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IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO ORDER AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IN THIS TOXIC TORT CASE; NO FRYE HEARING WAS NECESSARY BECAUSE THE EXPERTS DID NOT USE NOVEL OR EXPERIMENTAL METHODS; NO PARKER HEARING WAS NECESSARY BECAUSE GENERAL AND SPECIFIC CAUSATION WERE ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED IN THE EXPERTS’ SUBMISSIONS AND GENERALLY ACCEPTED METHODS WERE USED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Ceresa, determined there was no need for a Frye hearing in this toxic tort case because none of the three experts used methods that were novel or experimental. In addition, there was no need for a Parker hearing because the expert’s used generally accepted methods to determine general and specific causation. Therefore ordering the evidentiary hearing was an abuse of discretion:

“The singular purpose of a Frye hearing is to ascertain the reliability of novel scientific evidence by determining whether the methods used to generate such evidence will, when properly performed, produce results accepted as reliable within the scientific community generally” … . ” ‘A court need not hold a Frye hearing where it can rely upon previous rulings in other court proceedings as an aid in determining the admissibility of the proffered testimony’ ” … . “Absent a novel or experimental scientific theory, a Frye hearing is generally unwarranted” … . * * *

… [U]nder Parker, ” ‘[t]he focus moves from the general reliability concerns of Frye to the specific reliability of the procedures followed to generate the evidence proffered and whether they establish a foundation for the reception of the evidence at trial.’ . . . [In toxic tort cases,] [i]t is well-established that an opinion on causation should set forth a plaintiff’s exposure to a toxin, that the toxin is capable of causing the particular illness (general causation) and that plaintiff was exposed to sufficient levels of the toxin to cause the illness (specific causation)” (Parker v Mobil Oil Corp., 7 NY3d at 447-448 …). … [A] s plaintiffs’ [experts’] written submissions … offered the requisite causal links, there was no need for a hearing to determine whether these foundational standards were met. Marpe v Tonoga, Inc., 2025 NY Slip Op 07053, Third Dept 12-18-25

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for insight into when a Frye/Parker hearing is necessary to determine the admissibility of expert evidence in a toxic tort case. The evidentiary hearing had been ordered by the trial judge, but the Third Department held ordering the hearing was an abuse of discretion.

 

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