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PENAL LAW 220.39(1) AND 220.16(1) DO NOT REQUIRE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SPECIFIC DRUG INVOLVED; ONLY KNOWLEDGE THAT THE SUBSTANCE IS A “NARCOTIC DRUG” IS REQUIRED; THEREFORE PENAL LAW 220.16(1) AND 21 USC 841(1)(A) ARE “STRICTLY EQUIVALENT” OFFENSES FOR PURPOSES OF A SECOND FELONY OFFENDER ADJUDICATION (FIRST DEPT)

The First Department, overruling precedent, determined that the knowledge element of Penal Law 220.16(1) (criminal possession of a controlled substance) requires only that a defendant know that the substance is a “narcotic drug” and does not require knowledge that the substance is a specific drug. Therefore Penal Law 220.16(1) is equivalent to 21 USC 841(1)(a) and defendant can be sentenced as a second felony offender based on the prior federal conviction:

… Penal Law § 220.39(1) … [states that] a person is guilty of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree “when he knowingly and unlawfully sells . . . a narcotic drug.” We now hold that the “nature” of the substance possessed under Penal Law § 220.39(1), and under Penal Law § 220.16(1), the statute at issue in the instance case, is, in accordance with the statutory language, “a narcotic drug.” Knowledge of the particular drug possessed is not required. This definition also aligns the knowledge requirement with other decisions of this Court. For example, in People v Martin (153 AD2d 807, 808 [1st Dept 1989], lv denied 74 NY2d 950 [1989]), we held, in a different context, that “Penal Law § 220.16(1) does not distinguish between the types of narcotics possessed, but treats all drugs classified as narcotics interchangeably.”

Under the correct definition of the nature of the substance possessed, defendant’s federal conviction and Penal Law § 220.16(1) are strictly equivalent. People v Jones, 2026 NY Slip Op 01857, First Dept 3-26-26

Practice Point: Here the First Department overruled precedent which held that the knowledge element of drug-possession charges required knowledge of the specific drug involved. Because the knowledge element requires only that a defendant know the possessed substance is a “narcotic drug,” Penal Law 220.16(1) is strictly equivalent to the federal statute 21 USC 841(1)(a) for purposes of a second felony offender adjudication.

 

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