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PLAINTIFF TRIPPED AND FELL OUTSIDE, NOT IN A “PASSAGEWAY” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE; THE LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the Labor Law 241(6) cause of action should have been dismissed because plaintiff tripped and fell outside and not in a “passageway” within the meaning of Industrial Code 23-1.7(e)(1):

… [T]he Labor Law § 241(6) claim insofar as it was predicated on Industrial Code § 23-1.7(e)(1), as the accident occurred outdoors and therefore did not take place in a “passageway” within the meaning of the Industrial Code provision (see Quigley v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 168 AD3d 65, 67-68 [1st Dept 2018] [holding that a “passageway” under § 23-1.7(e)(1) pertains to “an interior or internal way of passage inside a building”]). Lacruise v Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr., 2026 NY Slip Op 00424, First Dept 1-29-26

Practice Point: The quotation from Quigley aside, the Industrial Code does not define “passageway” and courts have left the applicability of Industrial Code Section 23-1.7(e)(1) for the trier of fact. See, for example, Ordonez v USM Asset Trust Series -7, 2026 NY Slip Op 04912, First Dept 8-6-26 (exterior stairs leading to a curbside dumpster).

 

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