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CPL 300.40 (3) (b), WHICH REQUIRES DISMISSAL OF INCLUSORY CONCURRENT COUNTS, APPLIES ONLY TO VERDICTS AFTER TRIAL, NOT TO GUILTY PLEAS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined that Criminal Procedure Law 300.40 (3) (b), which requires dismissal of inclusory concurrent counts, applies only to verdicts after trial and not to cases resolved by guilty plea. Defendant confessed to killing a mother and daughter and he was charged with two counts of first degree murder and two counts of second degree murder. He pled guilty to the two counts of second degree murder. On appeal defendant argued the second degree murder counts should have been dismissed as inclusory concurrent counts of first degree murder:

CPL 300.40 (3) (b) provides, with respect to inclusory concurrent counts, that “[a] verdict of guilty upon the greatest count submitted is deemed a dismissal of every lesser count submitted” … . Even assuming, without deciding, that counts 3 and 4 of the indictment indeed are inclusory concurrent counts of counts 1 and 2, defendant’s reliance upon both the statute and the cases applying it … is misplaced, as CPL article 300 “‘deals only with trials, and has no application to convictions obtained on a plea of guilty'” … . Having elected to plead guilty to the entire indictment, as was defendant’s right (see CPL 220.10 [2]), he cannot now avail himself of the provisions of CPL 300.40 (3) (b) … . People v Redden, 2020 NY Slip Op 02502, Third Dept 4-30-20

 

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