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DEFENDANT SPECIFICALLY CHALLENGED THE ACCURACY OF THE DMV DATABASE WHICH PURPORTEDLY INDICATED DEFENDANT’S DRIVER’S LICENSE HAD BEEN SUSPENDED (THE BASIS FOR THE TRAFFIC STOP): THE PEOPLE THEREFORE WERE REQUIRED TO DEMONSTRATE THE RELIABILITY OF THE DMV DATABASE TO DEMONSTRATE PROBABLE CAUSE; BY FAILING TO INTRODUCE ANY EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE, THE PEOPLE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE LEGALITY OF THE STOP (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing the judgment of conviction, suppressing the physical evidence and dismissing the indictment, over a two-justice dissent, determined the People did not demonstrate that the traffic stop was justified because the People offered no proof defendant’s license had been suspended at the time of the stop. An officer testified, just prior to stopping the defendant, he checked the DMV database on his in-vehicle computer where the suspension of defendant’s license was indicated. But no evidence establishing the license suspension or the accuracy of the DMV database was introduced:

Defendant contends that the People were required to establish, at the suppression hearing, that defendant’s license had been suspended, because defendant challenged the reliability of the DMV information, and that the court therefore erred in refusing to suppress physical evidence. We agree.

“It is well settled that, although ‘a defendant who challenges the legality of a search and seizure has the burden of proving illegality, the People are nevertheless put to the burden of going forward to show the legality of the police conduct in the first instance’ ” … . As relevant here, a vehicle stop is permissible when based on probable cause that the driver has committed a traffic violation … .

Under the “fellow officer rule” …. , “[a] police officer is entitled to act on the strength of a radio bulletin or a telephone or teletype alert from a fellow officer or department and to assume its reliability” … , and the same rule applies to the DMV database accessible on an in-vehicle computer … . “[T]he probabilities are that such detailed information of the type in these communications does not find its way onto the police air waves [or mobile data terminal] without substantial basis” … .

“But where on a motion to suppress, a challenge to the [officer’s] action is made, the presumption of probable cause that originally cloaked that action disappears from the case” … .  If a defendant raises a “specific challenge” to the reliability of certain transmitted information, that information may not be relied upon by the suppression court … . “[B]are reliance on an unsubstantiated hearsay communication from the instigating officer or department will not suffice for probable cause” … . “[T]he People must demonstrate that the sender or sending agency itself possessed the requisite probable cause to act” … . “The pertinent inquiry in all situations has been directed to the nature and reliability of the information possessed by the person or agency transmitting the information” … . People v McGuire, 2026 NY Slip Op 04597, Fourth Dept 7-24-26

Practice Point: When the accuracy of information transmitted to the arresting officer is specifically challenged, the People must prove the reliability of the information. Here the accuracy of the DMV database (showing that defendant’s license had been suspended) was specifically challenged. Because the People did not attempt to prove the information in the DMV database was reliable, they did not demonstrate probable cause for the traffic stop.

 

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