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ALLOWING DEFENDANT AND CODEFENDANT TO EXERCISE THEIR SHARED PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES TO PROSPECTIVE JURORS UNILATERALLY WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the trial judge should not have allowed the defendant and the codefendant to exercise their shared peremptory challenges to jurors unilaterally:

… County Court erred in permitting the codefendant to unilaterally exercise peremptory challenges. … The court’s process of allowing defendant and codefendant to each unilaterally exercise their shared peremptory challenges was in violation of CPL 270.25 former (3) and resulted in defendant and codefendant exhausting their shared peremptory challenges before all jurors were selected … . A court’s mistaken denial of a defendant’s peremptory challenge “under New York law mandates automatic reversal” … . People v Jones, 2026 NY Slip Op 01874, Fourth Dept 3-26-26

Practice Point: The court should not have allowed defendant and codefendant to exercise their shared peremptory challenges unilaterally.​

 

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