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SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE ACCEPTED PLAINTIFF’S LAW-OFFICE-FAILURE EXCUSE FOR LATE SUBMISSION OF PAPERS OPPOSING DFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion to vacate a default judgment, based upon law office failure, should have been granted:

… [T]he defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. That motion was initially returnable on October 20, 2016, but the return date was adjourned to December 8, 2016, with opposition papers to be served by November 21, 2016. The plaintiff served opposition to the motion on or about November 28, 2016 … . In an order entered February 2, 2017, the Supreme Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. …

… [G]iven the totality of all relevant factors, including the delay of only approximately seven days from the due date for opposition papers to the time the plaintiff served opposition papers, the lack of any evidence of willfulness by the plaintiff, or prejudice to the defendant from the delay, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in not accepting the plaintiff’s excuse of law office failure … . … [T]he plaintiff demonstrated that he had a potentially meritorious opposition to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Stango v Byrnes, 2021 NY Slip Op 06877, Second Dept 12-8-21

 

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