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DRIVER AND CAR OWNER WERE NOT EMPLOYEES OF CAR SERVICE, CAR SERVICE THEREFORE NOT LIABLE FOR ACCIDENT UNDER DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants Tuapanta and Hanif (driver and owner of the car involved in an accident) were not employees of defendant car service, Church Ave. Therefore the car service was not liable to plaintiff passenger:

Here, Church Ave established, prima facie, that Tuapanta and Hanif were independent contractors, not its employees. The evidence submitted by Church Ave showed that it is a licensed livery base station in the business of dispatching for-hire vehicles. Specifically, Church Ave receives calls from customers seeking transportation services and then dispatches such calls to drivers of vehicles affiliated with it. Church Ave further demonstrated that it does not own the vehicles to which it dispatches calls and that it does not provide any services to drivers other than transmitting a customer’s request for transportation services. Drivers are responsible for their own schedules, choosing when to turn on their two-way radios and deciding which dispatches to accept. Drivers are free to provide their services to other car services and they retain all of the monies paid by the customers. Drivers pay Church Ave $100 per week to use the service. Church Ave does not provide a salary to the drivers, nor does it provide them with any tax forms. Drivers are also responsible for maintaining their own insurance. There were no written agreements or meetings between the drivers and Church Ave, nor did Church Ave provide any manuals, policies, or procedures for the drivers outside of establishing prices. Under these circumstances, Church Ave established, prima facie, that it did not exercise sufficient control to give rise to liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior … . Castro-Quesada v Tuapanta, 2017 NY Slip Op 02014, 2nd Dept 3-22-17

EMPLOYMENT LAW (DRIVER AND CAR OWNER WERE NOT EMPLOYEES OF CAR SERVICE, CAR SERVICE THEREFORE NOT LIABLE FOR ACCIDENT UNDER DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR)/RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR (DRIVER AND CAR OWNER WERE NOT EMPLOYEES OF CAR SERVICE, CAR SERVICE THEREFORE NOT LIABLE FOR ACCIDENT UNDER DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR)/INDEPENCENT CONTRACTOR (DRIVER AND CAR OWNER WERE NOT EMPLOYEES OF CAR SERVICE, CAR SERVICE THEREFORE NOT LIABLE FOR ACCIDENT UNDER DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR)/NEGLIGENCE (RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR, DRIVER AND CAR OWNER WERE NOT EMPLOYEES OF CAR SERVICE, CAR SERVICE THEREFORE NOT LIABLE FOR ACCIDENT UNDER DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR)

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DRIVER AND CAR OWNER WERE NOT EMPLOYEES OF CAR SERVICE, CAR SERVICE THEREFORE... QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER OBJECT THAT FELL WAS THE TYPE OF OBJECT WHICH SHOULD...