHER’S PETITION TO MODIFY THE VISITATION ARRANGEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; MOTHER’S VIOLATION OF THE ORDER ALLOWING VISITATION BY GRANDMOTHER CONSTITUTED A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES (SECOND DEPT). ​
AFTER PLAINTIFFS’ CAR WAS SERVICED, A TIRE (WHEEL?) FELL OFF, CAUSING AN ACCIDENT; THE PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE RES IPSA LOQUITUR THEORY OF LIABILITY (SECOND DEPT).
THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE COULD SUE FOR DECEDENT’S CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING BUT, BECAUSE THE WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION HAD NOT BEEN LISTED AS AN ASSET IN THE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING, THE ADMINISTRATOR DID NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO SUE ON BEHALF OF THE DISTRIUBUTEE FOR WRONGFUL DEATH (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW NO LONGER REQUIRES EXHAUSTION OF ENFORCEMENT REMEDIES... COMMON CARRIER DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO KEEP SIDEWALK CLEAR OF ICE AND SNOW BECAUSE...