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FOUR-MONTH ARTICLE 78 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS STARTS WHEN THE PETITIONER’S ATTORNEY IS NOTIFIED OF THE CHALLENGED DETERMINATION, NOT WHEN PETITIONER IS NOTIFIED.

The Second Department determined the four-month statute of limitations for bringing an Article 78 action starts when petitioner’s attorney is notified of the challenged determination, not when the petitioner is notified:

Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, the four-month statute of limitations did not begin to run when the petitioner was personally served with a copy of the respondents’ letter notifying him that his employment had been terminated. At that time, the respondents were on notice that the petitioner had retained counsel to represent him in connection with the disciplinary charges. ” [B]asic procedural dictates and . . . fundamental policy considerations . . . require that once counsel has appeared in a matter a Statute of Limitations or time requirement cannot begin to run unless that counsel is served with the determination or the order or judgment sought to be reviewed'” … . Under the circumstances of this case, the respondents were required to serve a copy of the letter on the petitioner’s counsel in order for the statute of limitations to commence running … . Matter of Munroe v Ponte, 2017 NY Slip Op 02041, 2nd Dept 3-22-17

CIVIL PROCEDURE (FOUR-MONTH ARTICLE 78 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS STARTS WHEN THE PETITIONER’S ATTORNEY IS NOTIFIED OF THE CHALLENGED DETERMINATION, NOT WHEN PETITIONER IS NOTIFIED)/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (ARTICLE 78, FOUR-MONTH ARTICLE 78 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS STARTS WHEN THE PETITIONER’S ATTORNEY IS NOTIFIED OF THE CHALLENGED DETERMINATION, NOT WHEN PETITIONER IS NOTIFIED)/ARTICLE 78 (FOUR-MONTH ARTICLE 78 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS STARTS WHEN THE PETITIONER’S ATTORNEY IS NOTIFIED OF THE CHALLENGED DETERMINATION, NOT WHEN PETITIONER IS NOTIFIED)

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