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LABOR LAW 200 AND COMMON-LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the Labor Law 200 and common-law negligence causes of action should not have been dismissed:

This Labor Law and common-law negligence action arises from injuries sustained by Michael W. Parkhurst (decedent) when he slipped and fell on plastic sheeting covering newly-laid carpet after descending a ladder while performing drywall finishing work. …

Where, as here, “the worker's injuries result from a dangerous condition at the work site rather than from the manner in which the work is performed, the general contractor or owner may be liable in common-law negligence and under Labor Law § 200 if it has control over the work site and [has created or has] actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition” … . “Thus, [d]efendants, as the parties seeking summary judgment dismissing those claims, were required to establish as a matter of law that they did not exercise any supervisory control over the general condition of the premises or that they neither created nor had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition on the premises” … , and defendants failed to meet that burden here. Parkhurst v Syracuse Regional Airport Auth., 2018 NY Slip Op 06670, Fourth Dept 10-5-18

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (LABOR LAW 200 AND COMMON-LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, LABOR LAW 200 AND COMMON-LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT))

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