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THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE DID NOT ESTABLISH A DEFENSE AS A MATTER OF LAW (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion to dismiss the breach of contract cause of action should not have been granted:

… [T]he plaintiff stated a cause of action, in effect, to recover damages for breach of contract based on an alleged breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in the parties’ contract . The plaintiff alleged, in effect, that there was an implied understanding that the defendant would cooperate with the plaintiff’s efforts to legally change the usage of the rental space, which would require approval by the DOB, and, therefore, the defendant’s…  failure to cooperate in legalizing the premises constitutes a breach of contract.

“A party seeking dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) on the ground that its defense is based on documentary evidence must submit documentary evidence that resolves all factual issues as a matter of law and conclusively disposes of the plaintiff’s claim” … . “In order for evidence to qualify as documentary, it must be unambiguous, authentic, and undeniable” … . Here, the evidence submitted by the defendant either was not “documentary” within the meaning of CPLR 3211(a)(1) or failed to conclusively establish a defense to the third cause of action as a matter of law … . Twinkle Play Corp. v Alimar Props., Ltd., 2020 NY Slip Op 04987, Second Dept 9-16-20

 

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