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INFANT PLAINTIFF, H.M., WAS INJURED BY HOT WATER IN THE SHOWER; THE PROPERTY OWNER WHO REPLACED THE WATER HEATER MAY BE LIABLE; THE FOSTER-CARE SERVICE WHICH PLACED H.M. IN THE HOME, HOWEVER, COULD NOT HAVE FORESEEN THE INCIDENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact whether the property owner could be liable for injury to a child, H.M. caused by hot water in the shower. The defendant placement service (Leake) had placed H,M. in the foster care of defendant Butler who lived in a home owned by Alicea. Butler had turned on the shower and was picking up H.M.’s clothes when H.M. climbed into the tub. There was a question of fact whether the property owner, Alicea, was liable because of conflicting expert evidence about the danger posed by the temperature of the water. However, the incident was not foreseeable from the perspective of the placement agency (Leake). Therefore, Leake’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted:

… [T]here is an issue of fact as to whether [Alicea] created the dangerous hot water temperature when he replaced the home’s hot water heater prior to the accident. …

Leake demonstrated prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the negligent supervision claim against it because it established that it did not have “sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused injury,” and “[t]he scalding hot bath water was an intervening act or event that is divorced from and not the foreseeable risk associated with. . .defendant’s alleged negligence” … . The excessively hot water was not the foreseeable risk associated with Leake’s alleged negligence in placing more than five children in the home, and the momentary inattention of Butler was not an act that should have been foreseeable by Leake in the exercise of reasonable care … . H.M. v City of New York, 2021 NY Slip Op 03376, First Dept 5-27-21

 

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