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Quantity and Nature of Child Pornography Warranted an Upward Departure in a SORA Proceeding

The Second Department determined the quantity and nature of the child pornography in defendant’s possession warranted an upward departure in a SORA proceeding:

…[I]n light of the large quantity of child pornography recovered from the defendant’s possession and the nature of that material, which included, among other things, images and videos depicting the torture of children, the County Court properly determined that there were aggravating factors not adequately taken into account by the SORA guidelines … . Upon making such a determination, the court providently exercised its discretion in granting the People’s application for an upward departure from the presumptive sex offender risk level … . People v Rotunno, 2014 NY Slip Op 03817, 2nd Dept 5-28-14

 

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