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A STAIRWAY MAY CONSTITUTE A “SAFETY DEVICE” WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240(1) AND A STAIRWAY NEED NOT BE DEFECTIVE TO TRIGGER LABOR LAW 240(1) LIABILITY; HERE IT WAS ALLEGED THE STAIRWAY WAS INADEQUATELY ILLUMINATED AND WAS OBSTRUCTED BY A CABLE WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO TRIP AND FALL (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, affirming the denial of defendant’s (RBS’s) motion for summary judgment, over a two justice dissent, determined that a stairway need not be defective to fall under the coverage of Labor Law 240(1). Here plaintiff alleged the stairway was inadequately illuminated and was obstructed with a cable which caused plaintiff to trip and fall. The stairway can constitute a safety device within the meaning of Labor Law 240(1) and the majority concluded the stairway itself need not be defective to trigger Labor Law 240(1) liability:

Questions of fact exist as to whether the staircase constituted a Labor Law § 240(1) safety device … .

… [In] “the First Department, falls from permanent appurtenances which function as the only means of access are . . . entitled to Labor Law § 240(1) protection,” including “stairways . . . utilized . . . in the performance of the plaintiff’s work.” Consistent with this, RBS cites no controlling caselaw holding that Labor Law § 240(1) does not apply to injuries incurred on stairways that are not structurally defective….  … T]he dissent makes an argument … that Labor Law § 240(1) claims can only be made as to injuries incurred on stairways that are structurally defective. The dissent cites three cases to support its claim that Labor Law § 240(1) claims involving stairways have been sustained only when the stairways involved were structurally defective. However, none of these cases sustained a Labor Law § 240(1) claim; rather, they affirmed denials of summary judgment, and in any event, did not turn on the structural soundness of the staircases at issue … . It is improper for us to decide an issue that appellant did not raise and that respondent was not given an opportunity to address … . Mazzurco v Broadway 52nd L.P., 2026 NY Slip Op 04822, First Dept 7-30-26

Practice Point: In the First Department, a stairway may constitute a safety device within the meaning of Labor Law 240(1) and the stairway itself need not be defective to trigger Labor Law 230(1) liability.

Practice Point: An appeal should not be decided on a ground not raised by the appellant.

 

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