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THE COURT LACKED AUTHORITY TO DEEM A NOTICE OF CLAIM TIMELY FILED MORE THAN ONE YEAR AND 90 DAYS AFTER THE CAUSE OF ACTION (SLIP AND FALL) ACCRUED, EVEN THOUGH THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT WAS SERVED WITHIN THAT TIME PERIOD; A NOTICE OF CLAIM FILED MORE THAN 90 DAYS AFTER THE CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUES WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT IS A NULLITY (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the notice of claim served more than 90 after the slip and fall without leave of court was a nullity. The court further determined that the request for an order deeming the notice of claim timely served made more than one year and 90 days after the slip and fall could not be authorized by the court, even where the summons and complaint was served within that time period:

It is well settled that an “application for the extension [of time within which to serve a notice of claim] may be made before or after the commencement of the action but not more than one year and 90 days after the cause of action accrued, unless the statute has been tolled” .. . Where that time expires before the application for an extension is made, “the court lack[s] the power to authorize late filing of the notice [of claim]” … .

Here, we conclude that “[p]laintiff’s service of the summons and complaint within the limitations period does not excuse the failure to serve a notice of claim within that period,” and we further conclude that “plaintiff’s earlier service of a notice of claim is a nullity inasmuch as the notice of claim was served more than 90 days after the accident but before leave to serve a late notice of claim was granted” … . Thus, because plaintiff’s cross motion seeking an order deeming her notice of claim to be timely filed “was made after the expiration of the maximum period permitted” for seeking such relief, i.e., one year and 90 days, Supreme Court should have denied plaintiff’s cross motion, granted defendant’s motion, and dismissed the complaint … . Bennett v City of Buffalo Parks & Recreation, 2021 NY Slip Op 01920, Fourth Dept 3-26-21

 

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