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CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON THIRD DEGREE IS NOT AN ARMED FELONY; MATTER REMITTED FOR A NEW YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS DETERMINATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant was eligible for youthful offender status because criminal possession of a weapon third degree is not an armed felony:

The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s application for youthful offender status based upon its mistaken belief that he had been convicted of an armed felony, which required the court to find either mitigating circumstances that bear directly upon the manner in which the crime was committed or that the defendant was only a minor participant in the crime (see CPL 720.10[3]). The People correctly concede that the court erred in finding that the defendant had been convicted of an armed felony, since criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree pursuant to Penal Law 265.02(7) does not require proof that the firearm was loaded (see CPL 1.20[41] …). Thus, the defendant was eligible for youthful offender treatment without any finding of mitigation (see CPL 720.10[2]). Accordingly, we remit the matter … for a new determination of the defendant’s application for youthful offender status and resentencing thereafter. People v Javon L., 2020 NY Slip Op 07094, Second Dept 11-25-20

 

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