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THE BANK PRESENTED INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank did not submit admissible evidence of standing to bring the foreclosure action:

While a witness may always testify as to matters within his or her personal knowledge through personal observation … , here, Klein [plaintiff’s counsel] did not provide any factual details concerning when Cohn & Roth [Klein’s lawfirm] came into physical possession of the consolidated note and allonges … . Modlin’s [an authorized signatory’s] affidavit was similarly deficient inasmuch as she failed to identify the documents reviewed or any basis for the conclusion that the consolidated note and allonges had been in the plaintiff’s possession and were sent to Cohn & Roth prior to the commencement of the action. Under these circumstances, the statements made by Klein and Modlin constituted inadmissible hearsay and lacked probative value … . U.S. Bank Trust N.A. v Auxila, 2020 NY Slip Op 07945, Second Dept 12-23-20

 

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