PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS HIRED BY DEFENDANT TEMPLE AS A “FULL TIME JEWISH EDUCATOR,” WAS FIRED AFTER WRITING A BLOG POST CRITICIZING ISRAEL AND ZIONISM; PLAINTIFF SUED ALLEGING HER FIRING WAS A VIOLATION OF THE LABOR LAW; THE COURT DID NOT ADDRESS THE LABOR-LAW-VIOLATION THEORY FINDING THAT THE “MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION” PRECLUDED THE APPLICATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION AND ITS MINISTERS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, over two concurrences, determined the ministerial exception precluded this employment discrimination action brought by plaintiff, a “full time Jewish educator” employed by the Westchester Reform Temple. Plaintiff was fired after writing a blog post criticizing Israel and Zionism. She alleged her firing was a violation of Labor Law 201-d (2) which prohibits an employer from taking adverse action against an employee based on legal “recreational activities.” The court did not address the viability of the Labor-Law theory. The court held that plaintiff’s lawsuit was precluded by the ministerial exception, which precludes application of employment discrimination laws to relationships between a religious institution and its ministers:

We need not resolve today questions such as whether the [Labor Law 201-d (2)] covers blogging specifically or public expression generated during any protected activity, because the ministerial exception dispositively bars Plaintiff’s claim. That exception “precludes application of [employment discrimination] legislation to claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers” … . Requiring a religious institution “to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing [them] for failing to do so” both “infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments” and “violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions” … . * * *

Defendants invoked the ministerial exception here as grounds for dismissal on a CPLR 3211 (a) (1) motion. Such a motion “may be appropriately granted only where the documentary evidence utterly refutes plaintiff’s factual allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law” … . Defendants rely on Plaintiff’s offer letter, which is appended as an exhibit to the motion to dismiss. It states that Plaintiff was responsible for guiding the development of programs such as “Shabbat, Havdalah, and other teen led events and initiatives”; planning, supporting, and attending “Confirmation” experiences; and supporting the “Rabbi’s Table initiative.” In her fifteen weekly hours of teaching, she was responsible for “Chevruta (1:1 tutoring for our learners),” “Pre-bimah tutoring,” and “Parsha of the week.” And she was responsible for furthering the Temple’s “mission,” including by “support[ing] the development of a strong Jewish identity” and “bringing Torah to life and inspiring Jewish dreams.” Sander v Westchester Reform Temple, 2025 NY Slip Op 06958, CtApp 12-16-25

Practice Point: The “ministerial exception” precludes the application of employment discrimination laws to the relationship between a religious institution and its ministers. Here the ministerial exception precluded a suit alleging plaintiff was fired from her teaching job at the defendant temple for a blog post criticizing Israel and Zionism.