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Breach of Duty to Defend Precludes Reliance on Policy Exclusions

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Smith, the Court of Appeals held that “when a liability insurer has breached its duty to defend its insured, the insurer may not later rely on policy exclusions to escape its duty to indemnify the insured for a judgment against him.”  The Court wrote:

…”[A]n insurance company that has disclaimed its duty to defend “may litigate only the validity of its disclaimer.” If the disclaimer is found bad, the insurance company must indemnify its insured for the resulting judgment, even if policy exclusions would otherwise have negated the duty to indemnify. This rule will give insurers an incentive to defend the cases they are bound by law to defend, and thus to give insureds the full benefit of their bargain. It would be unfair to insureds, and would promote unnecessary and wasteful litigation, if an insurer, having wrongfully abandoned its insured’s defense, could then require the insured to litigate the effect of policy exclusions on the duty to indemnify.  K2 Investment Group, LLC v American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Company, No 106, CtApp, 6-11-13

 

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