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SUPREME COURT, IN THE CONTEXT OF A MOTION TO DISMISS, SHOULD NOT HAVE DETERMINED AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT “AFFILIATES” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE LANGUAGE OF A RELEASE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined Supreme Courts should have simply denied the motion to dismiss instead of deciding what parties were included in the term “affiliates” in the release at issue:

Supreme Court erred in finding, as a matter of law, that the word “affiliates” in the release entered into between plaintiffs and Siddiqui could not be read to include defendants Cernich and Huan Tseng … . The word “affiliates” may apply to individuals, and is “not commonly understood to apply only to entities” … . Furthermore, the arbitrator’s conclusion, in an earlier arbitration against different parties, that the release did not apply to nonparty Ming Dang does not serve as a conclusive basis for finding that the release did not apply to defendants. Accordingly, the scope of the release language with respect to Cernich and Tseng was ambiguous, and Supreme Court should have simply denied the motion to dismiss without determining the meaning of the release language as a matter of law. Apollo Mgt., Inc. v Cernich, 2022 NY Slip Op 00964, First Dept 2-15-22​

 

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