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SURROGATE’S COURT SHOULD HAVE CARRIED OUT WHAT DECEDENT CLEARLY INTENDED, DESPITE THE DEFECT IN THE MEANS CHOSEN TO EFFECT HIS INTENT.

The Second Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, determined the intent of the decedent was clear from the will and trust documents and should be carried out. The will and trust documents indicated decedent wished the sole asset of his estate, an IRA, be distributed 1/3 to his wife and 2/3 to his daughter. Decedent intended that a living trust he had set up receive the IRA, which all parties agreed was not possible:

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The wife … contends that pursuant to the terms of the Will, no Testamentary Trust was created into which the IRA proceeds could be transferred, because the Living Trust was neither terminated nor ineffective at the time of the decedent’s death. Such a constrained reading of the Will illustrates “the aptness of Judge Learned Hand’s wise and trenchant observation that courts should be wary of making a fortress out of the dictionary,’ since there is no more likely way to misapprehend the meaning of language . . . than to read the words literally, forgetting the object which the document as a whole’ seeks to achieve” … .

The drafter of the Will testified at his deposition that the decedent not only specifically intended to place the IRA proceeds into the Living Trust, but that the IRA was, in fact, “[t]he only asset” intended to fund the Living Trust. It is undisputed, however, that the Living Trust could not receive the IRA. Under the circumstances, it is evident that the Living Trust was ineffective in carrying out the very purpose for which it was created. Therefore, under the alternative disposition and residuary provisions of article SECOND of the Will, the Testamentary Trust became available to receive the IRA proceeds (see EPTL 13-3.3[a][2]), and it follows that the decedent’s beneficiary designation with respect to the IRA can, and must, be enforced as written, and the order appealed from must be reversed. Matter of Perlman, 2017 NY Slip Op 03957, 2nd Dept 5-17-17

 

TRUSTS AND ESTATES (SURROGATE’S COURT SHOULD HAVE CARRIED OUT WHAT DECEDENT CLEARLY INTENDED, DESPITE THE DEFECT IN THE MEANS CHOSEN TO EFFECT HIS INTENT)

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