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VETERINARY CLINIC MAY BE LIABLE IN NEGLIGENCE FOR INJURY CAUSED BY A DOG IN THE CLINIC’S WAITING ROOM, BUT THE CLINIC’S LIABILITY SHOULD NOT TURN ON WHETHER THE CLINIC WAS AWARE OF THE DOG’S VICIOUS PROPENSITIES, THE STRICT LIABILITY STANDARD IMPOSED ON DOG-OWNERS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, over a two-judge concurrence, determined that the defendant veterinary clinic (Palmer) should not have been awarded summary judgment in this dog-bite case. As a veterinarian was returning a dog (Vanilla) which had just been treated to the dog’s owner in the waiting room the dog slipped out of its collar and allegedly attacked plaintiff. The question was whether the liability theory requiring knowledge of a dog’s vicious propensities applied to the clinic as it does to a dog-owner. The clinic had been awarded summary judgment on the ground it had demonstrated it was not aware of the dog’s vicious propensities. The Court of Appeals held the case against the clinic should be analyzed under a standard negligence theory, not under the strict liability theory applicable to dog-owners:

The vicious propensity notice rule has been applied to animal owners who are held to a strict liability standard, as well as to certain non-pet-owners—such as landlords who rent to pet owners—under a negligence standard … . However, we have recognized that other competing policies and contemporary social expectations may be at play in certain instances where domestic animals cause injuries. For example, we held that the owner of a farm animal “may be liable under ordinary tort-law principles” when that farm animal is allowed to stray from the property on which it is kept … . …

It is undisputed that Palmer owed a duty of care to plaintiff—a client in its waiting room. Palmer is a veterinary clinic, whose agents have specialized knowledge relating to animal behavior and the treatment of animals who may be ill, injured, in pain, or otherwise distressed. An animal in a veterinary office may experience various stressors—in addition to illness or pain—including the potential absence of its owner and exposure to unfamiliar people, animals, and surroundings. Moreover, veterinarians or other agents of a veterinary practice may—either unavoidably in the course of treatment, or otherwise—create circumstances that give rise to a substantial risk of aggressive behavior. …

… [W]e conclude that Palmer does not need the protection afforded by the vicious propensities notice requirement, and the absence of such notice here does not warrant dismissal of plaintiff’s claim. To be sure, “[w]e do not intend to suggest that [Palmer] would be subject to the same strict liability” as the owner of a domestic animal … . However, we are  satisfied that, under the circumstances presented here, a negligence claim may lie despite Palmer’s lack of notice of Vanilla’s vicious propensities. Furthermore, viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, as we must … , questions of fact exist as to whether the alleged injury to plaintiff was foreseeable, and whether Palmer took reasonable steps to discharge its duty of care. Thus, neither party was entitled to summary judgment. Hewitt v Palmer Veterinary Clinic, PC, 2020 NY Slip Op 05975, Ct App 10-20-20

 

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