You are here: / / THE PARTIES DID NOT AGREE THAT THE INITIAL ‘PARTIAL’ ARBITRATION...

THE PARTIES DID NOT AGREE THAT THE INITIAL ‘PARTIAL’ ARBITRATION AWARD WAS A FINAL AWARD; THEREFORE THE ARBITRATORS HAD THE AUTHORITY TO REVISIT THE MATTER AND ISSUE A VALID FINAL AWARD (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the arbitrators had the power to revisit a “partial final award” and issue a valid final award. The Appellate Division had held the doctrine of functus officio prohibited the arbitrators from revisiting the initial award:

… [T]he Appellate Division held, that the arbitration panel exceeded its authority because it violated the common law doctrine of functus officio … . Functus officio, Latin for “having performed [one’s] office” … , has operated historically as a restriction on the authority of arbitrators, precluding them from taking additional actions after issuing a final award. As this Court stated well over one hundred years ago, “[a]s soon as [the arbitrators] have made and delivered their award, they become functus officio, and their power is at an end. After having once fully exercised their judgment upon the facts submitted to them and reached a conclusion which they have incorporated into their award, they are not at liberty at another and subsequent time to exercise a fresh judgment on the case and alter their award” … . * * *

This Court has not had occasion to determine whether or under what circumstances parties may agree to the issuance of a final award that disposes of some, but not all, of the issues submitted to the arbitrators; nor must we resolve that question in this case. Even assuming that parties to an arbitration may agree to the issuance of a partial determination that constitutes a final award, the parties here, as the arbitration panel below concluded, did not reach any such agreement. American Intl. Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v Corporation, 2020 NY Slip Op 02529, Second Dept 4-30-20

 

You might also like
Motion for a Change of Venue Can Be Entertained in “Dangerous Sex Offender” Trials and Hearings Under the Mental Hygiene Law/Non-Final Order Which Necessarily Affects the Final Order Is Appealable
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFIED WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF A BACKPACK.
“Rubbing” Constitutes “Forcible Touching”
THE FORECLOSURE ABUSE PREVENTION ACT (FAPA) WAS PROPERLY APPLIED RETROACTIVELY IN THIS CASE; RETROACTIVE APPLICATION DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS OR CONTRACT CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (CT APP).
The Prevailing Wage Statute Applies To All Work Reasonably Interpreted to Be Covered by the Statute—The Fact that the Application of the Statute Is Unsettled At the Time the Public Works Contract Is Entered Does Not Allow the Employer to Escape Its Reach Once the Law Is Settled
DELEGATION CLAUSES, PLACING THE DETERMINATION OF ARBITRABILITY IN THE ARBITRATOR, NOT THE COURT, ENFORCEABLE UNDER FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT.
DEFENSE COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TWO CROSS-EXAMINE THE TWO POLICE OFFICERS WHO IDENTIFIED THE DEFENDANT AS THE SHOOTER ABOUT ALLEGATIONS OF THE OFFICERS’ DISHONESTY ARISING FROM OTHER COURT PROCEEDINGS (CT APP).
THE MAJORITY DID NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE NON-DEADLY-FORCE JUSTIFICATION-DEFENSE JURY INSTRUCTION COULD BE APPROPRIATE IN A SECOND DEGREE ASSAULT CASE, BUT HELD THAT GIVING THE DEADLY-FORCE JUSTIFICATION-DEFENSE INSTRUCTION WAS NOT ERROR HERE (CT APP).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

CPL 300.40 (3) (b), WHICH REQUIRES DISMISSAL OF INCLUSORY CONCURRENT COUNTS,... THE OMISSION OF THE TIME AND PLACE OF THE OFFENSE FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION...